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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
The procurement of major weapons systems by the US Department of
Defense (DoD) involves a challenging contracting environment in which standard
pricing mechanisms, contract design, and solutions to incentive problems often
do not adequately accommodate all of its unique characteristics. As a result,
economists have frequently aspired to model these idiosyncratic features to
address concerns of efficiency and strategic manipulation, among others. My
intent with this collection of essays is to continue this endeavor. Specifically,
I will apply economic analysis to the US defense acquisition process in order
to enhance current understanding of the defense procurement environment, the
tools available to DoD officials in addressing unique procurement issues, and the
potential usefulness of these tools in other procurement scenarios. My analysis
includes the investigation of multiple policies and institutions within the DoD
contracting environment and focuses primarily on the DoD’s employment of an
incomplete contracting approach.
The next chapter examines the determinants of contractual completeness in
major weapons procurement. The focus of this chapter is the DoD acquisition
official’s selection of a contract type, given project and firm characteristics.
Additionally, the empirical research in this chapter aids in describing the role
of repeat interactions in the defense contracting environment. The third chapter
addresses the relevance of describability in determining cost outcomes for DoD
weapons contracts. Indescribable physical characteristics and unachieved states
of nature are at the heart of the hold up problem, yet economists debate the
optimality of an incomplete contract as a possible solution. Using contract
selection guidelines from the Federal Acquisition Regulation and performance
indicators from the DoD’s Earned Value Management process, I analyze the
impact of ex ante physical describability of the underlying project on subsequent
2
cost and schedule performance of its associated contract. My intent with this
chapter is to offer new empirical information pertinent to the debate regarding
the relevance of describability. Finally, the fourth chapter provides a theoretical
model of contract design in the presence of exogenous uncertainty regarding the
common procurement cost of an item. This chapter capitalizes on similarities
between DoD acquisition and post-disaster highway procurement to demonstrate
the possible gains of extending some of the DoD’s contract design tools to
additional government agencies.
3
Chapter 2
Uncovering The Determinants of Contractual
Completeness In The Acquisition of Major Weapons
Systems
4
Abstract
Major weapons acquisition comprises a significant portion of the immense
budget for National Defense in the United States. The role of the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) as both sole customer and regulatory supervisor of
the U.S. defense industry places it in a unique position, as it must simultaneously
promote innovation in defense technology and oversee production efficiency and
profit of defense firms. Given the current budgetary environment in the U.S., this
latter requirement is of primary importance. As a result of its aforementioned
singular role, acquisition officials for the DoD are able to select from a wide
range of contract structures in order to accommodate technological complexity,
uncertainty due to dynamic political and strategic environments, and the need
to continuously reward significant improvements in defense technology. This
paper attempts to determine whether uniform or common practices exist in
the application of the Federal Acquisition Regulation to the choice of contract
type. Specifically, I estimate the empirical significance of project and winning
firm characteristics in the acquisition official’s ultimate choice. The research
contained in this paper builds upon previous work in the defense contracting
literature by examining a larger sample of military programs, including contract
information from all three branches of the military (Army, Navy, and Air
Force) and by considering the effect of repeat interactions in the defense
acquisition environment. Additionally, the theoretical approach to ex ante
contract formalization costs and ex post contractor opportunism differs from prior
entries in the literature.
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2.1 Introduction
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) currently finds itself in a
challenging budgetary environment. Due to the completion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom and the pending drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the operational
requirements for the U.S. military have diminished, providing a window for
Congress to drastically reduce defense expenditure. To date, Congress has
ordered the Pentagon to reduce the defense budget by $450 billion over the next
decade, equivalent to a reduction in the base defense budget of approximately
eight percent per year (Shanker and Bumiller, 2011).
These cuts have necessitated a renewed focus on efficiency and frugality within
the DoD. For example, according to officials in the Performance Assessment
and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the defense contracting process must be thoroughly reviewed to ensure that its
contracts are being awarded efficiently and are incentivizing cost-minimizing
behavior by defense firms.1 Additionally, the DoD’s senior acquisition official,
Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall, clearly stated the organization’s
efficiency goals in an October 2011 memorandum:
The Department (DoD) cannot continue the practice of starting
programs that prove to be unaffordable. We will work with the
requirements and resources communities to ensure the programs we
start have firm cost goals in place, appropriate priorities set, and
the necessary trade-offs made to keep our programs within affordable
limits.2
Statistical analysis of prior and existing contracts is, of course, an obvious yet
necessary first step in ensuring that DoD acquisition policy is able to support Mr.
1From personal interview with the director of PARCA, 28 February 2012.
2Initial guidance from the Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics. 7 October 2011.
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Kendall’s affordability goals for its future contracts. In order to fully understand
the various factors that lead to adverse cost outcomes in weapons procurement, it
is important to account for the entire acquisition process, including idiosyncrasies
in the source selection and contract design phases. This paper will focus on
the latter step, specifically on the acquisition official’s choice of contractual
completeness for a given project.
Economic researchers have previously examined the contract type decision in
defense procurement. For instance, Crocker and Reynolds (1993) use contract
information from the procurement of F-15 fighter jet engines to examine the
question of optimal contract completeness.3 The authors theorize and verify that
both ex ante environmental complexity and potential for ex post opportunism
are significant determinants of contractual completeness.
My goal for this paper is to broaden the scope of Crocker and Reynolds
(1993). Using contract data for 18 DoD aircraft programs, this paper attempts
to determine the empirical significance of project and firm characteristics in
the choice of contract structure by U.S. acquisition officials. In contrast to
Crocker and Reynolds (1993), I hope to determine whether these relationships
are robust for multiple branches of the U.S. military and to a limited amount
of project heterogeneity. Furthermore, I consider the effect of repeat interaction
between the DoD and defense contractors on the contract type decision, extending
the work of Corts and Singh (2004) to the defense industry. Similar to their
finding that repeat interaction and contract power are substitutes in the offshore
drilling industry, my results indicate that previous experience and contractual
completeness are substitutes in the defense acquisition environment.
3Although the DoD defines procurement as a specific type of acquisition category, I follow
convention in the economic literature by using the word “procurement” interchangeably with
“acquisition” in this paper.
7
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of the economic
literature pertaining to contract design in defense procurement. Section 2.3
provides institutional background information on the acquisition of major
weapons systems by the U.S. Department of Defense. Section 2.4 presents
a theoretical model of the decision of contractual completeness in defense
acquisition. Section 2.5 describes the data set used in empirical estimation of
the underlying theoretical model. Section 2.6 proposes two different estimation
techniques and includes the definitions of the dependent and explanatory
variables used in the econometric model. Section 2.7 presents the results and
analysis of my initial estimation procedure. In Section 2.8, I model the effect
of repeat interactions on contract selection using Two-Stage Least Squares
estimation. Section 2.9 provides alternative specifications of my estimation model
to check the robustness of my results, and Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The microeconomic literature discussing major weapons procurement by the
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) considers many different aspects of this unique
contracting environment. In this review, I will narrow my focus to three of the
most relevant issues: 1) the role of the DoD as both regulator and sole customer
of the U.S. Defense industry, 2) regulation of profit and appropriate scale in
defense manufacturing, and 3) the optimality of incomplete contracts in defense
procurement. Quite predictably, authors in this literature are concerned with the
welfare implications of acquisition decisions for major weapons systems, which
routinely require the expenditure of billions of dollars of taxpayer funds. The
inherent tradeoff in this scenario is straightforward: if one concedes that security
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is a vital component of overall welfare, a welfare-maximizing society must balance
its desire for security with its aspirations to provide other vital public services. If
defense officials are funding national security in an inefficient manner, either the
provision levels of other services are suffering as a result, or taxpayers are saddled
with an unnecessarily high tax burden given their desired level of security.
2.2.1 Role of the Department of Defense in the Defense
Industrial Sector
In an overarching review of the defense procurement process in the United
States, Rogerson (1994) focuses on the unique role of the DoD in the U.S.
defense industrial sector. His analysis emphasizes the importance of creating a
procurement process that incentivizes research and development, accommodates
extraordinary levels of uncertainty, and accounts for the DoD’s role as the
only purchaser of U.S. defense products.4 Rogerson points out that defense
procurement is partially defined by a relentless search for superior weapons
capabilities (p. 66). As a result, the contracting process must be structured
to reward continuous research and development that leads to innovation in
weapons production and performance. The author also acknowledges the high
levels of internal and external uncertainty as signature characteristics of weapons
procurement. Internal uncertainty arises due to the technologically complex
nature of the weapons production process, whereas external uncertainty is the
result of an ever-changing strategic and political environment (p. 67).
Furthermore, Rogerson (1994) describes the DoD’s efforts to alleviate the
4Although U.S.-produced weapons systems are regularly sold to foreign countries, the DoD
thoroughly regulates this process. For example, the production contracts for weapons
eventually sold to foreign countries are negotiated in conjuction with the DoD and are reported
to Congress in the same format as U.S. military contracts.
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“hold-up problem” in defense contracting (p. 67). Firms may be reluctant to
invest significant amounts of capital in defense production because they fear the
DoD may abuse its bargaining power as a sole consumer, thus preventing the
recovery of firm investments. In order to assuage firms’ fears, the U.S. government
has responded by funding a significant portion of the research and development
phase and establishing “fair price” agreements with firms, whereby contracting
officers may emphasize non-price factors over lowest cost in negotiating the terms
of a contract (p. 68-69). Rogerson’s depiction of the DoD procurement process
for major weapons systems suggests that the contracting environment is both
precarious and subtle, and one can easily infer from his work that standard
contracting procedures may be inadequate in this complex setting.
2.2.2 Profit Regulation and Questions of Scale
Empirical studies of U.S. Department of Defense procurement appear to be
few and far between. Meaningful exploration of defense contracting practices and
procedures are complicated by limited access to pertinent data, inherent national
security concerns, and confidentiality of the source selection process. However,
several authors have used unique data sets and publicly available information to
test economic theories pertaining to the procurement of major weapons systems
by the DoD.
A key effort in the provision of any good whose production includes large
economies of scale and of which the government is the sole purchaser , especially
in the case of a private supplier, is the regulation of economic profit received by
the provider. Rogerson (1989) suggests that this regulation in the defense sector is
complicated by the fact that it is involved in a multi-stage process of innovation
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and production. However, this unique structure may allow defense officials to
prevent overall positive economic profits by providing different incentives in
each stage (p. 1286). Rogerson tests the hypothesis that the DoD rewards
innovation, not in the research and development phase, where the merit of the
innovation may be difficult to determine in an objective fashion, but during the
production phase of major defense projects by allowing the winning firms to
earn positive economic profits. The author considers the winning firms for 12
“major aerospace” contracts and uses firm stock prices over a five-day window
surrounding the contract award date to determine the reward to each winning firm
(pp. 1297-1301). On average, Rogerson estimates the “pure economic profit” of
the aerospace contracts to be 3.26 to 4.68 cents for every dollar of revenue received
by the winning firm. Rogerson views this result as confirmation of his hypothesis,
which suggests that the DoD rewards innovation in the production phase in order
to avoid difficult measurement issues in the research and development phase.
Rogerson (1990) suggests that the defense procurement process also suffers
from a principal-agent problem between Congress and U.S. defense officials. This
issue is the result of Congress’s deferment of weapons quality decisions to the
DoD, due to the Pentagon’s superior expertise in defense technology. Rogerson’s
theoretical exposition of this problem suggests that defense officials may choose
an excessive level of technology, even when the officials derive no personal
utility from weapons technology (p. 88). Thus, according to Rogerson, the
defense procurement process is complicated even further due to a misalignment
of incentives between the quality (DoD) and quantity (Congress) decision-makers.
Rogerson (1991) empirically examines this quality-quantity decision, testing
his hypothesis that the principal-agent problem leads to an inefficient scale of
production in the defense sector. Using contract data for 35 military aircraft and
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missile programs, Rogerson estimates that production rates have no statistically
significant effect on capacity utilization rates in the sample programs (production
not occurring in accordance with the LRAC curve) and that the production
processes exhibit excess capacity (pp. 244-246). As a result, he concludes that
the production rates for the sample aircraft and missile programs are inefficiently
low. While Rogerson admits that this finding could be due to the DoD’s stated
goal of retaining a surge capacity, he suggests that the economic losses due to
inefficient choices of scale in defense production, once quantified, could have
significant welfare impacts (p. 247). However, as in many economic discussions
regarding defense procurement, Rogerson’s argument for improved efficiency
likely overlooks the DoD’s larger mission, as capacity may have a strong role
in foreign policy discussions.
2.2.3 Optimal Pricing Mechanisms and Contractual
Completeness
Crocker and Reynolds (1993) emphasize the complex technological
environment and the multiple dimensions of competition that shape the
defense contracting process and attempt to model the decision of contractual
completeness. According to the authors, the completeness decision is based on
a fundamental tradeoff. Defense officials attempt to balance ex ante costs of
achieving thorough contractual agreements with the ex post costs of allowing
opportunistic behavior by the defense contractor (pp. 126-127). As previously
mentioned in this review, a primary concern of defense officials is the regulation
of contractor profit while supporting technological innovation, and Crocker and
Reynolds are attempting to demonstrate that this goal requires contracting
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officials to select an optimal level of contractual completeness for each project.
The authors use contract data for the procurement of engines for F-15 and
F-16 fighter jets from 1970 to 1991, including the type of contract awarded.
Crocker and Reynolds order the contracts in terms of “completeness.” For
example, a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract does not allow for any ex post
renegotiation due to fluctuations in contractor costs, whereas a Fixed Price
Incentive (FPI) contract allows for the negotiation of final cost, final profit, and
final price after the contract is signed (p. 130). Accordingly, a FPI contract
is assigned a value of 1 (least complete), and a FFP contract is assigned a
value of 8 (most complete) on the authors’ “completeness” index. Crocker and
Reynolds then estimate their model via OLS and Ordered Probit to examine the
significance of their suggested determinants of contractual completeness. The
authors find that uncertainty (environmental complexity) and contractor history
of post-contract litigation with the DoD (potential for opportunism) are indeed
statistically significant determinants of contractual completeness in the case of
F-15 engines.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) create a model that illustrates the important
tradeoff between transaction costs, which arise due to unanticipated changes,
and cost minimization incentives in contract formalization. They claim that
fixed-price contracts provide the greatest cost-minimization incentives but
allow for substantial costs of renegotiation if left incomplete. Conversely,
cost-reimbursement contracts provide little or no incentive to minimize
performance costs. However, the less restrictive structure of these contracts
accommodates changes with relatively smaller transaction costs. Essentially, the
authors claim that industries involving constant technological innovation (i.e.,
space, defense, etc.) should embrace the use of cost-plus contracts in order to
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better accommodate technological uncertainty.
In a related paper, Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2008) -hereafter BMT-
consider the decision of optimal pricing mechanisms in procurement contracting.
According to BMT, the decision of whether to award a procurement contract via
competitive bidding or by negotiation with the contractor is just as important
as the contract specifications and payment structure (p. 373). Using contract
data from construction contracts in California from 1995-2001, BMT demonstrate
that project complexity (project value, size, and administrative complexity)
and contractor characteristics (experience, credit history, and firm size) are
statistically significant determinants of the pricing mechanism decision (p. 385).
Furthermore, the authors suggest that their findings indicate a “downside” to
awarding fixed priced contracts via competitive bidding, primarily due to a lack
of contractor input in the design phase (p. 395). BMT assert that procurement
officials should be allowed more flexibility in awarding contracts based on the
characteristics of the project and potential bidders.
Further empirical contributions to the literature concerning the contract
type decision include Zervos (2009) and Jensen and Stonecash (2009). Zervos
uses a recursive least squares estimation technique to examine the effects of
variation in NASA’s procurement policies on the perceived level of competition
in space procurement in the US. The author finds that consolidation of the
US space industry counterintuitively led to a relatively higher proportion of
non-competitive contracts awarded to space firms. Additionally, Zervos concludes
that NASA did not counter this offering of fewer non-competitive awards with
contract types that included “rent control mechanisms” (p. 235). Jensen and
Stonecash use difference-in-difference estimation to analyze the effects of a natural
experiment involving the use of two different contract types: Cost Plus and
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Fixed Price. The natural experiment arises when one of two water providers
in Melbourne, Australia, changes contract types while the other remains the
same. In contrast to previous studies, the authors find that the change to cost
plus contracts by one of the firms led to significant additional savings, using three
different measures of maintenance costs (3 different dependent variables).
This paper will contribute to the aforementioned literature in several ways.
First, my analysis extends the literature on contractual completeness and pricing
mechanism issues to a broader class of defense acquisition programs and to
the modern defense procurement environment. In comparison to Crocker and
Reynolds, my sample includes contracts for multiple modern aircraft from all
branches of the Department of Defense. Second, this paper perhaps sheds
light on the importance of trust and reputation in the defense contracting
environment by considering the impact of repeat interactions on the contract type
decision. Finally, although scholars have readily identified areas of theoretical
inefficiency in the awarding of defense contracts, many hypotheses regarding
defense procurement remain empirically untested, tested with non-DoD data sets,
or based solely on theoretical conjecture. Thus, my unique data set allows me to
contribute new information to the relatively sparse empirical literature regarding
defense procurement.
2.3 Institutional Background: Weapons Acquisition
The development and procurement of major weapons systems by the U.S.
Department of Defense is a substantial component of the overall defense budget.
Figure 2.1 depicts the development and procurement components of the U.S.
National Defense budget, expressed as a percentage of total defense outlays from
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1962 to 2011. Research and development expenditures remain at approximately
12-13 percent of overall defense expenditures for the majority of the period, while
procurement expenses fluctuate between approximately 17 and 30 percent. This
corresponds to an average of $53.4 billion in annual outlays for procurement
and $30.3 billion for research and development during the same period.5 While
many other forms of procurement (e.g., fuel, uniforms, and a multitude of service
contracts) contribute to these budget figures, the sheer magnitude of the overall
costs help to emphasize the need to ensure efficiency and a feasible level of
transparency in the defense contracting process.
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Figure 2.1: Components of US Military Spending (% of Federal Defense Outlays)
5Historical Tables of the U.S. Budget, 2012
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2.3.1 Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides guidance and direction
for all forms of U.S. government expenditure, including any procurement
and development by the DoD. The FAR provides guidelines and procedural
requirements for all steps of the acquisition process, including but not limited
to solicitation of bids, bidding procedures, contract negotiation, pricing, and
payment. Despite the fact that the FAR is a 1,903-page document, its authors
cannot possibly hope to account for every contingency that the contracting officer
may face in his or her duties. To accommodate the diversity in acquisition
projects, the FAR creates flexibility in the contracting process by providing a
menu of different types of contracts that a defense official can award to a winning
bidder. Specifically, the FAR gives the following statement in justification for a
range of contract types:
A wide selection of contract types is available to the Government and
contractors in order to provide needed flexibility in acquiring the large
variety and volume of supplies and services required by agencies....The
objective is to negotiate a contract type and price (or estimated cost
and fee) that will result in reasonable contractor risk and provide
the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and economical
performance. 6
The following contract types are a selection of a larger range of types,
intended to accommodate the entire acquisition process, from initial research
and development to full-rate, multi-year production. Specifically, these types are
represented in the data sample used for regression analysis in this paper.
6FAR, 16.101a and 16.103.
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• Firm Fixed Price (FFP): A firm-fixed-price contract establishes a price
that is not subject to revision based on unexpected cost fluctuations during
the performance of the contract. The contractor is fully responsible for
all costs and associated profit or loss and bears a maximum amount of
risk under this type of contract. Accordingly, an FFP contract creates
a maximum incentive for the contractor to account for and control cost
variation, while placing a minimum oversight burden on defense acquisition
program managers.7
• Fixed Price Contract with Economic Price Adjustment (FPEPA):
A FPEPA contract allows for revision of the fixed price only in the
event of specified contingencies. The FAR provides guidance for three
general types of economic price adjustments: 1) adjustments based on a
change in prices from an agreed-upon level, which must be specified in the
contract; 2) adjustments based on changes in “actual” material or labor
costs experienced during performance of the contract; and 3) adjustments
based on changes in agreed-upon indices of labor or material costs, which
must be specifically identified in the contract.8
• Fixed Price Incentive Contracts (FPI): A FPI contract allows the
defense official to adjust profit, using a formula based on the ratio of final
total cost to target total cost. The FAR specifies several types of FPI
contracts.9 However, only one of these contract types appears in the data
sample that I use for this paper:
– Fixed Price Incentive (Firm Target) (FPIF): A FPIF contract
7FAR, 16.202.
8FAR, 16.203.
9FAR, 16.204.
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provides an agreed-upon target cost, target profit, price ceiling, and
profit adjustment formula (FAR, 16.403-1). After completion of the
contract, the contracting parties determine the final cost and apply
the profit adjustment formula from the initial contract to determine a
final price. This provides an incentive for the contractor: if final cost
exceeds the target cost, final profit will be less than target profit due to
the structure of the adjustment formula. However, if the contractor’s
final cost is lower than the target cost, the firm receives final profit that
exceeds target profit. Finally, if the contractor’s final costs exceed the
established price ceiling, the contractor must absorb the excess cost.
• Cost-Reimbursement Contracts: This broad category of contracts
provides for the payment of “allowable incurred costs.” As part of these
contracts, the contracting parties agree upon both a total cost and a price
ceiling, beyond which the contractor assumes all risk.10
– Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF): A CPIF contract allows the
responsible defense official to adjust the terms of the contract, using
a formula based on the ratio of final total cost to target total cost.11
– Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF): A CPAF contract allows the
defense official to augment the initial negotiated fee with an award,
which is based on “a judgmental evaluation by the Government (FAR,
16.305).” The specified intent of this award is to “provide motivation
for excellence in contract performance (FAR, 16.305).”
– Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF): A CPFF contract specifies an
10FAR, 16.301-1.
11FAR, 16.304.
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agreed-upon fee, which is adjusted only in the event that the “work
to be performed under the contract” changes during the contract
period (FAR, 16.306). This type of contract is intended to allow risk
sharing between the contractor and the U.S. government. However,
the authors of the FAR admit that this type of contract provides little
motivation for the contractor to minimize costs, as the contractor’s
profit is fixed by the terms of the initial contract.
These contract types allow the responsible acquisition official to weight both
project and firm characteristics in deciding upon an appropriate form of
agreement between the U.S. government and a profit-seeking private firm.
2.3.2 Selected Acquisition Reports
While acquisition officials for the DoD certainly follow the FAR and its
established procedures, the aforementioned magnitude of defense research and
procurement expenditure has led to significant additional regulatory classification
and oversight from Congress. The DoD must designate all weapons programs
that exceed $365 million in total research, development, training, and evaluation
(RDT&E) or $2.19 billion in total procurement costs (FY 2000 constant $) as
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) in accordance with 10 U.S.C.
2430.12 Additionally, the Secretary of Defense must submit an annual Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) for every MDAP to Congress for review of each
program. Each SAR must contain total cost of the program, program schedule,
and a cost analysis for the projected life cycle of the program. In addition to
annual SARs, the Secretary of Defense must also submit a quarterly SAR in the
12Defense Acquisition University, www.acc.dau.mil.
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event that the average cost of procurement exceeds the agreed-upon target by
15% in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2432.13 The SAR process provides Congress
with a framework to make informed decisions regarding the development and
procurement of major weapons systems. It is in this context that elected
representatives are responsible for ensuring that DoD acquisitions are serving
U.S. taxpayer interests in an efficient and welfare-maximizing manner.
2.4 The Model
Following Crocker and Reynolds (1993) -hereafter CR- and BMT (2008), the
remainder of this paper will focus on modeling the defense acquisition official’s
selection of contract type in component contracts for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs.
In accordance with previous literature in the field, the contract type decision
is based upon a tradeoff between ex ante contractual costs (transaction costs)
and ex post opportunities for the contracting firm to achieve additional profit
due to its information advantage. Contractual costs will arise, as in CR, due to
the technological complexity of modern weaponry and the external uncertainty
associated with dynamic threats to national security and the politicization of the
defense acquisition process in the US. In such an ambiguous and fluid production
environment, it seems virtually impossible that a defense acquisition official
could account for and negotiate upon every possible contingency.14 Meanwhile,
the same defense official must also protect the interests of the U.S. taxpayer
13Ibid.
14Interestingly, the government quantifies its administrative costs for awarding and
administering eact contract under a single, fixed-price, sealed bid solicitation at $500
(FAR,14.201-8). However, the FAR also requires the contracting official to address the
significant additional monitoring resources in awarding any contract type other than
fixed-price (FAR, 16.306).
21
and adhere to Congressional mandates by regulating the profit of the defense
contractor. This possibility of ex post seller opportunism, in CR’s terminology,
arises due to the defense contractor’s information advantage surrounding the
production process. The DoD has no organic ability to produce, nor does it often
have an alternative supplier for major weapons systems, leading to a dominant
bargaining position for the contractor in the full production phase of contracts.
In addition to these concerns, the DoD must be, according to Rogerson (1989),
ever cognizant of its role as both regulatory supervisor and sole consumer of the
U.S. defense industrial base. Therefore, defense acquisition officials must balance
the requirement to promote innovation in DoD technology with its requirement to
regulate profit in the defense industry. For example, the use of unmanned devices
by military forces has expanded rapidly over the last decade, primarily due to the
unique operational requirements of the Global War on Terror. The prevalence
of urban and mountainous terrain has led to a greater need for unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), while the widespread use of improvised explosive devices
against U.S. land vehicles and dismounted troops has necessitated the use of
unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Due to the immediate requirement for these
capabilities, the rapid fielding of UAVs and UGVs occurred in a relatively short
time span (only the UAVs in my sample had a development time of less than
five years), perhaps requiring more flexibility in the contracting process. Certain
UAVs were distributed at the tactical level, requiring simple controls and launch
procedures. Meanwhile, UAVs controlled at higher levels of command required
heavier ordnance, actual runways, and experienced pilots. The diverse array of
missions identified for UAVs in a relatively short time span required flexibility
within the terms of the contract to adjust the product design as necessary.
At this point, I again follow CR in modeling the defense acquisition official’s
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decision of an optimal level of contractual completeness as his or her choice of
contract type. This optimal level of completeness is based on the aforementioned
balance of ex ante contractual costs and ex post emphasis on profit regulation.
However, I deviate from CR in their measures for ex ante costs and ex post
opportunism. Instead, I choose to model the contractual completeness decision
based on project characteristics (x ) and winning firm characteristics (y) to
accommodate the multidimensionality of the contract-type decision. Certain
project characteristics - dollar amount, military branch, technological complexity
- may indicate unique ex ante contracting costs, while other project characteristics
- the presence of multiple winning firms in RDT&E contracts - may limit the
opportunities for ex post surplus extraction by the defense firms. Likewise, certain
firm characteristics, such as firm experience, firm size, or firm revenue, could have
effects on both ex ante costs and ex post opportunism. An experienced firm may
be familiar with the defense contracting process, leading to reduced negotiation
and administrative costs, while this same measure of experience might clearly
serve as an indicator of a series of profitable defense contracts for the firm.
However, a profitable firm in the defense industry may have an extensive history
of litigation with the U.S. government, as in Crocker and Reynolds (1993).
In order to illustrate the theoretical foundations of this model, we can consider
CR’s explanation of the acquisition official’s decision as the selection of an optimal
level of incompleteness, i∗, where i∗ ∈ [0, 1].15 Therefore, if (i∗ = 0), we would
expect that the contract covers all potential and hypothetical outcomes from
the suggested transaction. If (i∗ = 1), the contractual arrangement does not
implement any structure on the transaction. The acquisition official arrives at
this decision by equilibrating the marginal cost and marginal benefit of achieving
15Crocker and Reynolds (1993), p. 128
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a precise contract.
From above, we assume that the acquisition official’s primary costs incurred
in creating a precise contract are the result of research and deliberation about
possible contingencies. As the number of possible outcomes considered and
covered in the contract grow, we expect the costs associated with research and
negotiation efforts to also increase. Therefore, we can expect that the marginal
cost of achieving contractual agreement to grow as the degree of contractual
completeness increases. Similarly, the benefits associated with a more rigorous
contractual agreement are due to the perceived reduction in exposure to ex post
opportunism. If we expect that the magnitude of the possible adverse outcomes
for the participants increases as the agreement covers fewer contingencies, it
follows that we would assume that the marginal benefit of achieving a more precise
agreement will be greatest when the completeness level is lowest. Therefore, as
depicted in Figure 2.2, we expect the marginal cost of reaching a contractual
agreement to be an increasing function of contractual completeness, whereas the
marginal benefit should be a decreasing function.16
The project and firm characteristics that I am considering in this paper
could have an ambiguous effect on the acquisition official’s choice of i∗. In
terms of Figure 2.2, this is due to their ambiguous effect on the MC and
MB curves. For example, an experienced firm may assist in streamlining the
negotiation procedures, which would reduce transaction costs and shift the MC
curve downwards. However, the same firm’s continued viability in the industry
may indicate an ability to extract rents from the procurement process, shifting
the marginal benefit curve for a more thorough agreement upwards. Therefore,
16Figure 2.2 is a virtual reconstruction of Figure 1 from Crocker and Reynolds (1993) with
minor changes due to the differences in my model.
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we can expect contracts involving different project and firm characteristics to
possibly require different contract type choices to achieve an optimal level of
contractual completeness.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Concept for Contract Type Decision
In a manner comparable to CR’s exposition, this series of hypotheses regarding
the determinants of contractual completeness can be empirically examined using
the reduced-form expression,
C∗i = C(x, y) + ǫi, (2.1)
where C∗i represents the actual level of contractual completeness, C(·) is
a firm-invariant function used to determine contract type, and ǫi is a
contract-specific error term. In particular, we may view the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), defense acquisition history, political influence, and strategic
environment as key factors in forming the function C(·). Using a cross-section
of MDAP contracts, we can estimate the parameters of C(·) to determine the
empirical significance of project and firm characteristics on defense officials’ choice
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of contractual completeness.
2.5 Data
In order to estimate equation (2.1), I have constructed a cross-sectional data
set of MDAP component contracts, consisting of programs from all three branches
of the U.S. military (Army, Navy, and Air Force). The contract information
was collected from both annual and quarterly Selected Acquisition Reports. As
previously mentioned, the quarterly SARs are only generated in the event of
a breach of established cost thresholds and are thus random and infrequent
occurrences in the dataset.
The Department of Defense adopted the SAR format in 1997. Therefore,
the available SARs range in date from 1997 to 2011.17 However, the actual
contract period varies by individual contract. For example, the data set includes
both one-year initial production contracts and RDT&E contracts that extend for
more than five years. In order to address heterogeneity in required technology
and production characteristics, I have limited the sample to aircraft MDAPs that
are currently (as of 30 APR 2012) designated as “active” by the DoD. As a result,
the available sample consists of 195 individual contracts from 20 MDAPs. While
I have contract data from every year from 1997 to 2011, only six of the MDAPs
are active over the entire time period and none of the individual contracts cover
a period longer than eleven years. Although it may seem that this data structure
might facilitate the construction of an unbalanced panel, the contract type for a
specific contract does not change over its lifetime, despite significant variation in
17The contracts covered in these SARs have initial award dates ranging from 1986 to 2012.
However, I only have observations of these contracts during the 15-year peiod indicated
above.
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many of the contract details. As the contract type will serve as my independent
variable, this characteristic of DoD contracts requires a cross-sectional approach
to my specific research question.
For each contract covered in a SAR, I am able to observe contract type,
contract description, military branch, appropriation category (RDT&E vs.
Procurement), initial award date, initial contract price, initial contract quantity,
current contract price, current contract quantity, contractor’s estimated price
at completion, defense program manager’s estimated price at completion, and
contractor identity. In addition to serving as stand-alone project characteristics
in some cases, these measures also allow me to calculate the overall cost variation
of the individual contract and to discern between increases due to quantity
adjustment and those due to unforeseen complications. Each contract entry
also includes an identification number that allows for cross-referencing with a
second U.S. government database, the Federal Procurement Database System
(FPDS). From this second source, I am able to view the individual transactions
that occur under the main contract number from the program SAR. Although
the FPDS should theoretically allow me to collect detailed information about
the contracting firm, this data is not entered into the database in a uniform or
reliable manner. Therefore, I have collected all pertinent firm characteristics for
the defense contractors in from annual reports to investors and Form 10-K filings
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Prior to discussing the summary statistics for the contracts used in my
empirical analysis, it is important to discuss the reduction of the overall sample
due to data availability. Of the original 195 contracts, I removed twenty-five
observations that were “combination” contracts, indicating that the transactions
under these contract numbers were covered by various contract types. Despite
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the additional information contained in the FPDS database, I was unable to
classify these contracts under a single contract type. Additionally, one of the
contracting firms in the original sample is a private firm and does not publicly
report its annual financial statistics. This resulted in the loss of an additional
fifteen observations. For six contracts, I was unable to observe the completion
date of the contract and was therefore unable to calculate the contract’s length.
Due to these data issues, my estimation sample consists of 149 observations of
MDAP contracts. The MDAPS included in the estimation sample are listed in
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: MDAP Program List
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter
Light Utility Helicopter
UH-60M BLACK HAWK
CH-53K Heavy Lift Replacement
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
EA-18G Growler
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
KC-130J
MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter
MH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter
MQ-4C Unmanned Aircraft System Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
P-8A POSEIDON
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft - Osprey
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Fire Scout
C-130J Hercules
F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter
RQ-4A/B Unmanned Aircraft System Global Hawk
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 list the distribution of contract types and the distribution of
firms within the sample. Approximately one-third of the contracts in the sample
are Firm Fixed Price (FFP), which is similar to CR’s sample of Air Force engine
contracts. Roughly sixty percent of the sample contracts are fixed-price variants
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and the remainder of the sample consists of cost reimbursement contracts. This
distribution indicates significant variation in the type of contracts administered
in the acquisition of MDAPs. Given the specialized weapons technology and
production expertise required to develop and supply major weapons systems
to the U.S. government, the distribution of contracting firms is, perhaps
unsurprisingly, quite concentrated. The five largest firms in terms of number
of contracts account for roughly eighty-five percent of the overall number of
contracts.18
Table 2.2: Distribution of Contract Types
Total % of Sample
FFP 54 36.24%
FPEPA 6 4.03%
FPIF 30 20.13%
CPIF 21 14.09%
CPAF 24 16.11%
CPFF 14 9.40%
Table 2.3: Distribution of Contracts By Firm
Firm Total Contracts % of Sample
A 1 0.67%
B 10 6.71%
C 1 0.67%
D 33 22.15%
E 23 15.44%
F 3 2.01%
G 4 2.68%
H 16 10.74%
I 34 22.82%
J 24 16.11%
18Note that, while I am able to observe contractor identity in the SAR contract information, I
have specifically chosen not to disclose that information in this paper.
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Table 2.4 provides a more detailed description of the contracts in the
estimation sample. Of note, over half of the contracts in the sample correspond to
Navy MDAPs, and approximately thirty percent of the contracts are for RDT&E
purposes. The contracts managed by the Department of Defense, rather than
by one of the three branches of the military, are part of the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter MDAP. The unique nature of this particular program will be discussed
further in the results section of the paper. Although not listed in table 2.4, two
additional summary statistics warrant mention. The data sample includes twelve
contracts for MDAP components provided by dual source suppliers, representing
approximately eight percent of the overall sample. Additionally, over forty
percent of the contracts are performed by “Non-Subdivision” firms, which are
not segments of larger corporations. For instance, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
and Pratt-Whitney are operating segments of United Technologies Corporation,
whereas Raytheon is a stand-alone corporation. In assigning this category, I
defined a “Subdivision” as any firm whose stock did not trade under its own
symbol on a major exchange.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for MDAP Contracts
Total % of Sample
Army 21 14.09
Navy 81 54.36
Air Force 32 21.48
Dept. Of Defense 15 10.07
RDT&E 46 30.87
Procurement 100 67.11
Acquisition O&M 3 2.01
30
2.6 Estimation
In order to establish the relative statistical significance of project and firm
characteristics in the defense acquisition official’s choice of contract type, I will
estimate the following equation:
Ci = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βjxj +
m∑
l=1
γlyl + αi + ǫi, (2.2)
where each xj is a project characteristic and each yl is a firm characteristic. This
specification assumes that the ǫi are independently and identically distributed
error terms, with mean zero and constant variance σ2ǫ . Using the information
in my data set, I am also able to estimate contractor-specific intercepts,
αi’s. In addition to the firm characteristics (employment, revenue, experience),
these firm-specific intercepts should allow me to capture the full effect of firm
heterogeneity on the acquisition official’s choice of contract type. In order to
proxy for external uncertainty, I include an indicator variable for the contract’s
award year as an additional project characteristic (xj).
I will estimate equation (2.2) via Ordinary Least Squares and Ordered Probit.
Due to the fact that the dependent variable is not a continuous variable but a
set of discrete choices, the OLS estimation technique can result in inconsistent
estimates of the model parameters (Maddala (1983)). The Ordered Probit
estimation method accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is actually
“ordered” via its relationship with an “underlying latent variable” (Crocker and
Reynolds (1993), p. 141). In my model, the dependent variable (a series of
discrete numbers 1 to 6) is actually determined using an underlying latent variable
(the scale of contractual completeness).
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2.6.1 Dependent Variable
Following Crocker and Reynolds (1993), it is possible to rank the various
contract types using a “qualitative index of completeness,” where lower values in
the index include less rigorous contractual agreements (p. 132). Some additional
analysis, focusing on the opportunity for renegotiation by the contracting firm
under each contract type, is required to construct this index. The FAR allows
the contracting officer to use cost-reimbursement type contracts only in the
event that 1) project circumstances do not allow the contractor to define
requirements to a degree that will facilitate a fixed-price type contract; or 2)
uncertainties pertaining to contract performance do not allow for a “sufficient”
level of accuracy in the estimation of costs (FAR, 16.301-2). Therefore, all
cost-reimbursement contracts should be ranked lower than fixed-price contracts
in terms of completeness. Furthermore, contracts with award and incentive fees
should be ranked lower than those with fixed fees in the index. This is due to
the fact that the contracting firm controls its profit levels to a much greater
degree in these contracts. Moreover, an incentive fee contract, which is based on
a profit adjustment formula that the firm can control, should be ranked lower
than the award fee, which is based on a “judgmental” performance assessment
from the U.S. government (FAR, 16.305). The relative completeness rankings of
the FPEPA and FFP contracts are straightforward.
Table 2.5 lists the completeness index that this paper will incorporate as the
dependent variable in regression analysis. The underlying assumption required
for the use of this index to address the determinants of contractual completeness
is that the agreed-upon contract type represents an optimal level of completeness,
given the firm and project characteristics under consideration. In other words,
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we assume that the contract type decision represents the contracting official’s
equilibrium choice of C∗ from Figure 2.2. Based on the contracts in the estimation
sample, the mean completeness level is 3.93 with a standard deviation of 1.87.
Table 2.5: Dependent Variable for Estimation (Completeness Rank)
C (Completeness) = 1 if type = CPIF (Cost-Plus Incentive Fee)
2 if type = CPAF (Cost-Plus Award Fee)
3 if type = CPFF (Cost-Plus Fixed Fee)
4 if type = FPIF(Fixed-Price Incentive Fee)
5 if type = FPEPA (Fixed-Price, Economic Price Adj.)
6 if type = FFP (Firm Fixed Price)
2.6.2 Explanatory Variables
The project characteristics (x ) and firm characteristics (y) for each contract
serve as the covariates in equation (2.2). Table 2.6 provides a list of my proposed
explanatory variables and their definitions, while Table 2.7 lists the summary
statistics for these variables from the sample of contracts used for estimation.
Prior to estimation, it is important to justify my selection of these variables and
to elaborate briefly on their definitions.
Project Characteristics
In accordance with the cost-benefit analysis mentioned earlier in this paper,
it may be reasonable to expect that contracting officials will be more thorough in
constructing more expensive contracts. Leaving room for negotiation or surplus
extraction in these contracts could expose the government to a relatively greater
risk of surplus extraction. Therefore, we might anticipate that a contract’s size
(in dollar amount) could affect the acquisition official’s choice of contractual
completeness. To control for project size, I included the initial price (ADJIP) for
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each contract. In order to compare prices across all contracts, I used the Official
2013 Escalation Index used to account for inflation in December 2011 SARs. This
calculation converted all contract prices to 2005 U.S. dollars.
To further control for project heterogeneity in the contract type decision,
I included indicator variables for controlling military component (Army, Navy,
or Air Force) and for the acquisition phase during which the contract was
awarded (RDT&E or Procurement) In the case of military component, contracts
controlled by the Department of Defense are in the excluded category, and
O&M (Operations and Maintenance) contracts are the excluded acquisition phase
category.
The presence of internal and external uncertainty in defense procurement is
one of its defining characteristics. Constantly advancing the technological frontier
in defense weaponry will require the Department of Defense to display both
patience and encouragement to the defense industry as they strive to maintain
technological superiority. However, the DoD’s ability to fund and promote the
efforts of its contractors is directly affected by external threat, political pressures,
and economic conditions within the United States. In order to capture the
effects of uncertainty on the acquisition official’s choice of contract type, I use a
combination of several control variables.
I use the variable LENGTH to proxy for the effects of external uncertainty.
If a longer contracted time period is more likely to expose the parties to
unanticipated changes in the security and political environments, the acquisition
official may select a more complete contract type for agreements covering longer
periods. I use the variable WINAGE to control for internal uncertainty. It is
reasonable to expect that contracts earlier in the life of an MDAP will involve
more unproven technology. Due to the fact that an acquisition program progresses
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from development to low-rate initial production to multi-year production, one
would expect that earlier contracts in the program would involve the most
complicated technological issues. Therefore, it is likely that a contracting official
might choose less complete contract types in the early phases of a MDAP. In order
to calculate WINAGE, I determined the number of years between a contract’s
award date and the initial award date for any contract within the same MDAP.
The next variable that I use to control for internal and external uncertainty,
LVAR, requires further explanation. In Crocker and Reynolds (1993), the
authors capture the effect of technological uncertainty by including a variable for
“Unexpected Engine Removals,” which occur when an aircraft engine fails and
must be removed prior to scheduled maintenance (p. 138). The authors assume
that the acquisition official would anticipate these removals and assign a contract
type accordingly, thereby assuming that the engine removals are realizations
of the official’s ex ante perception of technological uncertainty. In a similar
manner, I now assume that any cost variation or quantity changes, which result
in price variation in my sample, are the realizations of anticipated environmental
uncertainty by contracting officials. In other words, the officials would have
chosen specific contract types that would allow these cost fluctuations or quantity
changes to occur within the terms of the agreement. This variable is calculated
using a contract’s initial price and repeat observations of a contract’s current
price from multiple SARs.
The presence of a secondary source for a particular component may inhibit a
firm’s ability to extract contractual surplus at subsequent stages of renegotiation.
For example, a contractor is unlikely to attempt to take advantage of the
government in subsequent negotiations if the government has the option to
purchase solely from a secondary source. As a result, it may be the case that
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the acquisition official can issue less complete contracts in these cases due to the
passive enforcement mechanism provided by the alternate contractor. In order
to control for this competitive effect, I include the indicator variable DUALS for
contracts that provide an item that is also provided to the DoD in a separate
contract by another firm.
Firm Characteristics
As mentioned in the Model section of this paper, the characteristics of a
firm that signal its profitability or success within the defense industry may have
confounding effects on the acquisition official’s choice of contract type. Although
a successful firm may have a demonstrated ability to work within the regulatory
structure of the defense procurement environment, it is also possible that this
success may be an indicator of the firm’s innate ability to extract contractual
rents from the government. Therefore, the hypotheses for the effects of the
firm characteristics on the acquisition official’s contract type decision may not
be as straightforward as the effects of the project characteristics. One of the
empirical goals of this paper, therefore, is to attempt to determine whether firm
characteristics affect acquisition officials’ decisions in a uniform manner.
In order to shed light on this issue, I include measures of firm size: annual
revenue (LREV ) and annual employment (LEMP). The revenue figures are from
the annual investor reports or Securities and Exchange Commission filings for
the year in which the contract in question was awarded. In the case that the
contractor is part of a larger firm, I use the operating segment revenues (i.e., the
segment revenues for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation rather than the revenue for
the entire United Technologies Corporation). In order to compare firm revenue
(LREV) across contracts, I first converted foreign currencies to U.S. dollars
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using the appropriate exchange rate for firms whose parent companies traded
on foreign stock exchanges.19 I then used the aforementioned Escalation Index to
convert all revenue figures into 2005 U.S. dollars. I collected the firm employment
figures from the same investor reports and Form 10-K filings. However, I was
unable to collect employment data at the operating segment level. Therefore, the
employment figures reflect the overall annual corporate employment levels. In
order to better understand the effect that this measurement issue may have on my
results, I will interact the non-subdivision indicator (NSD) with the continuous
firm characteristics during estimation.
Another factor that may affect the acquisition official’s contract type choice
is the firm’s reputation or past business history with the Department of Defense.
One might expect that defense officials would be more apt to allow firms
with more experience in weapons production to operate under less restrictive
contractual conditions. On the other hand it may be more feasible to negotiate
a fixed price contract with an experienced firm, which might be more adept at
forecasting supply chain issues, production requirements, etc. This effect would
tend to lead to a more complete contractual agreement, on average. Therefore,
this is another instance in which the firm characteristic has an ambiguous
theoretical effect on the acquisition official’s choice of contract type. To capture
the effect of a firm’s business history with the Department of Defense, I include
the variable PREVCONT. This variable is calculated using only the contracts
that appear within my estimation sample. While this is certainly not an ideal
measure of contractor experience, it is similar to the method used by BMT (2008).
Finally, it is likely that the government is cognizant of its business partners’
financial viability. In other words, it is unlikely that the DoD will agree to
19I gathered all exchange rate information from xe.com.
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terms with an inherently risky company without requiring certain contractual
concessions to ensure that its interests are protected in the event that the firm
becomes insolvent. Due to the fact that many of the firms in my empirical
sample are operating segments of larger corporations, this concern is even more
appropriate. Although the DoD may interact only with representatives from
the defense segment, one would expect that the DoD would also be aware that
the larger corporation’s overall financial status could affect all of its divisions.
To proxy for short- and long-term indebtedness, I have also included the firm’s
current ratio (current liabilities / current assets) and its leverage ratio (long term
debt / total assets), which I collected from annual investor reports and Form
10-K Filings.
38
Table 2.6: Explanatory Variables
Project Characteristics (x) Definition
ladjip Log of Inflation-Adjusted Initial Contract Price ($Millions)
army, navy, af Separate Intercepts for Army, Navy, AF (DoD excluded)
rd, proc Separate Intercepts for RDT&E and Procurement (O&M excluded)
length Number of Months between Contract Award Date and Scheduled Completion
lvar Log of (1+Variance) of Contract’s Target Price
winage Within Program Age (in Years): Contract Award Date - Initial Award Date
duals Indicator Variable for Presence of Multiple Sources (=1 if Multiple)
Firm Characteristics (y) Definition
lemp Log of Annual Employment
lrev Log of Inflation- and Exchange Rate- Adjusted Annual Revenue (Segment Level)
prevcont Number of Existing Contracts for Firm Prior to Award Date
nsd Indicator Variable for Firms that are not a Subdivision of a Larger Corporation
cratio Firm’s Current Ratio (Current Liabilities/Current Assets)
lev Firm’s Leverage Ratio (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets)
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
adjip ($M) 846.22 2081.46 0.33 20128.73
length 40.47 27.64 2.00 138.00
var (Thousands) 235.77 130.20 0.00 15374.20
winage 7.11 6.10 0.00 23.00
emp (Thousands) 145.01 62.77 32.00 31.90
rev ($M) 11243.05 8247.74 2275.76 30894.20
prevcont 15.11 11.48 0.00 46.00
cratio 0.90 0.22 0.48 2.15
leverage 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.39
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2.7 Results and Analysis
2.7.1 Ordinary Least Squares Results
Table 2.8 displays the results of estimating equation (2.2) via ordinary least
squares.20 From the baseline regression in column (1), I can make several
observations. First, the indicator variable for an RDT&E contract is negative
and significant at the 10% level. This result is intuitive, as one would expect
contracts during the RDT&E phase of a MDAP to include more technological
uncertainty as the contractor attempts to create and integrate new defense
technologies. Second, although insignificant, the negative signs on the ADJIP
and WINAGE variables are counterintuitive and problematic. These measures
suggest that contracts with larger initial prices and contracts that occur later
in a MDAP’s production cycle should be less complete, on average. Third, the
firm characteristics are statistically insignificant in this regression, and I certainly
hesitate to draw any conclusions about their theoretically ambiguous effects based
on this initial result. Finally, note that I have included only results for regressions
containing the variable CRATIO as a measure of a firm’s financial risk. I based
this decision on a comparison of Schwartz Information Criteria from regressions
including only the current ratio, only the leverage ratio, and both measures.
In columns (2) and (3), I add the controls for competitive contracts, DUALS,
and internal uncertainty, LVAR, respectively. In both cases, the estimated
coefficients are statistically insignificant, and the indicator variable for RDT&E
contracts also has a statistically insignificant effect after the addition of these
20I strongly rejected my initial assumption of homoskedastic error terms using the
Breusch-Pagan Test. This result holds for the sample including the F-35. However, I failed
to reject the null of homoskedasticity for the sample not including the F-35. Therefore, all
standard errors shown for the sample including the F-35 are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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two variables to the model. In Crocker and Reynolds (1993), the presence of
dual source contracts was a significant determinant of contractual completeness
in several (but not all) of their regressions. However, over forty percent of the
contracts in their data sample were awarded in a dual source environment (p.
137), whereas less than ten percent of the contracts in my data sample are for
dual source items. I assume that this relative scarcity is a factor in the difference
between our results.
In column (4), I add indicator variables for contracts controlled by different
branches of the military. Interestingly, the results suggest that Army, Navy and
Air Force officials select more complete contracts, on average, in comparison
to the DoD baseline. In subsequent regressions in columns (5), (6), and (7), the
coefficients for these variables become increasingly significant. While the rankings
for the Army and Air Force alternate, the results suggest that the Navy awards the
least complete contract types of the three service branches. This relative ranking
is perhaps due to the Navy’s involvement with projects requiring the integration
of relatively more complex technologies. For example, the Navy is the controlling
branch for four fixed-wing aircraft and the V-22 Osprey, an aircraft with vertical
takeoff capabilities. In contrast, the Army’s contracts involve only three different
types of helicopters, and two of these projects are modernization programs for
older airframes. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the Navy would require the
use of contract types that allow for more technological uncertainty in comparison
to the acquisition officials for the Army.21
21An alternative specification might include a variable that captures the project’s position
relative to the frontier of defense technology at the time of its inception. However, my
current level of expertise on defense aircraft is not sufficient to meaningfully differentiate
beyond the differing military branches. The analysis included in this paper would be greatly
strengthened by consultation with aircraft engineers familiar with these projects, who might
possess the expertise to rank these projects on a scale of technological heterogeneity.
41
The addition of the controls for military component also results in the
significance of the WINAGE variable. However, the sign on this variable remains
negative. This is likely due to a lack of uniformity in the length of the MDAPs
contained in my data set. For example, the first contract awarded for the
V-22 Osprey program occurred in 1986, and its unique technological advances
required a relatively long period for research and development. As a result,
acquisition officials for the V-22 were writing CPIF contracts for low-rate initial
production twenty-one years after the initial contract award for the program. In
contrast, acquisition officials awarded the first contract for the CH-47F in 1998
and issued its last CPIF contract after only five years. Although the contracting
officials are awarding contract types in the prescribed manner (i.e., more complete
contracts for later phases of production), the phases of production are not timed
in accordance with an industry-wide standard, thus confounding the ability of
this variable to measure the effect of the contract’s placement in the overall
production sequence.
In column (5), I add interaction terms to precisely examine the effect of a
firm’s status as a “non-subdivision” on the acquisition official’s contract type
decision. This step results in the significance of the PREVCONT variable. The
coefficient on the number of previous contracts is positive, suggesting that an
experienced contractor’s knowledge of the defense acquisition process, its own
production capabilities, and awareness of potential technological pitfalls may
allow more complete specification of potential contingencies. However, it is also
possible that this variable is capturing a production sequence effect due to the
fact that it is left censored. If contractors are only responsible for one project
in the sample, the number of previous contracts may closely follow the number
of production steps that have elapsed. If I possessed the number of previous
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contracts for each contractor prior to the contracts in my data sample, I would
perhaps be able to separate these effects.
The coefficient on the firm’s current ratio, CRATIO, is negative and significant
in column (5), suggesting that a higher current ratio results in a less complete
contract. It is possible that this result reflects the significant amount of
contract-specific investment that firms must undertake during the initial phase
of a MDAP. If the firms are incurring large amounts of short-term debt in order
to produce a prototype or demonstrate the feasibility of the new technology,
this activity would be reflected in the firms’ current ratios and would likely be
accompanied by a less complete contract type as a result of a large amount of
technological uncertainty.
In adding the interaction terms, I sought to explore the possibility that DoD
acquisition officials would have a fundamentally different approach to contracting
with firms that were solely defense contractors. In column (5), we see that the
coefficient on the interaction between the “non-subdivision” indicator variable
and the leverage ratio is positive and significant. This suggests that defense
acquisition officials perhaps approach “non-subdivision” firms that possess risky
long term debt positions in a more cautious fashion than when dealing with
operating segments of larger corporations with the same risk profile.
In columns (6) and (7), I sequentially introduce firm effects and then
year effects as additional covariates. Unfortunately, the introduction of these
additional controls for firm heterogeneity and external uncertainty result in a
high degree of collinearity and questionable standard errors. Although the results
in columns (6) and (7) are qualitatively very similar to column (5), I hesitate to
draw any further conclusions from these additional regressions as the introduction
of these additional covariates results in multicollinearity problems with the NSD
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indicator variable.
2.7.2 Ordered Probit Results
As mentioned in the Estimation Section of this paper, OLS estimation of
equation (2.2) may result in inconsistent estimates of the model parameters.
In order to account for the discrete nature of my dependent variable, I can
estimate equation (2.2) via ordered probit.22 Table 2.9 displays the results of
this estimation procedure.
In Table 2.9, I progress from the baseline regression to the regression with firm
and year effects in the same sequence as in Table 2.8. Of note, the coefficient of
the RDT&E indicator variable is of smaller magnitude and is never statistically
significant in the ordered probit results. Additionally, the results of column (7)
should be interpreted with caution, as the model completely determines three
observations once the firm and year effects are added as covariates.
The coefficient for WINAGE is again negative and significant. However,
the coefficient is smaller in magnitude and remains significant in column (6)
of the ordered probit results, after the addition of the firm intercepts. The
measure of ex ante rational expectations of technological uncertainty, LVAR,
is also significant following the addition of the interaction terms in column
(5). However, the coefficient indicates a positive relationship with contractual
completeness, which is contrary to my theoretical prediction. One would expect
that a contract involving more technological uncertainty would be less rigorous
in terms of describing possible outcomes, leading to a less complete contract. It
is possible that the positive coefficient for this contract is due to the fact that the
22Note that the regression coefficients and threshold values are determined via log likelihood
maximization. See Cameron and Trivedi (2010) for a full explanation of ordered probit
estimation.
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measured variation in the contract price also involves price fluctuations due to
quantity changes. Therefore, it is quite possible that my results are confounded by
the fact that the DoD regularly modifies fixed-price variant contracts to purchase
more units than initially specified, leading to large price increases.
The magnitude, significance, and sign of the ordered probit coefficients for
the different firm characteristics are very similar to those from OLS estimation.
Previous contracts, current ratio, and leverage ratios for NSD firms appear to be
significant factors in the acquisition official’s choice of contract type. Additionally,
the effect of the interaction between the NSD indicator and revenue is positive
and significant after controlling for firm effects. In other words, this suggests
that NSD firms with larger annual revenues receive more complete contracts, on
average. It is possible this finding is due to the aforementioned streamlining effect,
where a company specializing in defense acquisition is adept at forecasting supply
chain difficulties, technological hurdles, and pertinent external uncertainty.
The coefficients for the indicators of controlling military branch maintain
their statistical significance from the OLS results. However, the magnitudes of
these effects are much smaller when estimated via ordered probit. Furthermore,
the relative ranking of the three branches in terms of average completeness of
contracts is also consistent with the OLS results. The Air Force tends to award
the most complete contracts, followed by the Army, with the Navy writing the
least complete contracts. It’s also interesting to note that the coefficients for these
indicator variables are all positive when compared to the excluded category, DoD.
Due to the fact that this category consists of only those from the F-35 MDAP,
this finding suggests the F-35 may be inherently different from the other projects
in the data sample. This possibility warrants more discussion and will be the
focus of the next subsection of this paper.
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Table 2.8: Ordinary Least Squares Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip -0.0392 -0.0391 -0.0535 -0.0022 0.0053 0.0428 0.0370
(0.0948) (0.0952) (0.0985) (0.1008) (0.0923) (0.1042) (0.1107)
rd -2.0097* -2.0179 -2.0115 -1.8792 -1.6552 -1.1230 -1.4085
(1.2459) (1.2560) (1.2501) (1.3155) (1.4015) (1.3358) (1.6356)
proc 0.6921 0.6860 0.6436 0.6380 0.8922 1.2486 1.0372
(1.2591) (1.2651) (1.2501) (1.3254) (1.4067) (1.3281) (1.6074)
length 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0001
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0059)
winage -0.0440 -0.0436 -0.0457 -0.0564* -0.0628* -0.0537 -0.0446
(0.0339) (0.0337) (0.0344) (0.0348) (0.0364) (0.0407) (0.0589)
duals 0.0540 0.0568 0.4456 0.4911 0.5080 0.3409
(0.4849) (0.4745) (0.5687) (0.5836) (0.6432) (0.6280)
lvar 0.0262 0.0336 0.0443 0.0505* 0.0487
(0.0314) (0.0320) (0.0328) (0.0323) (0.0380)
army 1.1039 1.5567* 1.8474** 2.0630**
(0.8079) (0.8094) (0.8748) (1.0274)
navy 0.7349 1.0320* 1.4010** 1.4230*
(0.6091) (0.6099) (0.6634) (0.7810)
af 1.3058* 1.6216** 1.9754*** 1.8556**
(0.6934) (0.6747) (0.7138) (0.7924)
lemp -0.0618 -0.0630 -0.0472 -0.2260 -0.3329 -0.6720 -1.0866
(0.3690) (0.3719) (0.3727) (0.3514) (0.3726) (1.1735) (1.4656)
lrev -0.1763 -0.1739 -0.1621 -0.1182 -0.0675 -0.0540 -0.1334
(0.2155) (0.2179) (0.2177) (0.2280) (0.2648) (0.3391) (0.4128)
prevcont 0.0179 0.0178 0.0196 0.0225 0.0358** 0.0528** 0.0967**
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0135) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0215) (0.0436)
nsd 0.4010 0.4029 0.3878 0.2289 -3.7534 omitted omitted
(0.2771) (0.2820) (0.2858) (0.3657) (10.0122)
cratio -0.5370 -0.5280 -0.5439 -0.8285 -1.7982* -1.5869 -1.6410
(0.5981) (0.5995) (0.6230) (0.8999) (0.9890) (1.4121) (1.6643)
nsd × lrev 0.4676 1.3120** 1.4851
(0.7273) (0.6533) (1.0058)
nsd × cratio 1.1137 -0.9830 -2.3301
(1.5213) (1.7368) (2.4081)
nsd × lev 7.0754** 12.9814*** 14.7246***
(2.8610) (3.6207) (4.9891)
nsd × lemp -0.2228 1.1801 1.3938
(0.8234) (1.4391) (2.0276)
constant 6.9632* 6.9477* 6.5977 7.4092* 8.3168* 10.9795 16.9883
(4.1601) (4.1670) (4.2076) (4.0859) (4.2991) (14.4671) (18.0231)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.4184 0.4185 0.4218 0.4480 0.4764 0.5452 0.5765
F Statistic 18.37 18.42 16.74 12.05 11.92
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Ordered Probit Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip -0.0117 -0.0115 -0.0263 0.0170 0.0256 0.0536 0.0423
(0.0666) (0.0667) (0.0707) (0.0750) (0.0733) (0.0866) (0.0931)
rd -1.1449 -1.1639 -1.1707 -1.1183 -0.9086 -0.5509 -0.8921
(1.0407) (1.0453) (1.0420) (1.0756) (1.1064) (1.1189) (1.2755)
proc 0.6103 0.5970 0.5556 0.5528 0.8689 1.2260 1.0276
(1.0445) (1.0444) (1.0417) (1.0742) (1.1045) (1.1089) (1.2430)
length -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0013 0.0001
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0044)
winage -0.0401 -0.0392 -0.0412 -0.0485* -0.0621** -0.0581* -0.0436
(0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0298) (0.0351) (0.0496)
duals 0.1210 0.1170 0.4203 0.4902 0.5352 0.4029
(0.3999) (0.3893) (0.4911) (0.5422) (0.5848) (0.5538)
lvar 0.0226 0.0289 0.0429* 0.0505* 0.0535*
(0.0241) (0.0247) (0.0261) (0.0270) (0.0316)
army 0.8037 1.2532* 1.5640** 1.8640**
(0.5992) (0.6414) (0.7233) (0.8423)
navy 0.4841 0.7656** 1.1080** 1.2327**
(0.4510) (0.4853) (0.5473) (0.6405)
af 0.9702* 1.3504*** 1.8078*** 1.6976***
(0.5006) (0.5276) (0.6047) (0.6614)
lemp -0.1292 -0.1295 -0.1135 -0.2411 -0.3831 -0.4960 -0.7687
(0.2932) (0.2936) (0.2945) (0.2763) (0.2934) (0.8816) (1.1063)
lrev -0.1510 -0.1481 -0.1388 -0.1156 -0.0983 -0.1203 -0.2023
(0.1648) (0.1649) (0.1659) (0.1733) (0.2079) (0.2676) (0.3209)
prevcont 0.0164 0.0162 0.0179 0.0193 0.0318** 0.0498*** 0.0888**
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0141) (0.0194) (0.0377)
nsd 0.2834 0.2884 0.2709 0.1539 -6.7072 -26.2766 -30.8976
(0.2119) (0.2166) (0.2224) (0.2901) (8.9785) (15.7126) (19.7908)
cratio -0.4285 -0.4054 -0.4124 -0.6077 -1.4676** -1.5686 -1.3806
(0.4381) (0.4369) (0.4572) (0.6601) (0.7363) (1.0639) (1.2459)
nsd × lrev 0.5788 1.2713** 1.2087
(0.5538) (0.5828) (0.8771)
nsd × cratio 0.9093 -1.4503 -2.4193
(1.0931) (1.3964) (2.0764)
nsd × lev 6.2724*** 11.7382*** 12.4292***
(2.3508) (3.5143) (4.3422)
nsd × lemp -0.3534 1.5192 2.1090
(0.6994) (1.3391) (1.7398)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
Likelihood Ratio 62.07 67.41 68.33 86.7 100.22 513.95 1049.5
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.7.3 Estimation without the F-35 MDAP
With a price of $81.4 million per aircraft and a total program cost exceeding
$1 trillion, the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter is the most expensive single
weapon program in the history of the United States Department of Defense.23
Given its unique objectives and reliance on foreign government support, it is
natural that the procurement of this aircraft is controlled by the Department
of Defense rather than by one of its component branches. Given my estimation
results from the previous section, in which it appears that contracts for the F-35
are, on average, less complete than contracts from any of the military branches, it
seems prudent to examine the possibility that the heterogeneous characteristics of
the F-35 are affecting my analysis. Fortunately, removing the F-35 from my data
sample only results in the loss of fifteen contracts, reducing my overall sample
size to 134.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 recreate Tables 2.4 and 2.7 using the smaller sample. In
removing the fifteen F-35 contracts, I also lose five of twelve dual source contracts
and eleven of forty-six RDT&E contracts. The summary statistics for the
non-binary independent variables are very similar with one very large exception.
The mean initial contract price for the sample without the F-35 is almost $200
million less than in the previous sample, and the standard deviation decreases by
more than $700 million. While the minimum contract price remains the same,
the maximum contract price decreases by more than $10 billion. Meanwhile, the
average contract completeness rank increases to 4.11 with a standard deviation
of 1.86. This comparison indicates that estimation of the smaller sample may
be a worthwhile exercise in order to determine the impact of the inclusion of the
23http://www.defense.gov.
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F-35 on my empirical results.
Table 2.10: Summary Statistics for MDAP Contracts (without F-35)
Total % of Sample
Army 21 15.67
Navy 81 60.45
Air Force 32 23.88
RDT&E 35 26.12
Procurement 96 71.64
Acquisition O&M 3 2.24
Table 2.11: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables (without F-35)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
adjip ($M) 653.51 1321.58 0.33 9670.87
length 38.21 25.943 2.00 129.00
var (Thousands) 138.36 384.80 0.00 2262.86
winage 7.27 6.19 0.00 23.00
emp (Thousands) 141.92 62.04 32.00 319.00
rev ($M) 11393.72 8581.56 2275.76 30894.20
prevcont 15.38 11.19 0 46
cratio 0.90 0.19 0.48 1.38
leverage 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.38
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 display the results of OLS and ordered probit estimation
of equation (2.2) for the reduced sample, respectively. In Table 2.12, we can
see that the regression model suffers from the same multicollinearity issues after
adding Firm and Year effects in columns (6) and (7). Additionally, the RDT&E
indicator has a significant negative effect on the contract type decision in the
first five specifications and is quite similar in magnitude to the OLS coefficients
estimated from the larger sample. However, several new findings also emerge.
The measure for contractor experience, PREVCONT, is positive and highly
significant in all specifications. The coefficient for the NSD indicator is positive
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and significant until we add the military branch dummies. Also, unlike the
previous OLS results, the coefficient on the firm’s current ratio is significant after
controlling for military component but becomes insignificant with the addition of
the interaction terms. Finally, the coefficients for the military branch indicators
are never significant using the reduced sample.
In Table 2.13, we again have the result that, under ordered probit estimation,
the coefficient for RDT&E is never significant. However, the procurement dummy
exhibits a large, positive effect on the contract type in the specification with
firm effects. This is in accordance with theoretical predictions, as one would
expect initiation of the procurement phase to depend upon demonstration of the
technology, production processes, etc. Therefore, a procurement contract should
perhaps not be expected to accommodate as many hypothetical outcomes and
potential pitfalls.
Also in contrast to previous results, the coefficient on initial price is positive
and significant in the sixth specification. The uniquely expensive contracts for
the F-35 were clearly affecting the previous outcome, as the simple correlation
between the initial price and completeness level is reduced from -0.0947 to -0.0049
when I remove the F-35 from my sample. The finding of a positive relationship
between price and contract completeness is in line with the theoretical model,
as ex post opportunism could lead to higher surplus extraction for a contract
covering a larger dollar amount, all else equal. A more complete contract
ensures that the government’s relatively large investment is protected from costly
uncertainty.
Unlike the OLS results for the reduced sample, the coefficient on the
dummy variable for Navy-controlled contracts is negative and significant in the
specification that includes interaction terms. This finding supports the rankings
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from the larger sample. Given the technologically-advanced MDAPs that fall
under the Navy’s purview, the idea that Naval acquisition officials may issue less
complete contracts, on average, is perhaps not surprising.
The findings for the firm characteristics are similar to the OLS results for the
smaller sample. A firm’s status as a non-subdivision, its current ratio, and the
leverage ratio for non-subdivision firms are the only factors that exhibit significant
effects on the contract type decision, and none of these variables remain significant
across all specifications.
In summary, it appears that the inclusion of the F-35 program in my data
sample indeed affected my statistical results. However, the qualitative findings
for both samples were relatively uniform. The primary difference between the two
samples is the significance of the effect of the previous number of contracts within
the data sample. As I have previously discussed, this significant positive effect
may be capturing something other than contractor experience as a result of the
left-censoring of the data sample. Due to the fact that some of the contractors
are only responsible for one project within the data set, it is entirely possible
that this variable is mainly serving as a proxy for project sequence. Furthermore,
it is possible that my conclusions regarding the relationship between contractor
experience and contractor type suffer from an additional confounding issue. If
the selection of a contractor with a certain experience level occurs in tandem
with the selection of contract type, my previous results will exhibit bias due to
a simultaneity problem. I discuss this possibility at length in the next section of
the paper.
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Table 2.12: Ordinary Least Squares Results without F-35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip 0.0290 0.0274 0.0098 0.0413 0.0736 0.1091 0.1017
(0.0854) (0.0857) (0.0863) (0.0887) (0.0911) (0.0908) (0.0985)
rd -2.0422** -2.0361** -2.0001** -1.8295* -1.6415* -1.2186 -1.4629
(0.9465) (0.9495) (0.9464) (0.9478) (0.9731) (0.9460) (1.1854)
proc 0.8820 0.9079 0.8426 1.0115 1.1809 1.3963 1.2493
(0.9302) (0.9345) (0.9323) (0.9344) (0.9602) (0.9280) (1.1696)
length 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0024 -0.0001
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0065)
winage -0.0220 -0.0234 -0.0256 -0.0473 -0.0528 -0.0297 -0.0633
(0.0346) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0386) (0.0398) (0.0450) (0.0595)
duals -0.2841 -0.2017 0.0924 0.2126 -0.0590 -0.0572
(0.5761) (0.5771) (0.6011) (0.6323) (0.6180) (0.6721)
lvar 0.0414 0.0479 0.0473 0.0398 0.0489
(0.0301) (0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0300) (0.0326)
army 0.0395 0.0036 0.1656 0.1950
(0.5537) (0.5741) (0.5690) (0.6580)
navy -0.5264 -0.5701 -0.1767 -0.3743
(0.3992) (0.4108) (0.4334) (0.5313)
lemp 0.2311 0.2488 0.2898 -0.0290 -0.2173 -0.5503 -0.9306
(0.4062) (0.4090) (0.4086) (0.4596) (0.5026) (1.0133) (1.2091)
lrev -0.2883 -0.3127 -0.2821 -0.2610 -0.2235 0.3003 0.3797
(0.2317) (0.2377) (0.2378) (0.2391) (0.2676) (0.4158) (0.4519)
prevcont 0.0329** 0.0338** 0.0369** 0.0438*** 0.0515*** 0.0675*** 0.1054**
(0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0228) (0.0486)
nsd 0.5031* 0.5080* 0.4851* 0.3281 -3.8770 omitted omitted
(0.2930) (0.2940) (0.2934) (0.3902) (9.7673)
cratio -0.9308 -0.9259 -1.0691 -1.7201* -1.7517 -0.4813 -0.5016
(0.8050) (0.8075) (0.8113) (0.8974) (1.0909) (1.3576) (1.6606)
nsd × lrev -0.7719 1.2228 1.1046
(0.9134) (1.3102) (1.8132)
nsd × cratio -2.5289 0.9196 -1.8136
(2.4908) (3.4709) (4.2457)
nsd × lev 3.3029 16.3178*** 16.9177**
(3.5238) (5.8285) (7.6904)
nsd × lemp 1.1010 1.1746 1.0889
(1.0822) (1.5019) (1.9735)
Constant 4.0598 4.0770 3.2773 7.4686 9.0394 6.9771 10.1565
(4.5562) (4.5704) (4.5906) (5.3415) (5.6890) (12.4973) (15.0869)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.4234 0.4198 0.4240 0.4286 0.4316 0.4981 0.4843
F-Statistic 10.77 9.75 9.16 8.13 6.61 6.08 3.97
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 134 134 134 134 134 134 134
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.13: Ordered Probit Results without F-35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip 0.0522 0.0511 0.0316 0.0673 0.1022 0.1541* 0.1483
(0.0678) (0.0679) (0.0691) (0.0731) (0.0760) (0.0840) (0.0955)
rd -1.1788 -1.1733 -1.1779 -1.0130 -0.8763 -0.2144 -0.6994
(0.7981) (0.8005) (0.8038) (0.7973) (0.8184) (0.9231) (1.1174)
proc 0.8535 0.8884 0.8169 0.9967 1.2122 1.9219** 1.6884
(0.7913) (0.7959) (0.7994) (0.7940) (0.8199) (0.9224) (1.1117)
length -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0017
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0056)
winage -0.0259 -0.0279 -0.0295 -0.0467 -0.0550* -0.0278 -0.0200
(0.0295) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0323) (0.0334) (0.0433) (0.0663)
duals -0.3244 -0.2503 0.0209 0.0602 -0.1932 -0.1994
(0.5050) (0.5101) (0.5300) (0.5557) (0.5828) (0.6542)
lvar 0.0377 0.0470* 0.0483* 0.0438 0.0627**
(0.0250) (0.0260) (0.0265) (0.0278) (0.0304)
army 0.0595 0.0112 0.1384 0.4642
(0.4567) (0.4753) (0.5147) (0.6149)
navy -0.4936 -0.5819* -0.2926 -0.1870
(0.3296) (0.3425) (0.3954) (0.5211)
lemp 0.1184 0.1316 0.1852 -0.0705 -0.2531 -0.4836 -1.0209
(0.3399) (0.3413) (0.3437) (0.3789) (0.4114) (0.8632) (1.0568)
lrev -0.2928 -0.3179* -0.2983 -0.2920 -0.2902 0.1146 0.1796
(0.1880) (0.1923) (0.1940) (0.1984) (0.2227) (0.3625) (0.4019)
prevcont 0.0346*** 0.0360*** 0.0393*** 0.0452*** 0.0512*** 0.0762*** 0.1612***
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0225) (0.0527)
nsd 0.4104* 0.4175* 0.3938 0.2585 -9.0785 -36.6178 -33.6351
(0.2422) (0.2427) (0.2444) (0.3248) (9.2589) (310.0213) (443.0198)
cratio -0.8193 -0.8304 -0.9465 -1.5500* -1.5763* -1.0952 -0.8287
(0.6404) (0.6419) (0.6474) (0.7193) (0.8769) (1.2151) (1.5141)
nsd × lrev -0.5185 1.9047 2.4111
(0.7704) (1.2419) (1.8026)
nsd × cratio -2.3053 2.3978 0.0700
(2.1524) (3.0995) (3.9136)
nsd × lev 3.4143 19.1263*** 23.4710***
(3.0236) (5.8526) (8.0655)
nsd × lemp 1.3276 1.9332 1.5629
(1.0206) (1.6288) (2.1555)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
Likelihood Ratio 68.74 69.14 71.43 75.42 81.56 111.43 130.13
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 134 134 134 134 134 134 134
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.8 Effects of Repeat Interactions
Following Corts and Singh (2004), I now consider the possibility that the
Department of Defense views repeat interactions and “high-powered” contracts
(or complete contracts in the terminology of this paper) as either substitutes
or complements. This is a possibility if a contractor’s previous experience with
the defense contracting process directly affects the DoD’s selection of both the
contractor and a particular contract type for the same contract.
If repeat interactions with a particular contractor naturally engender trust
and a stronger alignment of incentives, one would expect the Department of
Defense to issue less complete contracts to firms with more experience in defense
acquisition (i.e., experience and contractual completeness are substitutes). On
the other hand, if the prevalent effect of the repeat interactions is to familiarize
defense firms with the FAR and the unique requirements of DoD acquisition and,
thus, reduce the costs of contract formalization, one might observe more complete
contracts for more experienced firms (a complementary relationship). According
to Corts and Singh, it is not entirely clear, for a particular industry, whether
repeat interactions should “primarily mitigate incentive problems or decrease
contracting costs” (p. 238). Therefore, it is also unclear, ex ante, whether the
two features are substitutes or complements within an industry.
The results of section 2.7 indicate that a contractor’s number of previous
contracts has a positive effect on the level of contractual completeness in my
data sample. This finding suggests that the DoD views repeat interactions
and contractual completeness as complements. While this is in contrast to
Corts and Singh’s findings for offshore drilling contracts, the positive relationship
may be reflecting a sequencing effect rather than the true relationship between
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repeated interactions and contract power. Due to the fact that defense projects
regularly aspire to advance the frontier of defense technology, initial contracts
for a particular weapons system will involve a large amount of technological
uncertainty, making cost-plus contracts more feasible. However, as the project
continues and subsequent contracts are agreed upon, these technical issues are
addressed and more complete contracts are naturally possible. As a result of
the left-censoring of my data sample and the fact that several of the contractors
work on only one MDAP, I would expect to see that repeat interactions will
closely follow the production sequence of the defense program, leading to more
complete contracts. This is clearly a separate effect from the one described by
Corts and Singh (2004) and does not satisfactorily characterize the effect of repeat
interactions in the defense industry.
Using Corts and Singh’s methodology, I will now estimate the direction of the
bias that results from simultaneity and endogenous matching in order to clarify
the relationship between contractor experience and the contract type decision in
DoD acquisition. The above discussion indicates that the selection of contract
type and the selection of a winning firm with a certain experience level might
be a simultaneous decision rather than sequential events, as previously modeled
in this paper. In fact, the FAR indicates that the contract type decision and
selection of a contractor are sequential rather than simultaneous events. During
price negotiation, the FAR states that the contracting officer’s primary goal is
to “negotiate a contract of a type and with a price providing the contractor
the greatest incentive for efficient and economical performance” (FAR,15.405b).
However, it is certainly possible that for a given project, a specific contract
type/contractor experience combination will be optimal. In other words, unique
aspects of the project may simultaneously guide the acquisition officer towards a
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certain contractor and a certain contract type. This is a distinct possibility, given
the FAR’s guidance that the contract type should be discussed as early as the
proposal phase, which occurs prior to any competitive bidding (FAR, 15.201c).
To account for this possibility, I now model the simultaneous choice of contract
type (contractual completeness) and contractor experience. As an illustrative
exercise, consider the following two equation version of my model in matrix
notation:
C = α0 + α1PREV CONT + α2X + ε (2.3)
PREV CONT = β0 + β1C + β2W + β3Y + υ. (2.4)
In this version of the model, all variables are defined as before exceptW, which
warrants further explanation. The matrix W contains all project characteristics
except the indicators for controlling military component. This exclusion is based
on the assumption that a contractor who produces an item for the Air Force
could feasibly modify its production technology to produce a similar item for the
Army. In other words, I am assuming that an Army acquisition official would
not choose a firm that is inexperienced in the production of helicopters over a
proven helicopter manufacturer merely because the more experienced contractor
has only worked for the Air Force.
Note that the two-equation model implies that firm characteristics only
affect the choice of contract type through the contractor’s previous number of
contracts. Due to the presence of the additional project characteristics (controls
for component) in equation (2.3) and the firm characteristics in equation (2.4),
this system of equations is numerically identified. Given this structure, we can
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now discuss potential modeling issues, which result directly from the possibility
that the contract type/experience decision is simultaneous rather than sequential.
First, the two-equation model demonstrates the simultaneity issue caused
by correlation between PREVCONT and ε. If we ignore the existence of
equation (2.4) and estimate only equation (2.3), the coefficient on PREVCONT
will be biased due to the presence of β1C. This effect can be negative or positive,
depending upon whether repeat interactions and completeness are substitutes or
complements, respectively. Based on the presence of the previously discussed
sequencing effect, the sign of this bias is unclear. However, any change in
the magnitude of the corrected coefficient will be informative in categorizing
contractual completeness and previous experience as either substitutes or
complements.
A second concern, raised first by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) and addressed
in Corts and Singh (2004), is that the simultaneously determined contract type
and experience level may be affected by an endogenous matching phenomenon.
For example, consider the scenario where a new security threat requires the
DoD to develop a very specific and unique technological countermeasure. The
technological uncertainty created by this new requirement will be exogenous
from the DoD’s standpoint. However, the technological issue may fall within
the purview of a particular defense firm, which has worked on similar projects
in the past. The defense firm’s decision to compete for this particular project
may therefore be endogenous. Given the contract data available for use in this
paper, I would be unable to observe this technological heterogeneity and must
account for the endogenous matching problem during estimation. In the presence
of endogenous matching, Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) find that ”the matching
generates correlation between observable characteristics of one of the parties and
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proxy errors for the other party, potentially biasing many or all coefficients of
interest” (p. 568). In the case of my empirical model, this problem would result
in correlation between the observed firm characteristics (X ’s) and ε.
2.8.1 Estimation
Although the structure of the above model suggests that I might pursue
three-stage least squares estimation of the system of equations, the presence of
heteroscedastic errors in the first equation prevents the use of the 3SLS technique
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Therefore, in order to correct for both simultaneity
and endogenous matching, I will use Two-Stage Least Squares estimation to
instrument for the endogenous regressors, which include PREVCONT, LEMP,
LREV, and CRATIO. I assume that the operating structure of a given firm
(NSD) is exogenous to any specific contract type/firm experience decision. As
the system of equations suggest, these instruments should be highly correlated
with the characteristics of the selected firm. However, the instruments must only
affect the contract type decision through their effect on the selected experience
level and should have no other effect on the contract type decision.
As in Corts and Singh (2004), I use the “hypothetical expected value” of
winning firm characteristics as instruments for the actual firm characteristics. To
calculate these instruments, I construct a weighted average of the characteristic
in question, using market shares from a three-period moving window. The
window includes last period, the current period, and the next period.24 For
this purpose, a “market” is defined by aircraft type (unmanned aerial vehicle,
helicopter, fixed-wing special purpose aircraft, or fixed-wing utility aircraft). I
24For example, for a contract awarded in year 2, the three-period window includes contracts
from year 1, year 2, and year 3.
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restrict my instruments to include only characteristics from firms that produce
similar aircraft types because I assume that it is prohibitively expensive for a firm
to routinely switch its production technology from one aircraft type to another.
Therefore, the relevant market for a helicopter producer is restricted to include
only other helicopter producers. A firm’s market share in this context is simply
its percentage of the overall number of contracts within its market during the
pertinent three-period window.25
Using the market-share weights, I then calculate expected values for the firm’s
previous contracts and financial characteristics. In order to use all available data
for the purposes of instrumentation, I have also included an expected value for
the firm’s leverage ratio as an additional instrument. These instruments should
have excellent predictive power for the characteristics of a winning firm. However,
it seems much less likely that these aggregate measures of firm size and financial
health within a market would directly affect an acquisition official’s contract
type decision for a specific project. Allowing for an indirect effect through the
PREVCONT variable, these instruments should be plausibly exogenous to the
selection of an optimal completeness level (equation (2.3)). In support of this
assumption, the Wu-Hausman test for endogenous instruments in my baseline
regression fails to reject the null of exogenous instruments with a p-value of
0.5585.
In the following section, I will present only the results of the linear
model. Although the econometric literature supports and provides tools for the
estimation of an ordered probit model with instrumental variables (Wooldridge
2010, p. 660), the estimation of an ordered probit model in conjunction
25The use of this three-period moving window results in the loss of ten contract observations
from the first and last period.
59
with 2SLS methods does not seem to be a developed technique. While
Roodman’s conditional mixed process estimator will allow for the estimation of an
ordered probit model with instrumental variables, it is recursive in nature and,
thus, cannot incorporate the simultaneous structure of my model (Roodman,
2011). Therefore even if I pursued purely an IV estimation approach, the
readily available econometric tools will not fully accommodate the unique issues
presented in this paper. As a result, I will consider the estimation of this model
via ordered probit as a future direction for research.
2.8.2 Results
Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 display the 2SLS estimation results for the samples
with and without the F-35 program, respectively. In order to ensure continuity,
these regression tables follow the same progression of analysis from previous
tables. However, the explanatory power of the model is drastically reduced when
I add the interaction terms, firm effects, and year effects in 2SLS estimation.
In fact, the regression F-statistics for columns (6) and (7) indicate that these
models do not explain a statistically significant amount of variation in contractual
completeness. While this is not the case for column (5), the drastic reduction in
the R-squared value due to the addition of the interaction terms suggests that I
should restrict my analysis of valid models to the first four specifications.26
Comparing Tables 2.8 and 2.14, the 2SLS estimation results in the significance
of the coefficient of the PREVCONT variable in specifications (2) through
(4). Additionally, we can see that the magnitude of the coefficient on
previous contracts also increases in each specification. This is evidence that
26Due to the endogeneity of these interaction terms, I calculated instruments for these variables
using the same moving-window technique in order to introduce them into the regressionmodel.
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the simultaneity between contract type and contractor experience induced a
downward bias in my previous results. Therefore, this result suggests that
contractual completeness and repeat interactions are treated as substitutes in the
defense contracting environment. The results for the remaining coefficients are
quite similar, with one exception. The coefficient on the procurement indicator
is much larger in magnitude and significant in the 2SLS results, whereas the
coefficient for the RDT&E indicator remains negative but is insignificant. This
result suggests that the endogenous matching phenomenon was indeed causing
bias in some or all of the coefficients of interest. Finally, the relative rankings of
the military components in terms of average contractual completeness are also
consistent with previous results (1. Air Force, 2. Army, 3. Navy).
In a similar fashion, the results listed in Table 2.15 are comparable to
Table 2.12. Again, one can see that the addition of the interaction terms,
firm intercepts, and year intercepts drastically reduces and even eliminates the
explanatory power of the regression model. Also, a similar pattern emerges in
terms of the coefficient for the PREVCONT variable. The coefficient from 2SLS
estimation is distinctly larger in magnitude in specifications (1) through (4).
This is further evidence that contract power and repeated interactions serve as
substitutes in the defense contracting environment. Additionally, we also observe
a reversal in magnitude and significance between the coefficients for the RDT&E
and Procurement indicators, similar to the results for the sample including the
F-35. This result and changes in magnitude and significance for other explanatory
variables (WINAGE, NSD, CRATIO, NAVY ) again suggests that the endogenous
matching problem induced severe bias in the OLS coefficients.
In accordance with Corts and Singh (2004), the result that more interactions
lead to less complete contracts in the defense contracting environment indicates
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that the primary effect of repeat interactions in the defense industry is to mitigate
incentive problems (p. 238). This result seems intuitive as one would expect that
a repeat contractor for the DoD to be largely dependent on future DoD contracts,
given the specialized nature of the defense industry. This contractor would have
a vested interest in meeting deadlines, controlling cost growth, and adhering to
federal guidelines, as deviation could result in exclusion from the industry. The
lack of an outside option for U.S. defense contractors virtually ensures that this
would be the case. Therefore, one would naturally expect the alignment of DoD
and contractor incentives to occur as a contractor becomes more experienced in
defense acquisition and more dependent on future DoD projects.
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Table 2.14: Two-Stage Least Squares Results with F-35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip 0.0237 0.0222 0.0060 0.1254 0.1083 0.6614 -25.0621
(0.0930) (0.0921) (0.0947) (0.1013) (0.2216) (1.5652) (165438.05)
rd -0.4782 -0.5164 -0.5947 0.0257 -0.4732 7.6032 3906.521
(1.4105) (1.3550) (1.3441) (1.3998) (2.1611) (24.1396) (2528285)
proc 2.3889* 2.2936* 2.1670* 2.5512* 1.7071 8.1001 4726.208
(1.406) (1.3383) (1.3307) (1.3855) (2.3741) (19.5771) (3057572)
length -0.0042 -0.0040 -0.0043 -0.0017 -0.0000 -0.0460 16.2712
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0082) (0.1470) (10541.7)
winage -0.1423** -0.1399** -0.1367** -0.1783** -0.1679** -0.0278 34.9373
(0.0688) (0.0649) (0.0643) (0.0789) (0.1014) (0.4496) (22689.51)
duals -0.1102 -0.0977 0.8542* 0.5501 -0.7543 307.3341
(0.5036) (0.4992) (0.4896) (1.7862) (6.1243) (198526.2)
lvar 0.0243 0.0587* 0.1049 0.1373 1.3296
(0.0321) (0.0320) (0.1007) (0.1853) (830.8749)
army 2.9371*** 2.2717 6.4531 -1157.706
(0.8514) (1.7334) (6.5529) (752844.6)
navy 1.9327*** 1.7841* 4.1719 -311.0114
(0.5715) (1.0690) (3.6009) (203711.4)
af 3.3322*** 3.4186** 4.9231 -1024.155
(0.7756) (1.5254) (4.1744) (665682.4)
lemp -1.4766 -1.4299 -1.3503 -1.9232* -1.7245 -36.6883 4638.29
(0.9360) (0.8879) (0.8881) (1.0773) (1.7322) (97.8572) (3010600)
lrev 0.1421 0.1332 0.1528 0.2818 0.3775 1.3774 492.9534
(0.4636) (0.4655) (0.4625) (0.4420) (0.6275) (9.2239) (317286.6)
prevcont 0.0495 0.0484* 0.0482* 0.0694** 0.0029 -0.0664 -467.4509
(0.0306) (0.0290) (0.0288) (0.0319) (0.1214) (0.2565) (302620.1)
nsd -0.0812 -0.0724 -0.0670 -0.5749 -61.1330 -460.6042 71602.68
(0.3936) (0.3828) (0.3795) (0.5292) (96.3871) (1282.947) (4.65e07)
cratio -3.0764 -3.0044 -2.9402 -4.9115** -1.3743 -15.2101 12581.93
(2.0537) (1.9153) (1.8931) (2.2020) (5.0382) (46.0470) (8147654)
nsd × lrev 1.9046 0.0701 -8619.857
(10.1868) (19.7419) (5580301)
nsd × cratio -17.9400 -35.8034 36893
(14.7724) (74.0233) (2.39e07)
nsd × lev 7.2720 4.1772 -38487.43
(24.2509) (56.2263) (2.49e07)
nsd × lemp 4.9928 39.8551 -2939.135
(4.5992) (95.8990) (1910883)
Constant 21.7105** 21.2272** 20.0594** 23.8475 19.0057 439.2165 -51426.15
(10.2243) (9.5183) (9.5600) (12.0080) (18.8546) (1257.26) (3.34e07)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.3859 0.3900 0.3993 0.4587 0.1031 . .
Wald Statistic 99.73 100.89 102.84 129.47 83.17 12.94 0
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9941 1.0000
N 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.15: Two-Stage Least Squares Results without F-35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip 0.0944 0.0928 0.0720 0.1432 0.1588 0.9892 0.08469
(0.0925) (0.0921) (0.0938) (0.1207) (0.2640) (4.4039) (0.6785)
rd -0.6184 -0.6737 -0.8063 0.1650 -0.0959 11.8811 11.4494
(1.4160 (1.3971) (1.3794) (1.8493) (2.8652) (63.4359) (20.8615)
proc 2.2426* 2.10977* 1.9785 2.8757* 2.1598 10.4406 16.1916
(1.3740) (1.3491) (1.3402) (1.7572) (2.9604) (45.3364) (24.5357)
length -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0029 0.0010 0.0038 0.0139
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0999) (0.0491)
winage -0.1158* -0.1136* -0.1059 -0.1953* -0.1884 -0.1294 -0.0847
(0.0681) (0.0671) (0.0664) (0.1102) (0.1545) (0.6936) (0.2994)
duals -0.1226 -0.0517 0.6620 0.7822 5.4986 -1.7743
(0.6000) (0.5941) (0.7833) (2.1884) (23.6964) (4.8052)
lvar 0.0332 0.0435 0.0946 0.4237 0.0514
(0.0317) (0.0335) (0.1094) (1.6980) (0.1444)
army -0.5758 -1.1280 -1.3070 3.9880
(0.6427) (1.0380) (8.9337) (6.3594)
navy -1.4544* -1.7893 -5.1766 3.6117
(0.8314) (1.4745) (22.3765) (7.2442)
lemp -1.2382 -1.1972 -1.0300 -2.2195 -2.1936 -45.6289 -4.5764
(0.9503) (0.9633) (0.9639) (1.5931) (2.5219) (212.3794) (19.5557)
lrev 0.1156 0.0995 0.1210 0.2518 0.4665 -4.5255 13.3478
(0.4317) (0.4534) (0.4485) (0.5001) (0.6095) (39.2989) (19.9641)
prevcont 0.0587** 0.0582** 0.0564** 0.0811** 0.0163 -0.3636 -1.4642
(0.0296) (0.0291) (0.0285) (0.0380) (0.1280) (1.8829) (2.6179)
nsd 0.0164 0.0310 0.0505 -0.7132 -58.6163 -631.0532 -45.6019
(0.3972) (0.3940) (0.3880) (0.7254) (94.8081) (3071.622) (272.7507)
cratio -2.5085 -2.3746 -2.3082 -4.6220 -2.1528 -17.7857 22.22403
(2.1025) (2.0359) (2.0029) (3.2022) (5.4215) (88.1338) (45.9048)
nsd × lrev 1.1026 -4.8762 -22.942
(9.6902) (31.8133) (45.2484)
nsd × cratio -17.2518 -164.6821 112.6361
(17.9059) (725.0103) (191.7837)
nsd × lev 5.7812 -52.30067 -69.4583
(26.3595) (279.8875) (183.0146)
nsd × lemp 5.4323 66.56773 9.7484
(5.5883) (301.5148) (28.5818)
Constant 18.0984* 17.6913* 15.4908 30.5350* 27.2473 603.5066 -14.0586
(10.2863) (10.1872) (10.2869) (18.1120) (29.7260) (2928.015) (228.0056)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.4352 0.4385 0.4539 0.4087 0.0673 . .
Wald Statistic 106.49 107.13 110.75 104.31 69.9 2.78 9.62
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.9 Robustness Checks
2.9.1 Robust Regression
A separate method of addressing the F-35 as a possible outlier in my data
sample is to perform a robust regression, which will weight the data in accordance
with how well each observation behaves with respect to the overall sample. This
method essentially represents a compromise between the OLS estimation of the
entire sample and estimation using the reduced sample. The STATA command
used to perform these regressions first performs an OLS regression and calculates
the Cook’s distance for each observation.27 It then removes any observation for
which Cook’s Distance is greater than one. The results of this process can be
found in Table 2.16.
Comparing these results with previous estimation techniques, the robust
regression estimates are much more similar to the OLS results for the reduced
sample than for the entire sample. However, the robust regression estimates
include some differential results. The coefficient for the RDT&E indicator
is negative and significant, but is larger in magnitude than the estimates in
Table 2.12. Additionally, a contractor’s number of previous contracts is significant
in only one specification, column (5), but is similar in magnitude to previous
results. One also observes expected and significant effects from both dual
27Cook’s Distance is calculated using the following formula:
Di =
∑n
k=1(Yˆk − Yˆk(i))
2
pMSE
,
where Yˆk is the predicted value for observation k from the full model, Yˆk(i) is the predicted
value for observation k from a regression excluding observation k, p is the number of estimated
coefficients, and MSE is the mean-squared error for the full regression. A more thorough
explanation of the robust regression technique can be found at https://idre.ucla.edu/stats.
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source contracts and firm current ratios. Finally, the indicators for the different
military branches retain their relative ranking with the Air Force issuing the most
complete contracts, followed by the Army and Navy. Given the results of robust
regression, it appears that completely eliminating the F-35 from the sample may
overstate the impact of both the contractor’s previous number of contracts and
understate the role played by the controlling military branch.
2.9.2 Alternative Ranking of Contract Completeness
In a seminal paper on incomplete contract theory, Hart and Moore (1999)
provide two alternative characterizations of incomplete contracts. As in
this paper, a contract can include incomplete descriptions of the contractual
obligations of the involved parties and leave items such as reimbursement schemes,
timelines, and profit rates open to future renegotiation. On the other hand, a
contract can also be incomplete if it is impossible to fully describe the physical
characteristics of the underlying project itself, perhaps due to unrealized states
of nature. In this type of incomplete contract, the contract’s incentive power is of
paramount importance if the buyer hopes to motivate cost-minimizing behavior
by the contractor.
This alternative definition of incomplete contracting, which hinges upon
the physical describability of the work to be performed under the contract,
also influences the language of the FAR. In fact, one can assign a separate
“describability” ranking to the different contract types, based on the implied
physical describability of the underlying projects from the contract type
descriptions in section 16 of the FAR. This procedure results in swapping the
ranks of the CPIF and CPFF contracts (i.e., C = 1 for CPFF and C = 3 for
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CPIF). Tables 2.17 and 2.18 present the results of estimation with the re-ordered
dependent variable.
The OLS results in Table 2.17 actually indicate that the fit of the regression
model improves when the dependent variable is re-ordered using the alternative
definition of completeness. The coefficient on the indicator for RDT&E contracts
is now larger in magnitude and significant in all specifications. Also in contrast
with previous results, the coefficient for the contractor’s number of contracts is
positive and highly significant, although the magnitude is quite similar. The
indicator for dual source contracts has a significant and positive effect on the
contract’s describability ranking in columns (4) and (5), and the firms’ current
ratio and subdivision status have more consistent effects than when using the
previous contract ranking. Meanwhile, the relative completeness ranking of the
different military branches is once again maintained.
Comparing the ordered probit results in Table 2.18 with Table 2.9, I again
see a larger and more significant effect of the RDT&E indicator, contractor
experience, subdivision status, and current ratio. Additionally, the coefficient for
dual source contracts is now significant in columns (4) and (5) and has doubled in
magnitude. Overall, the results from this robustness check seem to indicate that
an alternative definition of contractual completeness, derived from the ability
to fully describe the scope of work, may be more influential in DoD acquisition
officers’ selection of contract types. However, this paper’s comparison of the
results attained by using alternative definitions of completeness help to reinforce
Hart and Moore’s assertion that these competing characterizations may have
differential effects on contracting decisions.
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Table 2.16: Weighted Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip -0.025 -0.027 -0.033 -0.018 -0.003 -0.063 -0.090
(0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.082) (0.082) (0.071) (0.072)
rd -2.899∗∗∗ -2.795∗∗ -2.840∗∗ -2.702∗∗ -2.769∗∗ -3.250∗∗∗ -3.990∗∗∗
(0.842) (0.859) (0.858) (0.904) (0.912) (0.775) (0.896)
proc 0.192 0.280 0.231 0.249 0.078 -0.204 -0.591
(0.828) (0.843) (0.843) (0.890) (0.899) (0.759) (0.877)
length 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
winage -0.042 -0.043 -0.045 -0.059 -0.071∗ -0.021 -0.027
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.044)
lemp 0.046 0.017 0.031 -0.149 -0.419 -1.058 -1.483
(0.342) (0.348) (0.348) (0.398) (0.425) (0.795) (0.856)
lrev -0.170 -0.161 -0.146 -0.093 0.058 0.240 0.187
(0.203) (0.207) (0.207) (0.220) (0.246) (0.312) (0.317)
prevcont 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.040∗ 0.027 0.058
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.035)
nsd 0.218 0.262 0.236 0.117 -4.955
(0.248) (0.253) (0.253) (0.342) (8.937)
cratio -0.654 -0.588 -0.639 -0.934 -2.074∗ -1.917 -1.978
(0.591) (0.606) (0.605) (0.673) (1.012) (1.083) (1.177)
duals 0.314 0.306 0.573 1.039∗ 0.219 0.089
(0.405) (0.404) (0.451) (0.467) (0.403) (0.416)
lvar 0.015 0.021 0.033 0.021 -0.010
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024)
army 0.590 1.604∗ 0.414 0.372
(0.577) (0.642) (0.544) (0.561)
navy 0.474 1.336∗∗ 0.644 0.349
(0.446) (0.477) (0.406) (0.419)
af 0.833 1.916∗∗∗ 0.647 0.377
(0.517) (0.564) (0.465) (0.477)
nsd × lrev -0.744 0.888 0.564
(0.859) (0.711) (0.913)
nsd × cratio -2.830 -0.008 -1.191
(2.320) (1.550) (2.017)
nsd × lev 2.811 9.861∗∗ 9.446∗
(3.163) (3.105) (3.833)
nsd × lemp 1.171 1.206 1.097
(0.981) (1.140) (1.376)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
F-Statistic 17.72 15.23 14.32 10.22 8.95 10.14 7.81
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 149 149 149 149 148 149 149
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.17: Alternative Contract Ranking: OLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip -0.019 -0.019 -0.024 0.016 0.020 0.023 0.031
(0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.077) (0.082) (0.083)
rd -2.512∗∗∗ -2.549∗∗∗ -2.547∗∗∗ -2.433∗∗∗ -2.398∗∗ -2.088∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗
(0.797) (0.807) (0.809) (0.858) (0.981) (0.716) (0.917)
proc 0.276 0.249 0.234 0.142 0.197 0.355 0.371
(0.804) (0.813) (0.813) (0.864) (0.984) (0.700) (0.906)
length -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
winage -0.024 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.015 0.013 0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.041)
lemp -0.025 -0.030 -0.025 -0.021 -0.022 -0.129 -0.794
(0.306) (0.308) (0.308) (0.300) (0.336) (0.771) (0.979)
ldrev -0.143 -0.133 -0.129 -0.064 0.054 0.452 0.315
(0.194) (0.192) (0.192) (0.186) (0.217) (0.310) (0.347)
prevcont 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.048
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.033)
nsd 0.594∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗ 0.525∗∗ 8.644
(0.227) (0.229) (0.229) (0.257) (6.139)
cratio -0.891∗∗ -0.851∗∗ -0.856∗∗ -0.898∗ -1.713∗∗ -1.165 -1.273
(0.422) (0.424) (0.426) (0.505) (0.771) (1.063) (1.371)
duals 0.242 0.243 0.634∗ 0.791∗∗ 0.608 0.472
(0.328) (0.326) (0.359) (0.367) (0.387) (0.449)
lvar 0.009 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.011
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.029)
army 1.105∗∗ 1.390∗∗ 1.532∗∗ 1.571∗∗
(0.520) (0.560) (0.626) (0.728)
navy 1.091∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.319) (0.360) (0.454)
af 1.315∗∗∗ 1.528∗∗∗ 1.592∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.375) (0.418) (0.498)
nsd × lrev -0.547 -0.320 0.402
(0.573) (0.541) (0.702)
nsd × cratio 1.084 -0.343 -1.380
(1.082) (1.335) (1.881)
nsd × lev 3.405 6.508∗ 8.864∗∗
(2.807) (3.749) (4.395)
nsd × lemp -0.409 0.059 0.152
(0.580) (1.016) (1.327)
Constant 6.647∗∗ 6.577∗∗ 6.455∗ 4.541 3.711 0.927 10.106
(3.295) (3.320) (3.332) (3.368) (3.747) (9.333) (12.130)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
R-Squared 0.567 0.568 0.569 0.598 0.610 0.670 0.694
F-Statistic 38.603 36.721 33.193 29.512 26.628 . .
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . .
N 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.18: Alternative Contract Ranking: Ordered Probit Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable
ladjip 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.053 0.063 0.073 0.077
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.080) (0.074) (0.086) (0.085)
rd -2.063∗∗ -2.113∗∗ -2.118∗∗ -2.030∗∗ -2.029∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗ -2.192∗∗∗
(0.826) (0.835) (0.836) (0.936) (1.019) (0.707) (0.851)
proc 0.338 0.304 0.283 0.266 0.307 0.444 0.555
(0.838) (0.842) (0.845) (0.945) (1.026) (0.690) (0.864)
length -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
winage -0.027 -0.025 -0.026 -0.017 -0.012 0.030 0.054
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.055)
lemp -0.127 -0.129 -0.121 -0.042 -0.061 0.079 -0.658
(0.290) (0.290) (0.290) (0.294) (0.326) (0.735) (0.854)
ldrev -0.137 -0.125 -0.121 -0.072 0.031 0.642∗ 0.552
(0.184) (0.182) (0.181) (0.174) (0.212) (0.346) (0.350)
prevcont 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.035)
nsd 0.614∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗ 9.557 11.271 -1.355
(0.214) (0.219) (0.220) (0.290) (6.562) (11.757) (14.304)
cratio -0.961∗∗ -0.903∗∗ -0.914∗∗ -1.219∗∗ -1.606∗∗ -0.524 -0.273
(0.453) (0.452) (0.454) (0.561) (0.736) (1.087) (1.312)
duals 0.307 0.307 0.878∗ 1.089∗∗ 0.862 0.705
(0.371) (0.367) (0.513) (0.517) (0.564) (0.577)
lvar 0.010 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.031
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028)
army 1.457∗∗ 1.629∗∗ 2.090∗∗∗ 2.639∗∗∗
(0.600) (0.638) (0.684) (0.719)
navy 1.361∗∗∗ 1.534∗∗∗ 2.271∗∗∗ 2.835∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.406) (0.459) (0.487)
af 1.562∗∗∗ 1.788∗∗∗ 2.046∗∗∗ 2.474∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.452) (0.455) (0.515)
nsd × lrev -1.162∗ -0.945∗ 0.205
(0.615) (0.572) (0.742)
nsd × cratio -1.033 -1.624 -3.476∗
(1.469) (1.494) (1.996)
nsd × lev 0.705 4.837 9.579∗∗
(3.147) (4.310) (4.443)
nsd × lemp 0.203 -0.055 0.332
(0.688) (0.986) (1.198)
Firm Effects No No No No No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No No No No No Yes
Likelihood Ratio 119.41 120.93 125.02 142.68 145.38 545.30 1144.21
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.10 Conclusion
The primary goal of this paper was to establish empirically whether DoD
acquisition officials weight observed project and firm characteristics in a uniform
manner in their contract type decision. Building upon the work of Crocker and
Reynolds (1993), I extended a modified version of their theoretical model of
optimal incompleteness to a larger array of aircraft projects undertaken by the US
Department of Defense. After additionally controlling for simultaneity between
the contract type decision and contractor experience, several patterns emerged,
which suggest that DoD acquisition officials are acting in an efficient manner.
First, contracting officers tend to award more complete contracts during the
procurement phase of an MDAP. This accommodation of decreasing levels of
technological uncertainty aligns with the suggestions of Bajari and Tadelis (2001)
and Bajari, McMillan, and Tadelis (2008). Second, we see that the different
branches of the military are able to utilize the full menu of contract types to
account for technological heterogeneity specific to their MDAPs. For example,
the Navy appears to issue less complete contracts, on average, than the Army.
This finding is intuitive, considering that the Navy’s MDAPs, which include
multiple new fixed-wing aircraft, are likely more technologically complex than the
Army’s modernization MDAPs. Third, the coefficient for the previous contracts
variable is positive and significant. This net effect likely captures a sequencing
effect due to the left-censoring of my data sample, indicating that contracting
officials issue more complete contracts during later stages of an MDAP. This result
suggests that acquisition officials issue more complete contracts as contractor risk
diminishes and technological issues are addressed in later phases of production.
Perhaps the major contribution of this paper is the characterization of the
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relationship between repeat interactions and contractual completeness in the U.S.
defense industry. Using the empirical foundation of Corts and Singh (2004), I
modeled the choice of contract type and selection of contractor experience as a
simultaneous decision using 2SLS estimation. These revised estimates revealed
a negative bias on the OLS coefficient for previous contracts in my original
analysis, indicating that completeness and previous contractor experience are
substitutes in defense acquisition. Furthermore, this finding suggests that the
primary effect of repeat interactions in defense acquisition is to align DoD and
contractor incentives.
I suspect that the insignificance of many of the firm and project characteristics
in my results is at least partly due to measurement error. Despite the fact
that confidentiality rules prevent access to all of the firm and project variables
available to the acquisition official at the time of his decision, this is only one
area in which this model can be significantly improved. The proxy variables
for internal uncertainty used in this paper are far from perfect and are based
largely on assumption. Despite the fact that I’ve purposely selected aircraft
programs to limit heterogeneity in the production process (an approach similar
to Rogerson (1991)), the technological complexity of the MDAPs in my sample is
far from uniform. Therefore, further information that would allow me to control
for these differences in technological requirements or an estimation approach that
would allow the data to “sort itself” by technological complexity would be natural
considerations for future research.
Additionally, the robustness check for this model that introduces an
alternative ranking for the dependent variable, based on a different
characterization of contractual completeness, suggests that the definition of
“incomplete” contracting must be carefully applied. A contract may be
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incomplete in terms of contractual obligations, or it may be incomplete in
terms of the parties’ ability to describe the scope of the project. As my
results suggest, concern over contractual completeness may follow closely with
one definition or the other, depending on the contracting environment. Given
better characterization of technological heterogeneity within my data sample,
one might be able to test Hart and Moore’s conjecture that the competing
definitions of contractual completeness are both relevant but may have very
different effects on contract decisions and outcomes. For example, one could
perform a split-sample analysis, varying the technological composition of the
projects and the definition of contractual completeness, and perhaps provide
evidence regarding which definition is pertinent in various project settings.
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Chapter 3
The Relevance of Describability in the Performance of
Defense Acquisition Contracts
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Abstract
The incomplete contracting approach is used to solve the hold-up problem
in several prominent areas of public procurement. However, economists have
questioned both the optimality of incomplete contracts and the relevance of a
project’s physical describability. This paper contributes to this discussion by
providing empirical results related to the relevance of physical describability in
defense contracts for military aircraft. Despite attempts by government officials
to account for technological uncertainty, the underlying describability of the
project appears to have adverse effects on adherence to contractual timelines,
generating additional costs due to project delays.
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3.1 Introduction
The possibility of contractual hold-up, in which parties risk the loss of
relationship-specific investments in the event of a failed trade, has served as
the motivating force behind the economic literature pertaining to incomplete
contracting. In order to incentivize cost-minimizing investment by the contracted
parties prior to the actual trade, several economists have argued that the
buyer and seller can agree to an incomplete contract, which outlines contractual
obligations but allows for risk-sharing due to indescribable aspects of the project
in question. As in the case of many theoretical mechanisms, this incomplete
contracting approach has its fair share of proponents and detractors. However,
its prevalence in several prominent areas of procurement makes this debate
particularly interesting. The primary purpose of this paper is to bring empirical
results into the conversation.
The hold-up problem can take several forms. Bo¨s (1996) derives a model of
optimal incomplete contracts in which hold-up stems from the non-verifiability
of the relationship-specific investments. Alternatively, Hart and Moore (1999)
present a model of optimal incomplete contracting in which the hold-up problem
is due to the parties’ ex ante inability to describe all possible physical states of
nature. In contrast, Bo¨s (2001) provides a unique characterization of the hold-up
problem, specific to projects in which the intermediate product has no value (e.g.,
“construction ruins,” p. 105). In this situation, the buyer can be burdened with
the bill for the sunk costs but receives no actual benefit in the event of project
failure. As a result, the parties foresee this possibility and may underinvest, the
classic manifestation of the hold-up problem.
Despite these theoretical foundations and the fact that describability clearly
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plays a role in real world contract design, evidenced by the use of a menu of
different contract types in areas such as defense procurement, public service
provision, and petroleum drilling, a debate emerged in the late 1990s regarding
the optimality of incomplete contracts.
Maskin and Tirole (1999) posited their irrelevance theorems, claiming that the
ex ante indescribability of the physical outcomes of a project were insufficient to
prevent the implementation of a complete contract so long as the parties were
able to describe the spectrum of possible payoff outcomes. The authors criticize
previous work in the incomplete contracting literature, stating that the authors
“do not attempt to derive complete contract foundations for the restricted class
of contracts they study” and that the invocation of significant transaction costs is
not sufficient to relegate contract design to an incomplete approach (pp. 83-84).
In response to this criticism, Hart and Moore (1999) provide a model of
incomplete contracting, which they use to address Maskin and Tirole’s irrelevance
theorems. The authors’ results indicate that an optimal contract may be
incomplete in the presence of unachieved states of nature (indescribability).
Additionally, Hart and Moore find that Maskin and Tirole’s irrelevance results are
heavily dependent on restrictive assumptions, and “describability does matter”
when these assumptions are relaxed (p. 116). These two competing results
have spawned further research, which attempts to closely examine the ability
of contracts to solve the hold-up problem and/or to extend the discussion
on the relevance of describability. This literature includes Schmitz (2008),
Kunimoto (2008) and (2010), and Hoppe and Schmitz (2011), among others.
To summarize, there seems to be a lack of consensus regarding the use of
incomplete contracts to achieve an optimal outcome in the contracting literature.
While certain economists have asserted that describability is an “irrelevant”
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consideration in achieving optimal allocations, a second group of economists
maintain that describability is a critical factor in contract design and, thus, claim
that incomplete contracts warrant a separate classification.
In this paper, my goal is to bring new information to the aforementioned
discussion in the form of empirical results. The Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) provides guidelines for the acquisition of major weapons systems by
the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). This regulation includes a menu of
contract types from which an acquisition official may choose, given the specific
characteristics of the project and the winning firm. Given the description of
these contract types from the FAR, one can then rank contracts in terms of the
implied describability of the associated defense projects. Using this measure of
describability, project characteristics, winning firm characteristics, and efficiency
parameters from the DoD’s Earned Value Management System, I can then create
a model of contract performance and attempt to estimate the empirical effect of
describability on cost and schedule performance. While a lack of counterfactual
evidence in this study will not allow me to comment on the “optimality” of the
use of incomplete contracting methods, I hope to shed light on the relevance of
describability in determining contracting outcomes.
In order to empirically test theoretical predictions regarding describability,
this paper uses contract data from Selected Acquisition Reports, which are
required reports from the DoD to Congress for substantial weapons programs.
The contract data includes time series observations of 89 different contracts
for major weapons systems, including standardized measures of cost- and
schedule-related inefficiencies. These alternate dependent variables provide the
possibility to distinguish between the explanatory variables’ effects on overall cost
performance versus schedule-related cost performance, a distinction highlighted
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in previous studies of DoD acquisition. The analysis in this paper, while far from
conclusive, suggests that the physical describability of these projects is relevant
to the contracting process in two ways. First, the complexity and technological
uncertainty of the project in question are primary considerations in the contract
type decision by DoD officials. Second, this technological uncertainty, even after
accommodation by the DoD via the contract type decision, appears to have an
adverse effect on contract schedule performance in the form of costly production
delays.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 surveys the economic literature
on contractual solutions to the hold-up problem, discusses the Maskin/Tirole
and Hart/Moore debate in detail, and considers previous attempts to evaluate
the determinants of contract efficiency. Section 3.3 discusses specific features
of the DoD acquisition process that are relevant to the empirical portion of
this paper: Earned Value Management and contract types from the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. Section 3.4 discusses the underlying model, Section 3.5
contains a detailed description of the data used for estimation, and Section 3.6
discusses estimation procedures. Section 3.7 presents the regression results and
analysis, Section 3.8 presents robustness checks for the model, and Section 3.9
concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
The application of contracts to “solve” the hold-up problem is a
well-documented subject in the contracting literature. Rogerson (1992) finds
that first-best contractual solutions to the hold-up problem exist under extremely
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complex environmental conditions and in situations with a variety of assumptions
regarding information asymmetries (p. 777). He provides a unique corollary of the
hold-up problem: “the hold-up problem does not necessarily cause inefficiencies.
Rather inefficiencies only occur if certain environmental properties are not
satisfied or certain types of contracts cannot be written (p. 778).”
Fares (2006) surveys the literature pertaining to contractual solutions to the
hold-up problem, specifically considering implementation of mechanisms that
yield efficient investment even in the presence of contractual incompleteness.
In particular the author’s main goal is to demonstrate the importance of
renegotiation design in achieving efficient investment outcomes. Summarizing
conclusions from his survey, Fares claims that his paper mainly shows 1) that
renegotiation design is a necessary component of solving the hold-up problem
via contracts, and 2) this finding holds in cases of both selfish and cooperative
investment (p. 753). These conclusions suggest that contracts seeking to
implement efficient levels of investment must address the renegotiation process
and must include a mechanism for monitoring the relative allocation of bargaining
power between parties.
Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) seek to determine whether experimental data
supports the theoretical ability of contracts to mitigate the hold-up problem.
The results of their study suggest the following conclusions: 1) a fixed-price
contract does not improve investment incentives compared to the no-contract
benchmark, 2) a non-renegotiable option contract improves investment incentives
compared to the benchmark, and 3) the ability to commit to the contract (prevent
renegotiation) has a significant effect on a contract’s ability to promote efficient
investment (pp. 197-198).
Despite differences in the characterization of the hold-up problem itself and in
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underlying theoretical models, the above sample of papers from the contracting
literature seem to agree that a solution to the problem exists in deliberate
contractual design. Meanwhile, the existence of a hold-up problem during
the Research and Development phase of DoD weapons projects is thoroughly
described in Rogerson (1994), and the empirical work of Crocker and Reynolds
(1993) analyzes the DoD’s application of different contract types to accommodate
varying levels of project risk. Therefore, one can conclude, at a minimum, that
the DoD is attempting to contractually solve an incentive alignment problem
with its contractors that originates from uncertainty regarding the technological
feasibility of its weapons projects. This endeavor closely resembles the contractual
situation at the heart of the Maskin/Tirole and Hart/Moore debate.
3.2.2 An Influential Debate
The stated goal of Maskin and Tirole (1999) is to “scrutinize” the concepts
underlying the optimality of incomplete contracting (p. 83). The authors
motivate this paper based on the lack of an accepted theoretical foundation
for incomplete contracting, stating that many of the major contributions to
the literature “do not attempt to derive complete contract foundations for the
restricted class of contracts they study (p. 83).” They specifically take issue
with the fact that the commonly assumed ability of dynamic programming for
actors in the incomplete contracting literature should preclude the relevance of
transaction costs in contract formulation (p. 84). In other words, even if the
transaction costs prevent the ex ante description of physical outcomes, these
costs should not affect the agents’ abilities to forecast possible payoff outcomes.
This assertion is the underlying foundation of the authors’ irrelevance theorem:
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“If parties have trouble foreseeing the possible physical contingencies, they can
write contracts that ex ante specify only the possibly payoff contingencies (p.
84).”
Maskin and Tirole seek to determine when the “indescribability” of a
good or service affects the efficiency of the contracted outcome. Under the
assumptions of their model, the authors demonstrate that a welfare-neutral,
Pareto-optimal, payoff-based contract can be implemented under subgame perfect
equilibrium in the event that states are indescribable (p. 104). Furthermore,
they use their framework to show that their irrelevance result holds even in the
presence of renegotiation, given risk averse participants (p. 102). Maskin and
Tirole’s findings suggest that concerns surrounding the indescribability of physical
outcomes (incomplete contracts) may be unfounded, given the ability to describe
payoff outcomes.
Hart and Moore (1999) respond to Maskin and Tirole’s (hereafter MT)
criticism of incomplete contracting theory. The authors seek to develop a
“rigorous foundation” for the theory, based on the following idea of contractual
incompleteness: a buyer seeks to purchase an item from a seller; the precise nature
of the item is uncertain or is dependent on a heretofore unrealized state of nature;
if the number of possible physical outcomes for the item is substantial, the cost
of accounting for all contingencies in contractual form would be “prohibitively
expensive (p. 115).” Therefore, the parties agree to an incomplete contract,
allowing renegotiation of the terms of the contract at a stage when the nature of
the item is defined or its physical characteristics become describable.
MT (1999) describe mechanisms that allow the parties to circumvent these
prohibitively expensive transaction costs, by detailing the possible outcomes
of trade ex ante and thus preventing the parties’ need to describe the actual
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characteristics of the item itself. Hart and Moore evaluate this critique and MT’s
underlying “irrelevance theorems.” They show that it is possible that an optimal
contract may be incomplete, a notion clearly disputed by MT (1999).
Hart and Moore provide two possible definitions of an incomplete contract:
1) the contractual obligations of the parties involved may not be fully described,
or 2) the parties are unable to describe possible contingencies because possible
states of nature are prohibitively expensive to describe ex ante (p. 134). Hart and
Moore conclude that the issues raised by type-1) contracts may be overcome by
the actions described by Maskin and Tirole (1999). However, the authors assert
that their model shows that an optimal contract in a type-2) situation may be
incomplete. Furthermore, the authors suggest that both of these incomplete
contract types are “qualitatively” different from comprehensive and complete
contracts typically studied in the mechanism design literature, and thus merit a
separate classification (p. 135).
Therefore, the literature presents two diametrically opposing views of the
importance of describability in determining whether an incomplete contract
can serve as an optimal solution to the hold-up problem. While my goal
in this paper is not to evaluate the theoretical approaches of these opposing
economists, I certainly believe that the existence of real world contracts intended
to accommodate differing levels of project uncertainty and describability suggest
that the MT (1999) mechanisms may not be feasible, particularly in defense
acquisition. It seems that their assumption regarding welfare-neutrality between
a contract’s indescribable physical states and its describable payoff outcomes is
overly optimistic. This idea becomes particularly problematic if one chooses to
place a metric (e.g., a dollar amount) on the welfare impact of a specific contract.
For example, suppose the DoD wants to purchase a new anti-aircraft missile.
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If the DoD agrees to a contract that is based on a very specific set of technical
specifications for this missile, one might expect an extremely different cost
outcome than if the contract only specified “create an anti-aircraft missile.”
The first contract focuses research, development, and production in a detailed
manner, while the second is much less defined and could lead defense firms in a
variety of directions. If one measures welfare impact in terms of cost/benefit of
the procurement program, these two methods could lead to significantly different
welfare outcomes.
Frankly, incomplete contracts are frequently used in procurement, and it
seems that the mere presence of a menu of different contracts with different levels
of completeness solidifies the importance of “incomplete contracting.” It seems
that Maskin and Tirole’s irrelevance theorem is relevant only in the context of
environments where their mechanisms are feasible. However, this paper does yield
at least one testable hypothesis: does the describability of a contract’s physical
characteristics influence its efficiency outcome?
3.2.3 Empirical Determinants of Contract Performance
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the efficient performance of defense acquisition
programs is a politically-charged and contentious issue. Due to the United
States’ singular role in the international security environment, DoD expenditure
on major weapons systems has largely dwarfed that of both its adversaries
and allies, particularly following the end of the Cold War. The magnitude of
this defense expenditure naturally attracts the attention of the US public, and
the procurement of the nation’s most ambitious projects typically receives a
preponderance of this public scrutiny. As one might expect, economists have
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also shown interest in the efficient conduct of defense acquisition programs.
Peck and Scherer (1962) evaluate the outcomes of twelve military acquisition
programs in terms of deviation from time, cost, and quantity baselines. These
deviations are expressed using the final parameter value as a percentage of its
original planned value. In their sample, the authors find that technological
uncertainty plays a role in development cost overruns but has “little if any
effect” on time overruns (p. 436). In contrast, urgency had more explanatory
power for time overruns than did program costs, leading the authors to refute
a common opinion (e.g., “unavailability of funds is a major villain in causing
schedule slippages”) (p. 447). The authors also discuss service demands; lack
of clarity in program decisions and objectives; delayed decisions (particularly in
lower priority programs); contractor technical and managerial capability; and
conflicting objectives between the contractor and the Government as possible
determinants of cost, time, and quality variance in weapons procurement.
Marshall and Meckling (1962) focus on cost estimation during operational
development, which they define as “the effort to take ideas or components
that have been tested experimentally and embody them in useful equipment
(p. 462-463).” The authors offer four separate categories which collectively
describe the success or failure of a weapons program: cost, performance, time,
and utility (p. 464-465). In a manner similar to Peck and Scherer (1962), the
authors use percent deviations of the final program costs and timelines from the
original estimates as measures of efficiency. Additionally, Marshall and Meckling
present adjusted measures of the program cost deviations, which take into account
quantity changes and inflation.
Using survey classifications of the different projects in their data sample, the
authors demonstrate that the nature of technological advance (small, medium, or
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large) plays a significant role in the magnitude of total factor increases in costs (p.
472). In terms of schedule deviation, or “time slippages,” their results indicate
that the accuracy of baseline schedules is inversely related to technological
advancement and program maturity (p. 473). Marshall and Meckling attribute
the majority of the large deviations in program costs and schedules to overly
optimistic initial estimates for the program parameters. In their summary, the
authors discuss the incentive to be overly optimistic in cost estimation at the
beginning of a weapons program: contractors want the DoD to accept their plan,
and the DoD wants Congress to support their development goals. However, they
also admit that contractor penalties for poor estimation were relatively weak in
1962 (p. 475).
Economists have also explored the determinants of contract performance
in the provision of other public services, specifically considering the effect of
contract type in addition to other pertinent factors. For example, Piacenza
(2006) estimates X-inefficiency for public transportation firms in Italy using
a stochastic frontier variable cost function. He models X-inefficiency as a
function of regulatory scheme (cost-plus vs. fixed-price) and environmental
factors (aggregating to the delivery speed), among other variables. Using this
approach, the author finds that the incentive-maximizing regulatory structure
provided by the fixed-price (FP) regime indeed results in X-inefficiency reduction
for the firms that use fixed-price contracts (p. 268). Additionally, Piacenza finds
a differential effect of the regulatory scheme based on the existing environmental
factors affecting the transportation company’s delivery speed (p. 274). His results
indicate that high speed rail lines subject to FP contracts decreased X-inefficiency
to a greater degree than average speed rail lines with FP contracts. Therefore,
Piacenza suggests that a full evaluation of a company’s existing infrastructure
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must accompany any regulatory scheme decision, as the company’s ultimate
performance may depend on both.
Similarly, Jensen and Stonecash (2009) use a difference-in-difference
estimation approach to analyze the effects of a natural experiment involving the
use of two different contract types in the provision of water services: cost-plus
and fixed-price. This experiment results from a change in contract type by one
provider while the other remains the same. In contrast to previous studies, the
authors find that the change to cost-plus contracts by one of the firms led to
significant additional savings, using three different measures of maintenance costs
(p. 290). However, their results are confounded by the fact that they are unable
to control for both unbalanced bidding on the cost-plus contracts and differences
in work quality, which could affect the interpretation of their results.
These entries in the empirical literature suggest that technological uncertainty,
project urgency, production/managerial capacity, and contract type play a critical
role in the eventual performance outcomes of public sector contracts. Therefore,
these elements must be considered in any model of contract performance for the
DoD.
This paper will contribute to the aforementioned literature in the following
manner. First, I will demonstrate the link between the physical describability of
projects and contract types administered for those projects, utilizing application
instructions for contract types from the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Second, I
will attempt to model the efficiency outcome for an array of modern DoD aircraft
programs as a function of project, firm, and contract characteristics. Finally, I will
use this link to determine the empirical significance of describability in the cost
outcome of DoD aircraft contracts, perhaps indicating relevance or irrelevance of
describability in the DoD contracting environment. My main goal for this paper
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is to contribute empirical evidence to the incomplete contracting literature in
support of a discussion that has been largely theoretical to this point.
3.3 Institutional Background: Earned Value
Management (EVM) and Describability in DoD
Contracts
The specialized technological nature of major weapons systems requires that
the DoD employ distinctive approaches to both R&D and procurement. In order
to simultaneously serve as good stewards of taxpayer money and advance the
frontier of defense technology, the DoD uses both a stringent monitoring process
to ensure compliance with contract guidelines and an extensive menu of contract
types to accommodate varying levels of project uncertainty. Both of these features
of the defense acquisition process are unique to the DoD and warrant further
explanation, as they will serve prominent roles in the empirical portion of this
paper.
3.3.1 EVM Background and Terminology
In order to synchronize management of defense acquisition programs across
all military services, the US Department of Defense pioneered the Earned Value
Management (EVM) System as a project management technique in the 1960s.
EVM serves as the DoD’s required standard for project management today,
and the data from the EVM process is used to prescribe corrective actions
and even cancellation of contracts for US weapons projects. The backbone
of the EVM process is a set of 32 system guidelines, which are intended to
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guide contractors and acquisition officials in creating systems to monitor weapons
contracts. These guidelines are quite general, allowing involved parties to tailor
the EVM system to the project in question. A particular strength of the EVM
process is its ability to simultaneously incorporate measures of project scope,
cost, and schedule. According to the DoD EVM Guide, “EVM encompasses
both performance measurement (i.e., what is the project status) and performance
management (i.e., what can we do about it?).”1
While this system involves monitoring of multiple parameters related to
contract performance, this paper will specifically focus on two variables from
the EVM process: cost variance (CV) and schedule variance (SV). These are
not, as one might reasonably expect, traditional second moments and require
further explanation. In order to define these measures, I must also define several
additional EVM terms. First, a project’s planned value (PV) is defined as “the
value to be earned as a function of project work accomplishments up to a given
point of time” (Anbari, p. 13). Second, a program’s actual cost (AC) is the
cumulative total cost of work performed as of a specific point in time (Anbari, p.
13). Finally, the earned value (EV) of the contract is “the amount budgeted for
performing the work that was accomplished by a given point in time” (Anbari, p.
13). Using these terms, we define the cost variance of a project as the difference
between the program’s earned value and actual cost at a given point in the project
timeline (CV = EV-AC). Similarly, a project’s schedule variance is determined
by finding the difference between the project’s earned value and planned value
(SV = EV-PV).2
In examining these formulae, it is apparent that positive values of CV and
1DoD EVM Guide, p.11
2The formulas for these parameters can be found in both the DoD EVM Guide and Anbari,
2003.
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SV signify a project that is performing above expectations, zero values indicate a
strictly efficient program, and negative values indicate adverse and inefficient
performance outcomes. To illustrate these concepts, Figure 3.1 depicts the
hypothetical EVM parameter curves for a project with negative CV and SV.3
Alternatively, consider the following example of EVM in the administration
of a hypothetical contract. A defense contract has an overall price of $10
million. Suppose the software development package and engineering design
package for the contract consist of 30% and 20% of the total contract price,
respectively. According to the contract’s milestones, the firm should complete
both the software package and the engineering design package before the first
annual review. At the annual review, the firm reveals that it has completed only
the software package at a cost of $4 million. This means that the cost variance
for the project is (EV-AC) = ($3M - $4M) = -$1M. Meanwhile, the schedule
variance is (EV-PV) = ($3M - $5) = -$2M. Therefore, one can assess that a
project is over - budget and behind schedule at a given point in time merely by
observing negative values of cost and schedule variance.
For each of the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) included in the
data sample for this paper, I have annual measurements of both cost and schedule
variance at the contract level. While previous studies have utilized empirical
estimates of contract efficiency in testing theoretical hypotheses, these measures
of CV and SV provide me with standardized measurements of efficiency, which I
can use to test hypotheses regarding the determinants of contract performance.
3I constructed this figure using Figure 4 from Anbari, 2003, as an example
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Figure 3.1: Earned Value Management (EVM) Parameters
3.3.2 Hierarchy of Describability in DoD Contracts
Among other factors, the US Government Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) directs that contracting officers should consider the “type and complexity”
of contracted projects in negotiating contract types with winning defense firms.
The FAR concedes that “complex requirements, particularly those unique to
the government, usually result in greater risk assumption by the Government
(16.104d).” This phrasing indicates that the DoD acquisition process is capable
of accommodating projects with varying levels of technological uncertainty and
complexity through the use of contract types that differ in terms of the amount
of risk shouldered by the DoD. If one concedes that it is primarily internal
uncertainty that the contracting officer is capable of evaluating during the
initiation of a contract, the contracting officer’s major focus in accommodating
complexity should be selecting a contract type that reflects the level of physical
describability of the project in question. This physical describability of the
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project could feasibly include aspects of design, scope, scale of production, and
input materials.
In fact, the application instructions for various contract types in the FAR
reflects this suggested relationship between describability and contract type.
Given these directions from the FAR, one can then establish an implied ranking
of the physical describability of the projects that different contracts are able to
accommodate. For example, the data sample for this paper includes the following
contract types: Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF), Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF),
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF), and Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee (FPIF). Using the
application instructions for these contract types from the FAR, I can then infer
the relative describability of the contracted projects.
• FPIF > CPIF: Contracting officials are only able to use
cost-reimbursement contracts when uncertainty does not allow for a
sufficiently accurate cost estimation (16.301-2). Therefore, projects
covered by fixed-price contracts should be relatively more describable than
all cost-reimbursement contracts.4
• CPIF > CPAF: Award-fee contracts are to be used when the creation
of incentive targets is not feasible. This indicates that the physical
describability of projects covered by an incentive fee contract should be
more conducive to establishing cost and performance targets than one
covered by an award fee contract.5
4According to FAR section 16.301-2, acquisition officials are able to use cost-reimbursement
contracts only in the event that “(1) Circumstances do not allow the agency to define its
requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price type contract; or (2) Uncertainties involved
in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use
any type of fixed-price contract.”
5Section 16.401e directs that acquisition officials should employ an award fee contract
when “The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective to
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• CPAF > CPFF: Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts provide the least incentive
for cost minimization and the most secure profits for the defense firm. The
FAR’s description of this contract type suggests that it should be used as
a last resort, when incentive fees aren’t practical and “the level of effort” is
unknown (16.306b).6
Using these relationships, I can order the contract types in terms of
describability from most to least: FPIF, CPIF, CPAF, CPFF. These relative
describability “rankings” serve as a variable that I can test as a determinant
of contract efficiency, which is indicated by contract EVM parameters. The
empirical results from this procedure would then allow me to comment on the
overall impact of describability on contract performance and the relevance of
describability in contract theory. Given that the FAR’s contract menu is intended
to afford flexibility to the acquisition official in acquiring complex projects at the
best value to the government, this empirical approach will also serve as a test
of the efficacy of acquisition officials’ application of the FAR in controlling cost
growth in defense projects.
3.4 Model
In order to test for the impact of a project’s relative level of physical
describability on eventual contract efficiency via the contract type decision, I will
devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, schedule, and technical
performance.”
6Section 16.306b indicates that contracting officers should employ cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts
when “(i) The contract is for the performance of research or preliminary exploration or study,
and the level of effort required is unknown; or (ii) The contract is for development and test,
and using a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is not practical.” Due to the fact that the fixed
fee does not vary with the performance costs of the contract and is determined at the award
date of the contract, the FAR indicates that this type of contract provides little incentive for
the contractor to minimize costs and should be used only to facilitate “contracting for efforts
that might otherwise present too great a risk to contractors (16.306a).”
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use a reduced form model of contract performance. While previous evaluations
of contract type (e.g., Piacenza, 2006) have estimated efficiency measures using
structural equations, the availability of EVM performance statistics ensures that
I am not imposing any additional restrictions on my analysis due to structural
assumptions. This approach is certainly acceptable, according to the contract
evaluation literature surveyed in this paper.
One can speculate that multiple different project characteristics could have a
significant impact on the corresponding contract’s ability to adhere to price and
schedule guidelines. For example, contract type may influence the government’s
level of involvement in administration of the contract, corresponding to the
relative amount of risk that the government shares for cost growth. As previously
mentioned, the contract type may also serve as an indicator of the relative physical
describability of the project in question. Therefore, it is possible that a project
requiring a low-powered contract (CPFF for instance) may be relatively more
prone to production difficulties, which could ultimately result in a relatively lower
level of performance efficiency. Along the same line of reasoning, a research and
development contract may naturally be more prone to technological obstacles
than a production contract in which proof of concept and system validation have
already occurred.
Other identifying features of the project/contract in question could potentially
have a significant impact on the contractor’s ability to adhere to contractual
guidelines. In the case of a dual source project (e.g., the DoD often procures
aircraft engines for a single platform from two different manufacturers), the
defense firms may have additional motivation to adhere strictly to contract
requirements due to the presumed ability of the government to terminate one of
the contracts in the case of poor relative performance. The length of the contract
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may also affect its performance outcome. In one sense, the government may
not engage in lengthier contracts for projects with high levels of technological
uncertainty to limit its exposure to unexpected cost growth. However, longer
contracts may also enable the contractor to exercise greater flexibility in the
application of corrective action and eventually result in desirable efficiency
outcomes. These two competing theories suggest that the effect of contract length
could be different if measured at the end of a contract versus in the interim.
Learning curve effects are also well documented for various manufacturing
process and, specifically, for the aircraft industry. (See, for example, Benkard,
2000.) In repeat iterations of an identical contract, one therefore might expect
contracting efficiency measures to improve relative to past versions of the same
contracts. Similarly, a firm’s familiarity with defense manufacturing and the
DoD procurement process may have an impact on their ability to provide reliable
cost estimates and projected timelines, thereby directly influencing the firm’s
performance in adhering to contractual requirements. As a result, a firm’s
previous contracting history with the DoD may affect its ability to adhere to
cost and schedule milestones.
To test these hypotheses regarding the effect of specific contract characteristics
on the efficiency outcome of the contract in question, I can use the following
reduced form model for contract performance:
Pi = F (di, x) + ǫi, (3.1)
where P is the contract performance in EVM terminology (cost or schedule
variance), F(·) is a contract-invariant efficiency function, d is the physical
describability of the contract indicated by its contract type, x is a set of
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identifying contract characteristics, and ǫ is a contract specific error term.
One possible confounding feature of this empirical approach is the possibility
that, as I have briefly alluded to above, the physical describability of a project
may affect contract performance other than through the selected contract type.
For example, a more complex, next generation technology may warrant a less
complete contract type (e.g., CPFF) during its research and development phase.
Clearly, the selection of this type of contract indicates that the possible outcomes
for this project will be numerous and difficult to foresee, but the additional
oversight from the DoD that accompanies this contract type should serve to
control or impede cost growth. However, it remains a possibility that the
contract will not fully accommodate ALL complications due to the indescribable
nature of the project. Therefore, it is possible that describability can affect
both the contract type decision and the contract performance simultaneously,
creating an endogeneity issue. In order to account for this possibility, I will use
an instrumental variable for contract type, which I will further discuss in the
estimation section of this paper.
3.5 Data
This paper uses data collected directly from Selected Acquisition Reports
(SARs), which are submitted to Congress annually by the US Department of
Defense. Congress uses SARs to guide funding decisions for major defense
projects. In order to qualify for SAR submission, a project must either a) exceed
$365 million in total research, development, training, and evaluation (RDT&E)
or b) exceed $2.19 billion in total procurement costs (FY 2000 constant $).7
7Defense Acquisition University, www.acc.dau.mil.
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The data sample used for estimation in this paper consists of contracts from
active military aircraft programs with SARs submitted from December 1997
to December 2011. These programs include multiple aircraft procured by each
branch of service (Army, Navy, Air Force) and one managed by the DoD as a
whole (F-35 Lightning). Due to differences in program start dates and duration
of procurement, the data has an unbalanced panel structure.8
Due to the contractor’s sole responsibility for cost performance and resulting
profits in firm-fixed-price (FFP) and fixed-price-with-economic-price-adjustment
(FPEPA) contracts, the US government does not apply EVM in the
administration of these contracts. As a result, program managers do not collect
and report cost and schedule variances for these contracts as part of the SAR
process. As an additional restriction, the database includes “combination”
contracts, indicating that one contract type could not accommodate the work
performed under the contract. In these contracts, it is impossible to align the
contract type with the physical describability rankings previously discussed in
this paper. Table 3.1 depicts the distribution of contracts in the entire sample
and their translation into contract-year observations. Note the exclusion of
FFP, FPEPA, and Combination contracts from the “relevant” sample leads to a
reduction of 93 contracts and 310 contract-year observations. Additionally, the
distribution of contract types in the relevant sample (FPIF, CPIF, CPAF, CPFF)
is indicative of the government’s increasing responsibility for cost growth as the
contract becomes less complete. FPIF contracts appear most frequently, followed
by approximately equivalent amounts of CPIF and CPAF contracts, and CPFF
contracts are issued almost half as often as FPIF. This distribution belies the
8There is no indication in the available SARs that the DoD terminated any of the projects
contained in my data sample due to poor contract performance. All of the projects include a
natural progression of R&D and procurement phases.
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government’s efforts to incentivize cost minimization to the maximum possible
degree in each contract.
Table 3.2 details the available cost variance and schedule variance observations
for the contracts in the data sample. Of the 367 relevant contract-year
observations, 331 include cost variation observations and 322 include schedule
variance observations. Nine total contracts experienced cost variance without
schedule variance, but no contract demonstrated schedule variance without
simultaneous cost variance. The ratio of positive to negative observations is
similar across the two types of performance measures: a 45/55 split in cost
variance and a 40/60 split in schedule variance. Table 3.3 lists summary statistics
for different expressions of cost and schedule variances from the estimation
sample. Note the change in sign when cost variance is expressed as a percentage of
the initial contract price. This is due to the common occurrence of major changes
to contract price between the award date and a contract’s first appearance in a
SAR. As a result, the initial price is typically not representative of the eventual
price of the contract. With this exception, the mean values of the other statistics
are all negative, perhaps indicating a tendency for contracts to perform over
budget and behind schedule in major aircraft programs.
Table 3.1: Distribution of Contracts by Type
Contract Observations Contract-Year Observations
FFP 62 205
FPEPA 6 30
FPIF 33 92
CPIF 26 88
CPAF 25 127
CPFF 18 60
Combination 25 75
Total 195 677
Relevant Sample 102 367
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Table 3.2: Observations of Cost and Schedule Variance
Cost Variance Schedule Variance
Total Observations 331 322
Relevant Observations 298 290
Positive Obs. (Raw) 135 118
Positive Obs. (Percentage) 45.30 40.69
Negative Obs. (Raw) 163 172
Negative Obs. (Percentage) 54.70 59.31
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for Cost Variance and Schedule Variance
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cost Variance (CV) 305 -4.282 67.524 -376.5 779.1
CV/Current Price 305 -0.002 0.028 -0.171 0.097
CV/Initial Price 305 0.002 0.176 -1.347 1.812
Cumulative CV 89 -15.236 58.508 -315 130.6
Average (CV/Current Price) 85 -0.002 0.019 -0.076 0.043
Average (CV/Initial Price) 85 0.003 0.064 -0.28 0.269
Schedule Variance (SV) 305 -3.125 51.751 -457.2 581.6
SV/Current Price 305 -0.003 0.024 -0.161 0.114
SV/Initial Price 305 -0.018 0.267 -2.488 2.382
Cumulative SV 89 -12.02 26.867 -130.6 7.4
Average (SV/Current Price) 85 -0.007 0.02 -0.125 0.04
Average (SV/Initial Price) 85 -0.027 0.085 -0.591 0.04
In addition to the previously described information, the contract section of
each SAR provides each contract’s managing military branch; initial price and
quantity; current price and quantity; funding category (R&D vs. Procurement);
award date; basic contractor information; contractor and military program
manager estimates of price at completion; and brief explanations of factors
contributing to the current levels of cost variance and schedule variance. I will
describe and analyze these explanations in greater detail in the estimation section
of this paper.
While the database that produces each SAR relies on the Federal Procurement
Database System (FPDS) to provide contractor characteristics, many of these
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entries are incomplete, missing, or recorded in a non-uniform manner. Therefore,
I collected firm employment, revenue, and other financial figures from annual
investor reports and Securities and Exchange Commission filings (form 10-K)
for each of the contractors in the data sample. Additionally, while the FPDS
information on firm characteristics was less than desirable, I was still able to
use this system to collect detailed information regarding contract length, as it
contains the actual completion date for each contract. Due to my need to use
outside sources to collect additional data, I was unable to find all pertinent
information for each contract, and data availability ultimately reduced the
estimation sample to 89 contracts with 305 contract-year observations. Tables 3.4
and 3.5 list the distributions of contract types and contracting firms in the
estimation sample, respectively.9
Table 3.4: Contract Type Distribution (Estimation Sample)
Total % of Sample
FPIF 30 35.29%
CPIF 21 24.71%
CPAF 24 28.24%
CPFF 14 16.47%
3.6 Estimation
The main goal of this paper is to comment on the relevance of physical
describability in contract performance outcomes, using defense contracts to
provide empirical information for the debate regarding the use of incomplete
contracting. My main variable of interest is, therefore, the physical describability
9Due to business confidentiality concerns, I am unable to provide actual firm names for the
contractors in my data sample.
100
Table 3.5: Distribution of Contracts by Firm (Estimation Sample)
Firm Total Contracts % of Sample
A 5 5.62%
B 1 1.12%
C 15 16.85%
D 16 17.98%
E 1 1.12%
F 1 1.12%
G 14 15.73%
H 23 25.84%
I 13 14.61%
of the underlying project as indicated by the contract type chosen by the
acquisition official. Due to the fact that this variable, along with many of a
contract’s other identifying characteristics, is time-invariant, I cannot use the
within transformation and achieve my intended purpose. As a result, I will
conduct cross-sectional analysis of my data sample and supplement this with
panel analysis using the pooled OLS and between effects panel estimators. More
concretely, I will estimate the following contract performance equations, using a)
a cross-sectional structure and b) an unbalanced panel structure:
a)Pi = β0+β1DRNKi+β2CUMDQi+
4∑
j=3
βjSUMEXPLji+
m∑
l=5
βlxli+ǫi, (3.2)
and
b)Pit = β0 + β1DRNKi + β2DQit +
14∑
j=3
βjEXPLjit +
m∑
l=15
βlxlit + ǫit. (3.3)
In equation (3.2), Pi is either the contract’s cumulative cost variance or
schedule variance for the duration of the contract, DRNKi represents the
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describability ranking of the contract’s type in accordance with the previous
discussion, CUMDQi is the cumulative change in quantity over the duration
of the contract, the SUMEXPLis are the sum of the positive and sum of the
negative variance explanations offered by the program manager over the duration
of the contract, and the xlis are control variables, which account for identifying
characteristics of the contract in question.
For equation (3.3), I have a similar set of explanatory variables, consisting
of disaggregated versions of the variables used in equation (3.2). Pit is the
cost or schedule variance for contract i in time period t, DRNKi is the same
time-invariant describability ranking used in equation (3.2), DQit is the change
in quantity for contract i in time period t, the EXPLjits are the categorized
variance explanations for the contract in period t, and the xlits are time variant
and invariant characteristics of contract i. The primary importance of the panel
analysis is the inclusion of the more robust set of variance explanations, which
cannot be included in the cross-sectional analysis due to more limited degrees of
freedom.
3.6.1 Dependent Variables
The cost variance and schedule variance figures for each contract are expressed
in dollar amounts as of the date of the Selected Acquisition Report in which they
appear. For sake of comparison across contracts, it is necessary to adjust these
figures for inflation. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that higher-priced
projects may result in relatively higher cost and schedule variance dollar amounts
relative to less expensive projects. Therefore, it may also be worthwhile to
normalize cost and schedule variance figures by contract price at the time of the
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recorded cost or schedule variance.10 Table 3.6 lists the names and definitions of
the dependent variables used in both cross-sectional and panel analysis.
Table 3.6: List of Dependent Variables
Cost Variance (CV) Definition
cumcv Cumulative Cost Variance for of contract, adjusted for inflation
avcvpercurp Average ratio of Cost Variance to Current Price over duration of contract
cv Inflation-adjusted Cost Variance
cvpercurp Cost Variance/Current Contract Price
Schedule Variance (SV)
cumsv Cumulative Schedule Variance for duration of contract, adjusted for inflation
avsvpercurp Average ratio of SV to Current Price over duration of contract
sv Inflation-adjusted Schedule Variance
svpercurp Schedule Variance/Current Contract Price
3.6.2 Instrumental Variable for Describability Ranking
Given the previous discussion of the link between the physical describability of
a project and the resulting contract type chosen by acquisition officials, I can rank
projects covered by FPIF, CPIF, CPAF, and CPFF contracts in terms of implied
describability as in Table 3.7. However, for estimation purposes, I must account
for the possibility that the describability of the project affects the subsequent
performance of the contract via a separate channel other than the contract type
decision. In other words, the inclusion of the ordered describability ranking in
Table 3.7 may create an endogeneity issue in estimating equations (3.2) and (3.3).
10Note that cost variance observations always occur with respect to the current contract price.
In other words, the current price will not also include previously accumulated cost variance.
In scenarios when acquisition officials adjust the contract price due to performance issues,
the cumulative cost variance is reset to zero. In this sense, there should be no concern that
the current price of the contract is moving with the cumulative cost variance.
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In order to address this problem, I will use an instrumental variable approach in
my regression analysis.
Table 3.7: Describability Rank of Contract Types
DRNK (Describability Rank) = 1 if type = CPFF
2 if type = CPAF
3 if type = CPIF
4 if type = FPIF
In a previous paper, I demonstrated the ability to model the acquisition
official’s contract type decision for these same aircraft programs as a function
of both project and firm characteristics. To create the instrumental variable
for describability ranking, I will utilize this same contract type selection model
to predict the expected contract type, EDRNKi, for each contract, given its
associated project and firm characteristics.11 Due to the fact that the contract
selection model uses many of the same explanatory variables that I will use as
control variables for this paper, I will not discuss this estimation process at length
here. For transparency, the regression results for this procedure are presented in
Appendix B.
Using this method, the regression model accounts for 61% of the variation
in the DRNK variable. Table 3.8 presents a comparison of DRNK and the
instrumental variable produced via the contract choice model, EDRNK. The
contract choice model provides me with a variable that is highly correlated
with the DRNK variable but is plausibly exogenous to the actual performance
11The previous paper mentioned here used a ranking of contractual “completeness,” which
measured actual portions of the contract that were left open to subsequent renegotiation.
The “describability” ranking for this same set of contracts is very similar, as only the ranking
of the CPIF and CPFF contracts differ. As one of the robustness checks for my previous paper,
I estimated the model using the describability scale. This distinction between “completeness”
and “describability” mirrors the two possible definitions of incomplete contracts provided by
Hart and Moore.
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outcome of the project at hand. The lack of a controlling variable for technological
uncertainty or complexity in the contract choice model is likely a) responsible for
the imprecision of the contract type predictions and b) cause to believe it will
be not be highly correlated with the contract’s cost and schedule variances.12
Additionally, the predicted describability ranking from OLS estimation is a
continuous variable, which should further diminish problematic correlation
between the predicted contract type and the contract’s performance outcome.
Table 3.8: Summary Statistics for DRNK and EDRNK
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
drnk 149 4.020 1.772 1 6
edrnk 149 4.020 1.388 0.441 6.153
3.6.3 Control Variables
Despite the fact that all of the contracts in my estimation sample are part
of large-scale military aircraft programs, the details of each contract are quite
diverse. In order to isolate the effect of the project’s physical describability on
the subsequent performance outcome for the associated project, it is essential
to account for these potentially confounding factors. In addition, it may be
informative to uncover the independent statistical effect of these variables on
contract performance, as empirical evidence from the defense industry is quite
sparse and outdated. Table 3.9 provides a list of the explanatory variables used in
estimation of equations (3.2) and (3.3). Note that in some cases I have listed both
the individual and aggregated variables, which I then use in the appropriate data
setting (e.g., cumdq is used for equation (3.2) and dq is used in equation (3.3)).
12This inability to control for technological heterogeneity in a precise manner is due to the lack
of any uniform measure of this variable across contracts.
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Several of these variables may be of particular interest in comparing the
contracting environment for military aircraft to other industrial settings. For
example, the iteration variable could provide further evidence on the effects of
learning on defense manufacturing. One might expect the cost and schedule
performance of a military contractor to improve for the tenth lot (iteration=10)
of aircraft produced relative to the first lot (iteration=1). Additionally, a
contractor’s ability to implement and follow EVM procedures may improve as
they become more experienced with military contracting. The variable prevcont
is intended to capture this administrative learning effect. As the theoretical
foundations for this paper rely heavily on the power of incentives in contracting,
I have also included a control for the use of a passive incentive mechanism,
dual source contracting. Although dual source contracts make up only a small
portion of the overall estimation sample, the effect of competitive pressure could
be substantial for these select contracts.
To further account for heterogeneity between projects, I have also included
controls for military branch, source of funding (rd versus proc), firm size
(employment and revenue), and firm risk level (cratio and lev). Tables 3.10
and 3.11 provide summary statistics for the continuous and binary control
variables, respectively.
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Table 3.9: Control Variables
Variable Definition
dq Change in quantity over the current period
cumdq Cumulative quantity change over duration of contract
prevcont Number of Existing Contracts for Firm Prior to Award Date
duals Indicator Variable for Presence of Multiple Sources (=1 if Multiple)
length Number of Months between Contract Award Date and Scheduled Completion
iteration Control for repeat procurement of same item (i.e., Lot 9 = 9)
winage Within Program Age (Years): Contract Award Date - Initial Award Date for Program
wincage Within Contract Age (Years): Observation Date - Initial Award Date for Contract
rd,proc Separate Intercepts for RDT&E and Procurement (O&M excluded)
army, navy, af Separate Intercepts for Army, Navy, AF (DoD excluded)
Firm Controls
lemp Log of Annual Employment
lrev Log of Inflation- and Exchange Rate- Adjusted Annual Revenue (Segment Level)
cratio Firm’s Current Ratio (Current Liabilities/Current Assets)
lev Firm’s Leverage Ratio (Long-Term Debt/Total Assets)
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Table 3.10: Summary Statistics for Continuous Control Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dq 305 0.256 1.876 -7 21
cumdq 89 0.976 4.189 -12 30
prevcont 89 13.011 11.012 0 46
length 89 43.461 29.125 2 138
iteration 89 2.843 3.118 1 15
winage 89 6.854 6.728 0 23
wincage 305 1.803 1.916 0 9
emp 305 142081.4 59656.11 32000 293000
rev 305 11962.4 8879.696 2275.759 20894.2
cratio 305 0.87 0.216 0.422 1.38
lev 305 0.163 0.054 0.064 0.381
Table 3.11: Summary Statistics for Binary Control Variables
Obs. Mean
duals 7 0.079
rd 45 0.506
proc 43 0.483
army 12 0.135
navy 45 0.506
af 17 0.191
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3.6.4 Program Manager Variance Explanations
In addition to the hypothetical effects of the explanatory variables mentioned
above, I must also account for the fact that the SAR format provides
other concrete, yet imprecise, information regarding the performance of each
contract. For example, this will prevent the model from falsely attributing
poor performance to project describability that is actually due to contractor
labor disputes. For each contract subject to EVM monitoring listed in the
SAR, the program manager must provide explanatory comments regarding the
net change in cost (CV) and schedule variation (SV). These comments provide
brief explanations of the underlying causes leading to changes in the contract’s
performance measures. Unfortunately, the program manager does not attach
dollar amounts or even percentages of the total contract value attributable to
these factors, which would allow me to fully account for their impact on the CV
and SV. Alternatively, I have created six general categories and recorded the
program manager’s explanation of net changes in CV and SV in terms of these
categories for each contract-year observation. Due to the fact that acquisition
officials report separate effects of these underlying problems on CV and SV, I
record the effects separately and also record whether the issue has a positive
(improvement) or negative (degradation) effect on contract performance. This
leads to a total of 24 indicator variables that capture the underlying causes of
contract performance in accordance with the program manager’s explanatory
comments.13 These categories and corresponding indicator variables are listed
below. Appendix A provides actual explanations from the subject SARs,
13There are six total categories, which are further divided into positive and negative effects.
Additionally, there are separate explanations of the categories’ effects on CV and SV: 6 × 2
× 2 = 24.
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categorized in accordance with the following framework.
1. Change in Manufacturing Inputs: This category includes changes
in material costs or changes in the amount of materials required. In
addition, this category includes external changes in the price of labor.
Examples of positive changes include the use of less material than originally
budgeted and decreased wage costs due to a manufacturer’s decision to hire
locally. Examples of negative changes include an increase in material prices
and underestimation of required amounts of materials. (CV: poscdpc(+),
negcdpc(-); SV: possdpc(+), negsdpc(-))
2. Supply Chain Management: The execution of a MDAP contract
often includes multiple outside vendors and subcontractors, who supply
components and parts to the prime contractor for integration and assembly.
Negative examples from this category include delinquent deliveries of parts
from subcontractors, parts shortages, chain reaction production delays, and
delays in the awarding of subcontracted efforts by the prime contractor.
Positive effects from this category are typically due to early delivery
of parts and components. (CV: poscsuppman(+), negcsuppman(-); SV:
posssuppman(+), negssuppman(-))
3. Corrective Actions in Production: The Earned Value Management
System (EVMS) requires the use of process monitoring and periodic reviews
to assist the defense contractor in preemptively identifying issues in the
manufacturing process that will cause cost or schedule overruns. The
resulting prescribed actions from this review process can have positive or
negative short run effects on both cost and schedule variation, depending
on the magnitude of the change to the production process. Examples in
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this category include accelerated timelines that may incur greater short
run costs to mitigate future schedule delays,14 additional product testing
mandated by the review team, correction of deficiencies identified during
product testing, and staffing adjustments to address problem areas. (CV:
posccorract(+), negccorract(-); SV: posscorract(+), negscorract(-))
4. Fundamental Change to Contract Details: Due to the challenging
level of technological complexity of the typical MDAP, program managers
and defense contractors are often forced to make fundamental changes to the
design or scope of the MDAP, which in turn has an effect on the contract
costs and schedule performance. Additionally, an MDAP’s priority level
may result in its relegation to a standby status or a loss of resources in the
event of a national defense emergency, leading to adverse cost and schedule
outcomes. Examples from this category include design changes to major
components, contract amendments to incorporate additional capabilities,
loss of resources due to other operational requirements, incorporation
of funds spent before contract definitization, and other major contract
revisions (e.g., restructures and re-designs). Additionally, this category
includes “over-target-baseline” revisions, which reset the cost and schedule
variances to zero as the contractor and Government essentially agree that
the original baseline contract was inadequate or overly ambitious. (CV:
poscdbase(+), negcdbase(-); SV: possdbase(+), negsdbase(-))
5. Administrative Factors: As with any production contract,
administrative parameters can have a significant effect on contract outcomes
for MDAPs, despite the fact that these parameters may be insignificant
14In this situation, the manufacturer implements an internal timeline that is more demanding
than the basline contract schedule
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to the physical execution of the contract. Administrative errors and the
correction of these errors can, thus, have a significant effect on the cost
and schedule variance outcomes for MDAPs. Examples from this category
include accounting errors, EVMS reporting errors, changes in General and
Administrative (G&A) and overhead rates, expenditure of funds prior
to contract definitization, and invoicing problems. (CV:poscadmin(+),
negcadmin(-); SV: possadmin(+), negsadmin(-))
6. Changes to Required Effort: The final category includes changes
in the amount of “effort” or billed hours of work. Program managers
often report that a particular component or work package requires “more
effort than originally planned” or “more hours than originally planned.”
Alternatively, the execution of the contract can require less effort/fewer
hours than specified in the project. These explanations indicate that
the contractor’s employees completed the contractual task in question
in a greater or shorter amount of billable time than estimated in the
original contract, or the contractor adjusted the amount or skill level of
the labor assigned to the contract. (CV: posceffort(+), negceffort(-); SV:
posseffort(+), negseffort(-))
The inclusion of these factors in an estimation equation results in an additional
twelve explanatory variables, which the 305 observations of the unbalanced panel
supports with ease. However, the aggregation of these variables over the duration
of the contract, which would be necessary to use all of the categories in a
cross-sectional setting, seems to be a very imprecise treatment. It is impossible
to attribute exact portions of the cost and schedule variance within a single
contract-year observation to these factors, and the aggregation of these variables
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would require that I assign relative impacts over the entire duration of the
contract. Rather than make an inevitably poor assumption, I will sum the
positive variance explanations and negative variance explanations over the life
of the contract and use this generic result in the cross-sectional model. While
this is still not an ideal method of accounting for these factors, it prevents me from
assigning potentially misleading importance to the individual variance categories.
(CV: sumposcv(+), sumnegcv(-); SV: sumpossv(+), sumnegsv(-))
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 provide summary statistics and distribution for the
variance explanations, respectively. Note from Table 3.12 that it is quite common
for the program manager to provide no explanation for observed cost and schedule
variance (approximately 35% in both cases). It is even more common that only
one explanation is provided (approximately 45% for instances of cost variance
and 43% for schedule variance). Anecdotally, these trends are likely due to the
prevalence of singular “problem areas,” which continue to cause problems over the
life of a contract, and to the imprecise method by which program managers are
required to account for cost and schedule variances for SAR purposes. Meanwhile,
in Table 3.13, the tendency to provide explanatory comments in the case of
negative cost or schedule variance outcomes is much greater than for positive
outcomes. This is particularly striking given the overall ratio of positive to
negative observations in the case of both performance measures (45:55 for CV
and 40:60 for SV).
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Table 3.12: Collected Explanation Data
Cost Variance Schedule Variance
Total Observations 298 290
Number of Explanations
≥ 1 (Raw) 193 184
≥ 1 (% of Total) 64.77 63.45
> 1 (Raw) 57 29
> 1 (% of Total) 19.13 10.00
None (Raw) 105 106
None (% of Total) 35.23 36.55
Table 3.13: Distribution of Explanations by Type and Effect
1A 1B 2A 2B 3A 3B 4A 4B 5A 5B 6A 6B Total
CV Exp. 18 24 10 27 9 19 19 33 21 36 19 33 268
SV Exp. 0 2 16 66 30 13 19 28 4 37 0 3 218
Enumeration based on order from Section 3.6.4.
A = Positive Effect. B = Negative Effect.
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3.7 Results and Analysis
3.7.1 Cross Sectional Model
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 present the 2SLS estimation results for equation (3.2)
with cost variance and schedule variance as the dependent variable, respectively.
Each table presents the results of four regressions, including two sets of results
for each version of the contract’s cumulative variance (adjusted for inflation and
expressed as a percentage of current price). Within these sets, one regression
includes only the baseline regression, while the second column includes controls
for military branch.15 In order to assist the reader in understanding these
regression results, it may be prudent to again mention the EVM definitions of the
cost and schedule variances. A positive cost or schedule variance is a desirable
outcome, indicating that the contract is under-budget or on-schedule. Conversely,
a negative cost or schedule variance is an adverse outcome, suggesting that the
contract is over-budget or behind-schedule.
In Table 3.14, column (1) shows that the coefficient for a contract’s
describability ranking has, on average, a marginally significant positive effect
on the adjusted cumulative cost variance. This indicates that the cost variance
improves as the describability ranking of the contract increases, suggesting that
increased describability of the underlying project improves the chances of keeping
the contract under budget. The program manager cost variance explanations,
15The bottom row of each regression table reports the P-Value of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman
Chi-Squared test for exogenous regressors. The null hypothesis for this test is that the
regressors are exogenous. Also, several of the specifications do not report an R-Squared value
for the regression. This is due to the fact that, in a 2SLS regression, there is no constraint
forcing the residual sum of squares to be less than the total sum of squares, potentially leading
to negative R-squared values. In specifications where this occurs, I have chosen to suppress
the R-squared value rather than report a negative value. For a more thorough explanation,
see Sribney, et al. (1999).
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sumposcv and sumnegcv, enter with the expected sign and significance. In column
(2), the addition of the controls for military branch results in the insignificance
of the describability ranking, while the coefficient on the indicator variable for
Army contracts is positive and significant. This is likely due to the fact that the
excluded military category, DoD projects, includes only the F-35, which is the
most expensive acquisition program in the history of the DoD.
As previously mentioned, it is reasonable to expect that more expensive
projects would be naturally prone to larger dollar amounts of cost and schedule
variance. Therefore, expressing the variance as a percentage of the contract price
may provide a more reasonable comparison across contracts. In columns (3) and
(4), I see the effects of this transformation. The contract describability ranking
no longer has a significant effect on the cost variance outcome when cost variance
is expressed as a percentage of the contract’s current price, and the contract’s
parent branch no longer has a significant effect on cost performance. This finding
is supportive of my assertion that the significance of the branch control in column
(2) was due to the magnitude of the cost variance in the excluded category, which
only includes contracts from the F-35 project.
In Table 3.15, I use the same progression of analysis as in Table 3.14 with
versions of schedule variance as the dependent variable. In column (1), I again
see a marginally significant, positive effect of the describability ranking. In
contrast to Table 3.14, however, I see additional significant effects, some of
which are counterintuitive. For example, I observe negative and significant
effects from the procurement indicator and iteration variable. These findings
suggest that contracts in more advanced stages of acquisition and repeat
iterations of the same contract will perform poorly in terms of schedule adherence
relative to contracts in early phases of production. However, when the branch
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controls are added in column (2), these coefficients become insignificant and the
iteration coefficient becomes positive. A possible explanation for the negative
impact of the procurement indicator is linked to the use of procurement funds
during full rate production. At this stage, engineering changes and additional
equipment added to aircraft impact a much larger number of units than in the
RDT&E-phase contracts. As a result, the schedule impact of these changes may
be greater in procurement contracts even though changes should occur with less
frequency. Meanwhile, the branch coefficients and the indicator for dual source
contracts become positive. The positive effect of the the dual source contracting
environment is intuitive, as one might expect contractors in pseudo competition
to adhere more closely to contract guidelines.
When I use the normalized dependent variable in columns (3) and (4), none
of the coefficients for describability ranking are significant and both are positive.
Comparing the results for the iteration coefficient in Table 3.15 to those in
Table 3.14, it appears that there is a differential effect of repeat iterations
on CV and SV. Specifically, it appears that production lots procured later in
the acquisition process are more likely to fall behind schedule than to exceed
budgeted costs. Upon inspection of the data sample, this is likely due to the
fact that production lots tend to increase in quantity as contractors perform
a repeat contract. Alternatively, there appears to be no significant effect of
repeat iteration on the cost performance (CV) of a contract. Summarizing the
results of my cross-sectional analysis, the evidence for the effect of describability
via the selected contract type on subsequent performance outcomes remains
unclear. However, additional information from the panel model may allow me
to use the results of both approaches to draw conclusions about the relevance of
describability in the defense acquisition process.
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Table 3.14: IV Regressions for Cost Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cumcv cumcv avcvpercurp avcvpercurp
drnk 43.554∗ 47.957 -0.005 -0.030
(25.649) (69.080) (0.009) (0.023)
cumdq -0.672 -0.732 -0.000 0.000
(0.726) (0.853) (0.000) (0.000)
prevcont -1.145 -1.390 0.000 0.000
(0.697) (1.024) (0.000) (0.000)
duals 4.369 17.389 0.007 0.016
(20.403) (26.752) (0.005) (0.011)
length -0.230 -0.259 -0.0000986∗ -0.000
(0.291) (0.262) (0.0000535) (0.000)
winage 0.536 1.205 -0.000 -0.000
(0.932) (1.562) (0.000) (0.001)
iteration -3.100 -2.859 0.001 0.003
(2.988) (6.014) (0.001) (0.002)
proc 12.596 13.777 0.005 0.010
(21.753) (23.099) (0.007) (0.011)
rd 62.416 78.213 -0.000 -0.026
(39.998) (85.361) (0.012) (0.029)
sumposcv 10.169∗ 12.138∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(6.113) (6.005) (0.001) (0.003)
sumnegcv -12.290∗∗ -12.856∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(5.031) (5.039) (0.001) (0.001)
army 60.191∗∗ 0.014
(27.953) (0.013)
navy 8.928 0.020
(47.828) (0.014)
af 7.938 0.027
(49.750) (0.017)
Constant -130.089 -167.663 0.012 0.066
(83.024) (179.658) (0.029) (0.065)
N 89 89 85 85
R-Squared . . 0.244 .
Wald 20.34** 27.82** 44.16** 22.57*
DWH P-Value 0.063 0.423 0.985 0.039
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.15: IV Regressions for Schedule Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cumsv cumsv avsvpercurp avsvpercurp
drnk 26.789∗ -18.443 0.026 0.012
(14.649) (24.687) (0.018) (0.016)
cumdq 0.391 0.701∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.284) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000)
prevcont -0.403 -0.112 -0.000 -0.000
(0.437) (0.323) (0.000) (0.000)
duals 0.316 20.452∗∗ -0.001 0.005
(8.642) (9.642) (0.007) (0.008)
length -0.173 -0.097 0.000 0.000
(0.126) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000)
winage -0.626 -0.665 -0.000 -0.000
(0.627) (0.480) (0.001) (0.001)
iteration -3.051∗ 0.361 -0.002 -0.001
(1.838) (2.326) (0.002) (0.002)
proc -34.806∗∗ -18.584 -0.016 -0.012
(13.697) (11.471) (0.011) (0.011)
rd 1.489 -36.763 0.011 -0.000
(16.636) (25.202) (0.020) (0.020)
sumpossv -0.343 1.628 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗
(3.060) (2.974) (0.002) (0.002)
sumnegsv -4.687∗∗ -3.877∗∗ -0.002 -0.002∗
(2.159) (1.760) (0.001) (0.001)
army 36.099∗∗∗ 0.014
(10.741) (0.013)
navy 38.402∗∗ 0.008
(16.295) (0.012)
af 49.586∗∗∗ 0.018
(18.823) (0.013)
Constant -35.898 45.612 -0.071 -0.045
(39.265) (57.105) (0.056) (0.051)
N 89 89 85 85
R-Squared . 0.269 . 0.088
Wald 23.28** 74.92*** 13.69 24.25**
DWH P-Value 0.019 0.393 0.127 0.443
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.7.2 Panel Model
As an alternative method, I will now estimate equation (3.3) using both
a pooled OLS estimator and the between panel estimator. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3.16 present the results of panel IV estimation for cost variance,
using a pooled OLS estimator. I again present two different versions of the
dependent variable: inflation-adjusted cost variance and cost variance expressed
as a percentage of the contract’s current price.16 In columns (1) and (2) of
Table 3.16, I again see inconclusive evidence of the direction of the effect of the
underlying physical describability of the project. Neither of the coefficients for
the describability ranking variable are significant, but the sign of the coefficient
is uniform across both specifications. Of the additional regressors, only the
program manager variance explanations are significant, and I observe that the
relative magnitudes of the coefficients on the variance explanations suggest that
the design change indicator (poscdbase) produces the largest effect. This is
supported by the fact that this category includes over-target-baseline adjustments
of a contract’s budget. In most cases, this type of adjustment occurs in projects
that are performing extremely poorly, and a large positive cost variance is used
to reset the cumulative cost variance to zero.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.16, I use the between effects panel estimator
to estimate equation (3.3).17 The reported p-values for the Hausman test statistic
suggest that either a) the IV estimator is inefficient in these specifications, or b)
I have chosen a weak instrument. This finding must be taken into consideration
16In the panel setting, the underlying data are individual contract-year observations rather
than the cumulative figures used in the previous section.
17For columns (3) and (4) of Tables 3.16 and 3.17, I include the P-value of the Hausman
specification test statistic. The null of this test is that there is no systematic difference
between the two estimators (OLS vs. IV). Therefore, a failure to reject the null in this case
suggests that the IV estimator does not offer an improvement in terms of consistency.
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while interpreting the following results. The dependent variables are identical to
those used in columns (1) and (2), but the results are quite different. In column
(3), the coefficient on describability ranking is positive and marginally significant.
However, the coefficient is insignificant once the variance is normalized by current
price in column (4). In contrast to columns (1) and (2), much fewer of the cost
variance explanations are significant when estimated using the between estimator,
which one might expect as this method identifies the effect of variation in the
averages of these values across contracts.18
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.17 present the results of pooled OLS
estimation of equation (3.3). In both specifications, the variation in the dependent
variable is primarily accounted for by the program manager variables. Generally
speaking, the pooled OLS estimator performs poorly for the schedule variance
specifications. In column (2), the coefficient on describability ranking is positive
and marginally significant, but the F-statistic for this regression suggests that this
model does not predict a significant amount of variation in the dependent variable.
However, the results of using the between estimator in columns (3) and (4) of
Table 3.17 support the pooled OLS results, as the coefficient for describability
ranking is again positive and significant.19 I again observe decreased significance
for many of the variance explanation categories in comparing the pooled OLS
and between estimates of the regression coefficients.
Interestingly, it appears that there is an observable difference in the categories
affecting cost variance compared to those in the schedule variance. In Table 3.16,
I observe that cost variance is consistently affected by corrective actions.
Meanwhile, schedule variance is consistently affected by supply management
18The branch controls were insignificant in all of the panel specifications for CV and SV.
19Again, note the p-values of the Hausman test statistic. It is likely that the IV estimator does
not provide an improvement in consistency over the OLS estimator in this case.
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issues and administrative issues in Table 3.17. Unsurprisingly, both types of
variance are affected by baseline changes, which is likely due to the use of
over-target-baseline corrections that set both CV and SV to zero.
Although it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions given the precision of
my models, it is possible to observe several trends when one considers both the
cross-sectional and panel results from the preceding sections. First, in the case
of cost variance, the sign of the coefficient on the cost variance is inconsistent
in the cross-sectional model. Specifically, the effect is negative when I use cost
variance as a percentage of current contract price as the dependent variable. In
speaking with DoD EVM officials, this is likely due to differential administrative
procedures across different contract types.20 For example, in a CPFF contract,
the government will likely require more frequent cost monitoring and will quickly
demand corrective action in response to deficiencies, primarily due to the fact that
it bears the entire cost burden for this type of contract. As a result, annual reports
of cost variance for a CPFF could be reflecting active government management of
the contract. Conversely, in a FPIF contract, the contractor bears the majority of
the cost-growth burden, and the government’s administration of the contract will
be relatively more passive. Given this discussion, it might then be possible to see,
on average, a tendency for more describable projects and contract types to report
poorer annual contract performance measures, reflective of the government’s
willingness to let the contractor address the situation on its own. Second,
although the significance of the coefficient on the describability ranking in the
schedule variance regressions is inconsistent, the coefficient itself is positive in
every specification save one. Third, combining the two previous observations,
20My explanation of this phenomenon is attributable to a personal interview with an official in
the DoD’s Earned Value Management Division on 14 December 2012.
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it appears that the effect of the describability ranking of the underlying project
on contract performance occurs in the expected direction. In six of eight cost
variance specifications, describability ranking has a positive effect. Additionally,
the negative coefficient for describability ranking in the cross-sectional model,
using avcvpercurp, seems to be explainable given the government’s approach to
administering less complete contract types. Meanwhile, contracts using contract
types that are generally more “complete,” presumably stemming from the subject
parties’ ability to accurately describe the work at hand, seem to perform better
in terms of adherence to production schedule than those covering less describable
projects.21
21Note that I have also estimated each model without including the program manager
explanations. In the cross-sectional model, the results are robust only when I include the
program manager explanations. Specifically, the coefficient on drnk only achieves significance
when I include program manager explanations. However, in the panel model, the results
presented here are robust with and without the program manager explanations, exhibiting
classic signs of omitted variable bias when the programmanager explanations are not included
in the specification. I attribute the difference between the two models to the relatively
imprecise nature of the control variables in the cross-sectional setting. I am unable to finely
capture the effects of standard complications in the cross-sectional model due to the smaller
data sample and the resulting smaller number of degrees of freedom.
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Table 3.16: Panel IV Estimation: Cost Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cv cvpercurp cv cvpercurp
drnk 13.661 0.008 19.836∗ 0.011
(25.659) (0.011) (11.675) (0.012)
dq 0.104 0.000 -1.421 0.000
(1.863) (0.001) (2.512) (0.003)
prevcont -0.497 -0.000 -0.455 -0.000
(0.440) (0.000) (0.302) (0.000)
duals -2.114 0.005 -5.893 0.003
(12.051) (0.005) (10.040) (0.010)
length 0.044 -0.000 0.051 -0.000
(0.127) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000)
iteration 0.093 0.000 -1.186 0.000
(2.301) (0.001) (1.473) (0.001)
wincage 0.510 0.000 -0.110 -0.001
(2.026) (0.001) (3.276) (0.003)
proc -9.298 -0.018 -11.878 -0.042
(41.899) (0.019) (32.473) (0.033)
rd 1.376 -0.004 11.828 -0.024
(41.246) (0.018) (26.020) (0.026)
poscdpc 6.017 0.008 0.234 -0.012
(17.941) (0.008) (24.051) (0.024)
negcdpc -4.533 -0.000 10.960 0.016
(15.825) (0.007) (19.117) (0.019)
poscsuppman -9.742 0.003 -14.327 -0.008
(25.653) (0.011) (21.678) (0.022)
negcsuppman -52.103∗∗∗ -0.006 -34.918 0.010
(13.694) (0.006) (21.305) (0.022)
posccorract 26.218 0.012 47.636∗∗ 0.031
(20.725) (0.009) (21.209) (0.021)
negccorract -43.944∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -48.619∗ -0.044∗
(16.083) (0.007) (25.808) (0.026)
poscdbase 90.642∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 18.486 0.026
(14.604) (0.007) (22.230) (0.023)
negcdbase -5.257 -0.016∗∗∗ -9.730 -0.033
(13.188) (0.006) (20.405) (0.021)
poscadmin 13.730 0.010 -2.340 0.003
(14.900) (0.007) (22.014) (0.022)
negcadmin -13.837 -0.016∗∗ -36.682 -0.038
(17.035) (0.008) (26.589) (0.027)
posceffort 8.198 0.026∗∗∗ 8.803 0.022
(18.984) (0.008) (16.146) (0.016)
negceffort -8.544 -0.011∗ 4.534 0.003
(12.848) (0.006) (22.397) (0.023)
Constant -43.788 -0.033 -62.497∗ -0.034
(88.598) (0.039) (36.739) (0.037)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 305 305 305 305
R-Squared 0.250 0.261 0.001 0.218
F-Statistic 4.011 4.994 N/A N/A
DWH P-Value 0.269 0.269 N/A N/A
Wald N/A N/A 45.84*** 38.53**
Hausman P-Value N/A N/A 1.000 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.17: Panel IV Estimation: Schedule Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sv svpercurp sv svpercurp
drnk 14.449 0.022∗∗ 16.538∗ 0.020∗∗
(21.018) (0.011) (8.925) (0.010)
dq -0.158 0.000 -0.054 0.003
(1.651) (0.001) (2.335) (0.003)
prevcont -0.537 -0.000323∗ -0.509∗∗ -0.000
(0.369) (0.000186) (0.252) (0.000)
duals -1.629 -0.005 -1.443 -0.002
(10.473) (0.005) (8.934) (0.010)
length -0.018 0.000 -0.038 0.000
(0.108) (0.000) (0.093) (0.000)
wincage -0.205 0.001 1.035 0.004
(1.873) (0.001) (3.059) (0.003)
iteration -1.118 -0.001 -1.242 -0.000
(1.839) (0.001) (1.074) (0.001)
proc -16.677 -0.027 -36.744 -0.036
(34.099) (0.017) (24.055) (0.027)
rd -0.129 0.002 -16.369 -0.015
(34.336) (0.017) (22.116) (0.025)
negsdpc -9.719 -0.016 -35.236 -0.038
(35.976) (0.018) (52.859) (0.059)
posssuppman 3.486 0.013 -5.913 0.012
(17.924) (0.009) (17.042) (0.019)
negssuppman -15.036 -0.016∗∗∗ -13.080 -0.031∗∗∗
(9.551) (0.005) (9.743) (0.011)
posscorract 13.624 0.012∗∗ 3.518 0.012
(11.644) (0.006) (17.318) (0.019)
negscorract 0.174 -0.019∗ -3.996 -0.027
(19.073) (0.010) (21.860) (0.024)
possdbase 65.554∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 7.698 0.019
(13.132) (0.007) (22.631) (0.025)
negsdbase -20.716∗ -0.006 -10.814 -0.010
(11.088) (0.006) (16.678) (0.019)
possadmin 5.152 -0.001 -39.945 -0.012
(26.604) (0.013) (53.129) (0.059)
negsadmin -8.565 -0.026∗∗∗ -33.199∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(10.374) (0.005) (11.321) (0.013)
negseffort 27.587 0.006 60.430 0.063
(31.331) (0.016) (39.850) (0.045)
Constant -24.416 -0.059 -22.054 -0.060
(72.339) (0.036) (33.423) (0.037)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 305 305 305 305
R-Squared 0.105 . . 0.153
F-Statistic 2.006 3.729 N/A N/A
DWH P-Value 0.451 0.020 N/A N/A
Wald N/A N/A 18.42 32.42*
Hausman P-Value N/A N/A 1.000 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.8 Robustness Checks
3.8.1 Split Sample Results
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the outlier effect of the F-35 program
on my estimation results. Additionally, the cross-sectional results from this
chapter indicate that the identity of the controlling branch of the US military may
have a differential effect on a contract’s performance in terms of cost and schedule
adherence. Any effect of this nature likely stems from differing technological
requirements of the military branches and resulting technological heterogeneity in
the projects controlled by each branch. For example, the programs controlled by
the Army in the data sample include several modernization programs for existing
airframes, whereas the Navy’s projects include procurement of new fixed-wing
and rotary aircraft. As a result of the differing levels of technological complexity
associated with these programs, one might expect the contract performance
outcomes to also vary. In order to further examine this possibility, I now present
split-sample regression results, divided by controlling military branch, for both
the cross-sectional and panel models.
Tables 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20 provide estimation results of the cross-sectional
model for Army, Navy, and Air Force contracts, respectively. Note that the
binary control variables do not apply to each sample. For example, none of the
Army contracts in the data sample were dual source projects. Columns (1) and
(2) of each table list the results for cost variance, while columns (3) and (4)
list results for schedule variance. The model performs particularly well for the
Army and Air Force contracts in the schedule variance specifications. Comparing
these results to the cross-sectional estimation for the entire data sample, several
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trends are preserved. I continue to observe a negative and significant effect of
the procurement indicator variable on schedule performance, which is present for
all three military branches. The effect of the describability ranking on schedule
performance is positive for all three branches and significant in both specifications
for the the Air Force contracts. However, the effect of describability on cost
performance is negative in four of six specifications and is never significant.
In moving to the panel model, sample size becomes a primary issue when I
attempt to use the between estimator. Due to the limited number of contracts for
the Army and Air Force, I am unable to use the between transformation in those
samples due to the resulting restriction on degrees of freedom. However, I will
present pooled OLS estimation results for all three branches and additionally
include between estimation results for the Navy sample. Note that in these
regression tables, I have elected to only display the program manager variance
explanations that produce a significant effect on the dependent variable, despite
the fact that I have included all of the explanations in each specification.
In Table 3.21, there is evidence of a positive effect of moving into the
procurement phase of a program on contract cost performance, while repeat
iterations appear to have a negative effect on cost performance for both versions
of the dependent variable. Alternatively, only the re-baseline program variance
explanation has a significant effect on schedule performance. In contrast to the
cross-sectional results, contract describability ranking has a positive effect on
cost performance but a negative effect on schedule performance in the pooled
OLS model.
Table 3.22 presents the estimation results of the panel model for the sample
of Navy contracts, using cost variance measures as the dependent variables.
Columns (1) and (2) are the results from the pooled OLS estimator, while
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columns (3) and (4) use the between transformation. In these specifications, only
the program manager variance explanations exhibit any significant effect on cost
variance. The describability ranking coefficient is never significant and is negative
in three of four specifications. Table 3.23 presents pooled OLS and between
effects estimates of the panel model with schedule variance as the dependent
variable. Again, I observe that only the coefficients for select program manager
explanations are significant, and the effect of the describability ranking is again
negative in three of four specifications.
In Table 3.24, the only variables exhibiting a high degree of significance are
program manager explanations of the effects of negative corrective actions and
positive re-baseline changes on the contract’s cost performance. However, these
findings are not robust to normalization of the cost variance by the contract
price. The coefficient estimates for describability ranking reveal a negative but
insignificant effect on cost variance and an insignificant and non-uniform effect
on schedule variance.
A clear concern in conducting this type of split-sample analysis would be
the effects of small-sample bias. While I see evidence of a significant effect
of describability on schedule performance in the cross-sectional results for the
Air Force sample, this result is based on a sample of seventeen contracts.
Alternatively, I see no clear evidence of any significant effect of describability
from the split-sample analysis of the panel model estimates, and only the program
manager variance explanations appear to have any significant effect across the
different branches. In summary, it appears that the differential effects on contract
performance of management by each military branch, which one observes in the
estimation results for the full sample, are likely due to unobserved technological
heterogeneity that is indicative of branch-specific projects. The significant
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positive effects of the branch controls in the full sample are likely due to the
presence of the F-35, as split-sample analysis does not reveal any information
suggesting that the branch-controlled contracts are administered in a unique
manner.
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Table 3.18: Cross-Sectional IV Regressions: Army Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cumcv avcvpercurp cumsv avsvpercurp
drnk -13.748 -0.015 0.980 0.004
(12.708) (0.022) (2.589) (0.004)
cumdq 11.696 0.018 1.044 0.003∗∗
(13.765) (0.021) (0.798) (0.001)
prevcont 1.319 -0.003 -2.800∗∗ 0.000
(4.161) (0.010) (1.426) (0.003)
length 0.182 0.000 -0.202 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.000) (0.131) (0.000)
winage -2.647 0.010 9.938∗∗∗ 0.010∗
(12.004) (0.028) (3.813) (0.006)
iteration -2.313 -0.012∗ -2.317 -0.016∗
(3.101) (0.006) (5.207) (0.009)
proc 52.690 0.094 -22.288∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(51.435) (0.099) (12.225) (0.021)
sumposcv -22.762 -0.017
(28.178) (0.049)
sumnegcv 5.770 0.007
(9.316) (0.014)
sumpossv 6.666∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(2.031) (0.004)
sumnegsv -1.059 -0.008∗
(2.314) (0.004)
Constant -12.259 -0.015 20.075∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(22.189) (0.048) (9.944) (0.014)
N 12 12 12 12
R-Squared 0.517 0.839 0.699 0.688
Wald 1177.78*** 3272.93*** 787.96*** 684.25***
DWH P-Value 0.035 0.332 0.412 0.068
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.19: Cross-Sectional IV Regressions: Navy Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cumcv avcvpercurp cumsv avsvpercurp
drnk 84.669 -0.031 14.006 0.010
(105.210) (0.036) (16.957) (0.018)
cumdq -0.311 -0.000 0.640∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.598) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000)
prevcont -1.019 0.000 0.068 -0.000
(1.178) (0.000) (0.204) (0.000)
duals 0.365 0.005 -0.303 0.005
(40.891) (0.017) (5.854) (0.007)
length -0.265 -0.000 -0.057 0.000
(0.678) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000)
winage 1.968 -0.000 0.003 0.000
(2.380) (0.001) (0.463) (0.001)
iteration -6.356 0.002 -3.204∗ -0.001
(7.461) (0.002) (1.669) (0.002)
proc 21.436 0.018 -14.401 -0.003
(45.985) (0.016) (12.068) (0.016)
rd 117.731 -0.012 3.389 0.001
(122.895) (0.042) (18.304) (0.025)
sumposcv 9.778 0.006∗
(8.367) (0.003)
sumnegcv -14.471∗ -0.003
(8.683) (0.002)
sumpossv -1.222 0.005
(2.445) (0.003)
sumnegsv -5.011 -0.001
(3.049) (0.002)
Constant -282.192 0.073 -25.556 -0.041
(319.757) (0.108) (48.660) (0.067)
N 45 45 45 45
R-Squared . . 0.250 0.266
Wald 25.12*** 16.39 153.47*** 19.88**
DWH P-Value 0.186 0.063 0.171 0.949
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.20: Cross-Sectional IV Regressions: Air Force Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cumcv avcvpercurp cumsv avsvpercurp
drnk -15.582 0.009 2.993∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(14.461) (0.013) (1.295) (0.008)
cumdq 0.547 -0.001 0.911∗∗∗ 0.001∗
(1.844) (0.001) (0.317) (0.001)
prevcont -0.838 0.000 0.214∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(1.012) (0.001) (0.088) (0.000)
length -0.288∗∗ -0.000 0.136∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.133) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000)
winage 2.024 -0.002 -0.505∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(2.467) (0.002) (0.202) (0.001)
iteration 0.822 0.001 0.016 0.001
(1.240) (0.001) (0.118) (0.001)
proc 24.646 -0.015 -6.250∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(25.921) (0.026) (2.214) (0.011)
sumposcv -8.159 0.004
(6.528) (0.004)
sumnegcv 1.959 -0.002
(3.098) (0.002)
sumpossv 0.049 0.002
(1.457) (0.005)
sumnegsv -1.152∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.282) (0.001)
Constant 43.423 -0.017 -10.867∗∗∗ -0.049∗
(33.918) (0.039) (3.958) (0.025)
N 17 17 17 17
R-Squared 0.184 . 0.915 0.687
Wald 41.49*** 24.32*** 804.93*** 85.73***
DWH P-Value 0.083 0.363 0.970 0.136
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.21: Panel IV Estimation: Army Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cv cvpercurp sv svpercurp
drnk 1.994 0.033 -0.463 -0.010
(3.753) (0.032) (1.669) (0.013)
dq 0.894 0.006 -0.160 0.001
(0.961) (0.008) (0.542) (0.004)
prevcont 0.109 0.000 0.067 -0.001
(0.343) (0.003) (0.252) (0.002)
length 0.133 0.001 -0.095 -0.001
(0.171) (0.001) (0.105) (0.001)
iteration -6.974 -0.080∗ -1.041 0.006
(5.092) (0.044) (2.795) (0.021)
wincage 0.355 -0.000 0.910 0.005
(1.384) (0.012) (0.967) (0.007)
proc 14.996∗ 0.187∗∗ -0.816 -0.005
(8.040) (0.069) (4.504) (0.034)
possdbase 17.500∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(5.121) (0.039)
negsdbase -3.660 -0.047∗
(3.447) (0.026)
Constant -5.396 0.058 17.170 0.213
(26.252) (0.225) (18.918) (0.145)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PM Explanations Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 34 34 34 34
R-Squared 0.659 0.609 0.734 0.636
F-Statistic 1.217 1.069 2.057 1.382
DWH P-Value 0.091 0.053 0.305 0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.22: Panel IV Estimation for Cost Variance: Navy Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cv cvpercurp cv cvpercurp
drnk -24.799 -0.083 7.114 -0.005
(101.364) (0.213) (9.568) (0.013)
dq -1.504 -0.002 -1.407 -0.003
(2.637) (0.006) (2.095) (0.003)
prevcont 0.065 0.001 0.120 0.001
(0.366) (0.001) (0.360) (0.000)
duals 6.244 0.014 -3.997 -0.001
(26.379) (0.056) (12.647) (0.017)
length 0.113 0.000 -0.036 -0.000
(0.237) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000)
iteration 1.765 0.004 -0.002 0.000
(4.486) (0.009) (1.018) (0.001)
wincage -0.810 -0.003 -1.314 -0.001
(4.891) (0.010) (3.040) (0.004)
proc 30.953 0.066 -8.798 0.011
(90.369) (0.190) (23.886) (0.032)
rd -7.461 -0.036 -2.076 0.015
(48.837) (0.103) (17.595) (0.023)
negcdpc -16.899∗ -0.001 -13.230 0.019
(8.750) (0.018) (10.205) (0.014)
negcsuppman -34.777∗∗ -0.014 8.185 -0.009
(14.214) (0.030) (23.387) (0.031)
posccorract 47.516∗∗ 0.008 70.626∗∗∗ 0.004
(20.487) (0.043) (19.598) (0.026)
poscdbase 36.722∗∗∗ 0.031 4.049 0.022
(11.954) (0.025) (19.923) (0.027)
posceffort 5.246 0.027 -5.162 0.050∗∗
(14.320) (0.030) (17.058) (0.023)
negceffort -23.177∗∗ -0.017 -18.951 -0.030
(11.030) (0.023) (16.299) (0.022)
Constant 51.789 0.212 -17.245 -0.006
(277.527) (0.585) (23.971) (0.032)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PM Explanations Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 160 160 160
R-Squared 0.190 . 0.794 0.721
F-Statistic 3.624*** 0.607 N/A N/A
DWH P-Value 0.688 0.290 N/A N/A
Wald N/A N/A 75.94*** 46.42***
Hausman P-Value N/A N/A 1.000 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.23: Panel IV Estimation for Schedule Variance: Navy Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
sv svpercurp sv svpercurp
drnk -4.331 0.065 -1.913 -0.001
(47.535) (0.174) (7.449) (0.024)
dq 0.167 0.002 -0.522 0.004
(1.391) (0.005) (1.317) (0.004)
prevcont 0.018 -0.000 0.004 -0.000
(0.142) (0.001) (0.187) (0.001)
duals 2.401 -0.015 2.288 0.014
(11.476) (0.042) (7.841) (0.026)
length -0.003 -0.000 -0.011 0.000
(0.090) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000)
wincage 0.000 0.005 1.328 0.003
(2.948) (0.011) (2.654) (0.009)
iteration -0.670 -0.003 -0.984 0.001
(2.006) (0.007) (0.809) (0.003)
proc -1.081 -0.034 1.855 0.009
(26.936) (0.098) (10.463) (0.034)
rd -8.688 0.047 -2.080 0.003
(37.173) (0.136) (10.300) (0.034)
negssuppman -9.892 -0.024 -2.481 -0.041∗
(7.373) (0.027) (7.173) (0.023)
negsdbase -10.442 0.013 -19.963∗∗ 0.000
(13.792) (0.050) (9.449) (0.031)
Constant 19.995 -0.217 9.937 -0.036
(151.422) (0.553) (19.780) (0.064)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PM Explanations Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 160 160 160
R-Squared 0.347 . 0.544 0.495
F-Statistic 3.744*** 0.428 N/A N/A
DWH P-Value 0.909 0.325 N/A N/A
Wald N/A N/A 28.28 22.40
Hausman P-Value N/A N/A 1.000 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.24: Panel IV Estimation: Air Force Contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cv cvpercurp sv svpercurp
drnk -10.170 -0.096 94.307 -0.004
(54.983) (0.230) (2608.284) (1.287)
dq 0.793 0.001 1.064 -0.004
(1.182) (0.005) (33.694) (0.017)
prevcont 0.092 0.001 -2.133 0.000
(1.400) (0.006) (58.698) (0.029)
length -0.179 -0.001 0.867 0.000
(0.449) (0.002) (23.112) (0.011)
iteration -0.163 0.001 2.966 0.001
(0.903) (0.004) (81.448) (0.040)
wincage -0.931 -0.001 -0.102 0.002
(1.138) (0.005) (11.160) (0.006)
proc 13.560 0.160 -180.886 0.013
(98.179) (0.410) (5022.863) (2.479)
negccorract -47.336∗∗∗ -0.054
(15.857) (0.066)
poscdbase 32.990∗∗∗ 0.039
(8.822) (0.037)
Constant 59.693 0.305 -284.248 -0.059
(191.203) (0.799) (7516.958) (3.710)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
PM Explanations Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52 52 52 52
R-Squared 0.709 . . 0.628
F-Statistic 3.803*** 0.563 0.062 2.919***
DWH P-Value 0.739 0.080 0.787 0.988
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.8.2 Effect of Describability on Contract Administration
It is possible that the physical describability of a project and the resulting
contract type may affect the dynamics of the administration of the contract in
addition to the performance outcome. For example, in conversations with DoD
officials, it is apparent that contracts in which the government shoulders a larger
share of the cost burden often require more frequent cost reporting from the
contractor.22 Additionally, the describability of a contract may affect the ability
of the government and the contractor to determine an accurate price for the
contract or to estimate future costs. It is quite common in my data sample to
observe changes to the baseline contract, which drastically alter the contractual
details. This, in turn, often resets the cost and schedule variances to zero
by incorporating over-target costs into the contract. While the panel analysis
conducted in this paper takes this possibility into account, the cross-sectional
analysis is unable to account for this type of effect. A poorly performing contract
that is re-baselined could have a cumulative positive variance upon completion.
Therefore, it may be appropriate to consider whether a contract’s describability
rank has a distinct effect on the intermediate dynamics of the contract in addition
to looking at the performance outcomes. Given this discussion, I will now
estimate equation (3.2) with a set of variability measures as dependent variables,
using a reduced form approach to model the effect of describability on contract
administration via the contract type decision.
Table 3.25 lists the additional dependent variables and a definition of each.
A brief explanation of each type of statistic is perhaps warranted at this point.
22This information is attributable to a personal interview with DoD EVM officials, 14 December
2012.
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• Sharpe Ratio: The Sharpe Ratio is a statistic used in the finance literature
to measure the ratio of return to risk for a financial portfolio. It is calculated
by dividing the mean of the excess return of an asset by the standard
deviation of the excess return (Schuster and Auer, 2012). This excess
is relative to a benchmark asset, often a risk-free investment. Clearly,
if one compares two assets to an identical benchmark, a higher Sharpe
ratio indicates more return per unit of risk. Due to the fact that cost and
schedule variances can take positive and negative values, this seems to be
an appropriate way to measure the government’s return per unit of risk for
a contract. Underperformance would result in a verifiable loss (negative
cost or schedule variance), while over-performance would result in a gain
(positive cost or schedule variance). Additionally, the DoD contracting
environment has its own risk-free benchmark: the firm fixed price contract.
Due to the fact that the contractor bears full responsibility for all cost
growth in an FFP contract, EVM is not applied, and the variances are
always zero from the government’s point of view. Therefore, I can calculate
the Sharpe Ratio for either cost or schedule variance for a particular
contract using the following formula (using cost variance as an example):
SRCV =
µCV
σCV
(3.4)
• Coefficient of Variation: In contrast to the Sharpe Ratio, the coefficient
of variation is purely a measure of variability and is appropriate in
comparing variables with widely differing mean values (Scheel, 1978). In
this case, a comparison of coefficients of variation for two different measures
allows one to determine which of the two measures is more variable. I
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have calculated the coefficient of variation for several different measures
in my data sample: contract price, unit price (with initial price), unit
price (without initial price), difference in the contractor’s estimate at
completion and the program manager’s estimate at completion, difference
in the contractor’s estimate and the current price, and difference in the
program manager’s estimate and the current price. The formula for the
coefficient of variation is (for a generic variable x):
CoefVx =
σx
µx
(3.5)
• Mean Squared Forecasting Error: In each SAR, both the contractor
and program manager provide estimates for the cost of the contract at
completion(EAC). In the next annual SAR, I observe an update to the
contract’s price and a new estimate from each party. Presumably, the
estimate from the previous SAR should serve as a forecast of the contract
price in the current SAR. Therefore, I can calculate the forecasting error
for each party for every contract-year in which there is a preceding estimate
and use these forecast errors to calculate a mean square forecasting error
for each contract. The formula for this statistic is (using the PM as an
example):
MSFEPM =
∑N
t=2(EACt−1 − CPt)
2
N
(3.6)
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Table 3.25: Variability Measures
Cost Variance (CV) Definition
cvsr Cost Variance Sharpe Ratio
svsr Schedule Variance Sharpe Ratio
pcoefv Contract Price Coefficient of Variation
upcoefvi Unit Price Coefficient of Variation (including initial price)
upcoefv Unit Price Coefficient of Variation (without initial price)
diffcoefv Coeff. of Variation of Difference in PM & Contractor Estimates
diffcoefvc Coeff. of Variation of Difference in Contractor Est. & Current Price
diffcoefvp Coeff. of Variation of Difference in PM Estimate & Current Price
lcmsfe Log of Contractor’s Mean Squared Forecasting Error
lpmsfe Log of PM’s Mean Squared Forecasting Error
Tables 3.27 and 3.28 display the estimation results for equation (3.2) using the
Sharpe ratios for cost variance and schedule variance, respectively. In each table,
I list three specifications, including a baseline regression, baseline with variance
explanations, and baseline with variance explanations and branch controls. In
the case of the cost variance Sharpe ratio, columns (1) and (2) show a significant
and negative effect from the length of the contract. This indicates that the
government is more likely to receive a poor “return” for a longer duration
contract, on average. However, this effect becomes insignificant when military
branch controls are added. For the schedule variance Sharpe ratio in Table 3.28,
I observe a positive and significant effect from cumulative quantity change and
a negative and significant effect from repeat iteration. Meanwhile, column (2)
suggests a positive and marginally significant effect from describability ranking,
which becomes insignificant upon the addition of the branch controls. From these
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Table 3.26: Summary Statistics for Variability Measures
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
cvsr 69 0.053 1.107 -4.699 4.142
svsr 69 -0.231 0.523 -2.67 1
pcoefv 89 0.331 0.47 0 2
upcoefvi 54 0.198 0.236 0 0.956
upcoefv 55 0.13 0.177 2.78E-16 0.814
diffcoefv 50 1.373 0.639 0.073 3.068
diffcoefvc 58 0.176 0.533 0.146 2.236
diffcoefvp 56 1.178 0.463 0.146 2.236
cmsfe 70 963069.5 6839603 0.00E+00 5.68E+07
pmsfe 71 987887.8 6769086 0 5.68E+07
results, it does not appear that the describability of the project via the contract
type has a consistently significant effect on the DoD’s “return” per unit of risk
for a contract.
Tables 3.29, 3.30, and 3.31 present the results of IV estimation of
equation (3.2) using coefficients of variation for different measurements of the
contract’s price. I have specific reasons for considering each of these. Due to
the fact that quantity changes often account for substantial increases in contract
price, particularly for full-scale production contracts, I wanted to compare the
effects on overall contract price to effects on the unit price. Additionally, I have
previously mentioned that the initial price of a contract is often not representative
of the eventual price of the contracts, and the largest changes in price often occur
between the award date and the first SAR (the dates at which the parties record
initial and current prices). Therefore, I am presenting results for the coefficient
of variation of the unit price both with and without the initial price.
In Table 3.29, the analysis proceeds as follows. Columns (1) and (3)
include schedule variance explanations and explanations with branch controls,
respectively. Columns (2) and (4) use cost variance explanations and cost
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variance explanations with branch controls, respectively. The results show a
consistently negative and significant effect on the variability of the overall price
due to the contractor’s previous number of in-sample aircraft contracts. This
perhaps indicates that firms develop an aptitude for estimating prices as they
become more experienced in DoD contracting. In addition, I observe a positive
and significant effect from the iteration variable in columns (1) and (2), but
this becomes insignificant and even changes sign as military branch controls are
introduced. There is no consistent sign or effect of the describability ranking on
the coefficient of variability for the overall contract price. The model performs
particularly poorly in Tables 3.30 and 3.31, and the model fails to predict a
statistically significant amount of variation in either the upcoefvi or upcoefv
variables.
Tables 3.32, 3.33, and 3.34 present results related to the variability of the
contractor and program manager estimates of the contract price at completion.
Table 3.32 suggests that the variability in the difference between the two parties’
estimates is significantly decreased in repeat iterations of the same contract.
However, this effect becomes insignificant when I control for firm attributes. In
Table 3.33, columns (5) and (6) show that the coefficient on the describability
ranking has a positive and significant effect on the variability between the current
contract price and the contractor’s estimate at completion. Table 3.34 shows a
negative and significant effect for the coefficient on the procurement indicator
variable, indicating that the program manager’s estimates follow the current price
of the contract more closely for the later stages of an acquisition project, on
average. While the results in Table 3.34 do not show a significant effect for the
describability ranking on the dependent variable, the sign of the coefficient is
consistent with the estimates from Table 3.33. Perhaps it is possible that the
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DoD is more willing to accept variable cost estimates from the contractor in
cases where the contractor bears a larger share of the cost burden. Conversely, it
may be the case that the government is more active or willing in implementing
corrective actions or incorporating unforeseen costs in contracts in which it bears
a greater share of the cost burden.
Tables 3.35 and 3.36 use the mean squared forecasting error of the contractor
and program manager estimates at completion in comparison to the next period’s
price of the contract. The effect of describability ranking is positive but
insignificant in eleven of twelve specifications. Both tables report a positive and
significant coefficient for the length variable in every specification. This indicates
that longer contract periods will complicate each party’s ability to accurately
estimate the contract’s price at completion. Also, I observe in both tables that the
firm employment has a significant and negative effect, whereas the firm revenue
has a significant, positive effect. This is an interesting result, considering that
both of these variables are being considered as a proxy for firm size. Due to
the fact that I’m using total employment but segment revenue, this may be an
indication of a difference in the estimation capabilities of defense firms versus
defense divisions of larger corporations.23 For example, a large corporation with
a defense segment may employ a much larger number of people than a stand-alone
defense firm. Conversely, the defense firm’s revenues may be much greater than
the revenues of the defense segment of a larger corporation. The results of
Tables 3.35 and 3.36 suggest that the overall effect may be more accurate price
estimation results from the defense segments of larger corporations. However,
this may be due to a tendency for these segments to contract for less complex
23I’m forced to use these differing measures due to the unavailability of sector employment data
for large firms
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projects than the specialized defense firms.
In summary, the regression results from this section of the paper do not
suggest a definitive role for the describability ranking of the contract on the ability
of the contractor and program manager to administer the contract. Almost all
of the results indicate a positive relationship with these measures of variability,
but the relationship is rarely significant and marginal at best. However, this
relationship supports the cost-sharing structure of the different contract types.
As project describability increases, the contract type will become more complete,
and the contractor will bear a greater share of the cost burden. As a result, one
might expect the cost estimates of the two sides to increase in variability as the
contractor becomes more invested in tying the contract price to its own estimates,
while the government will likely be less actively involved in the contractor’s
estimation and administration processes.
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Table 3.27: IV Regressions for Cost Variance Sharpe Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
cvsr cvsr cvsr
drnk 0.647 0.609 -0.561
(0.632) (0.558) (0.612)
cumdq 0.003 -0.006 -0.000
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
prevcont -0.007 -0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
duals -0.176 0.037 0.685
(0.250) (0.308) (0.520)
winage -0.011 -0.000 0.017
(0.036) (0.028) (0.027)
length -0.006∗ -0.006∗ -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
iteration 0.031 0.007 0.051
(0.086) (0.071) (0.072)
proc -0.870 0.177 0.895
(0.820) (0.700) (0.591)
rd 0.079 1.143 0.344
(0.983) (0.810) (0.894)
sumposcv 0.263∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗
(0.096) (0.111)
sumnegcv -0.160∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.053)
army 1.003
(0.630)
navy 1.072
(0.678)
af 1.739∗∗
(0.789)
Constant -0.986 -2.008 -0.090
(2.114) (1.842) (1.923)
N 69 69 69
R-Squared . 0.123 0.210
Wald 18.24** 22.32** 35.27***
DWH P-Value 0.342 0.289 0.210
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.28: IV Regressions for Schedule Variance Sharpe Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
svsr svsr svsr
drnk 0.209 0.310∗ 0.536
(0.151) (0.182) (0.384)
cumdq 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
prevcont 0.008 0.009 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
duals -0.252 -0.316 -0.451∗
(0.175) (0.192) (0.241)
winage 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
length 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
iteration -0.094∗ -0.092∗ -0.111∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.058)
proc -0.027 -0.130 -0.238
(0.211) (0.200) (0.253)
rd 0.172 0.236 0.424
(0.267) (0.305) (0.474)
sumpossv 0.115∗∗ 0.123∗
(0.050) (0.071)
sumnegsv -0.078∗∗ -0.086∗
(0.039) (0.047)
army -0.200
(0.270)
navy -0.327
(0.237)
af -0.190
(0.315)
Constant -0.750 -0.981 -1.331
(0.517) (0.642) (1.078)
N 69 69 69
R-Squared 0.164 0.162 .
Wald 38.71*** 52.89*** 53.22***
DWH P-Value 0.217 0.065 0.047
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.29: IV Estimation: Coeff. of Variation in Contract Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pcoefv pcoefv pcoefv pcoefv
drnk -0.125 -0.113 0.551 0.738
(0.232) (0.222) (0.671) (0.683)
cumdq 0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
prevcont -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.019∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010)
duals 0.382 0.386 0.083 0.083
(0.286) (0.288) (0.398) (0.412)
winage -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017)
length -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
iteration 0.058∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.003 -0.010
(0.029) (0.028) (0.056) (0.061)
proc -0.076 0.040 -0.316 -0.097
(0.147) (0.185) (0.385) (0.414)
rd -0.136 0.011 0.433 0.919
(0.299) (0.295) (0.646) (0.825)
sumpossv -0.070∗ -0.083
(0.036) (0.067)
sumnegsv 0.012 -0.004
(0.022) (0.052)
sumposcv 0.022 0.079
(0.038) (0.082)
sumnegcv -0.035∗ -0.051
(0.020) (0.045)
army -0.457 -0.458
(0.324) (0.379)
navy -0.660 -0.875
(0.461) (0.548)
af -0.659 -0.868
(0.549) (0.643)
Constant 0.849 0.683 -0.354 -1.069
(0.799) (0.779) (1.482) (1.620)
N 89 89 89 89
R-Squared 0.226 0.236 . .
Wald 67.29*** 62.67*** 35.00*** 25.47**
DWH P-Value 0.780 0.844 0.127 0.038
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.30: IV Estimation: Coeff. of Variation in Unit Price (with initial price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
upcoefvi upcoefvi upcoefvi upcoefvi
drnk 1.017 0.672 -1.162 0.624
(4.789) (1.835) (45.232) (19.051)
cumdq -0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.006
(0.021) (0.013) (0.272) (0.201)
prevcont -0.014 -0.010 0.006 -0.012
(0.038) (0.012) (0.438) (0.194)
duals -0.541 -0.259 0.484 -0.179
(2.342) (0.539) (19.781) (4.759)
winage 0.043 0.033 -0.053 0.042
(0.199) (0.092) (2.251) (1.100)
length 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.012) (0.003) (0.126) (0.005)
iteration -0.115 -0.069 0.190 -0.073
(0.680) (0.274) (6.603) (2.850)
proc -1.090 -0.673 1.481 -0.587
(5.597) (2.128) (53.412) (21.745)
sumpossv 0.032 -0.107
(0.269) (3.721)
sumnegsv -0.055 0.083
(0.265) (2.998)
sumposcv 0.088 0.098
(0.314) (3.552)
sumnegcv -0.014 0.008
(0.063) (0.305)
army -0.450 0.202
(17.850) (4.179)
navy 0.013 -0.039
(1.131) (3.792)
af -0.021 0.252
(7.233) (0.684)
Constant -1.965 -1.352 2.564 -1.381
(9.796) (4.018) (98.920) (40.506)
N 54 54 54 54
R-Squared . . . .
Wald 4.31 6.95 12.23 9.96
DWH P-Value 0.387 0.333 0.921 0.918
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.31: IV Estimation: Coeff. of Variation in Unit Price (no initial price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
upcoefv upcoefv upcoefv upcoefv
drnk 0.338 0.309 0.214 0.143
(0.641) (0.522) (0.448) (0.330)
cumdq -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
prevcont -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
duals -0.195 -0.156 -0.116 -0.045
(0.337) (0.226) (0.249) (0.159)
winage 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.014
(0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023)
length 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
iteration -0.036 -0.034 -0.029 -0.024
(0.074) (0.064) (0.058) (0.047)
proc -0.434 -0.377 -0.261 -0.136
(0.876) (0.694) (0.610) (0.445)
sumpossv 0.027 0.027
(0.077) (0.066)
sumnegsv -0.021 -0.013
(0.034) (0.028)
sumposcv -0.003 -0.004
(0.048) (0.047)
sumnegcv 0.009 0.017
(0.021) (0.016)
army 0.068 0.089
(0.148) (0.130)
navy 0.007 0.055
(0.112) (0.140)
af 0.155 0.206
(0.153) (0.157)
Constant -0.579 -0.537 -0.379 -0.306
(1.400) (1.174) (0.953) (0.695)
N 55 55 55 55
R-Squared . . . .
Wald 2.17 1.91 3.72 5.01
DWH P-Value 0.264 0.235 0.316 0.356
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.32: IV Estimation: Coeff. of Variation in PM/CTR Est. Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
diffcoefv diffcoefv diffcoefv diffcoefv diffcoefv diffcoefv
drnk 0.405 0.431 0.071 0.069 1.195 1.252
(0.483) (0.459) (0.503) (0.450) (1.210) (1.183)
cumdq -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 -0.018
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014)
prevcont 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.033 -0.033
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.038) (0.039)
duals -0.692 -0.632 -0.529 -0.464 -0.770 -0.759
(0.507) (0.424) (0.469) (0.385) (0.768) (0.730)
winage -0.019 -0.019 -0.008 -0.008 0.102 0.108
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.105) (0.107)
length 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006∗ 0.010 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
iteration -0.102∗ -0.111∗ -0.094∗ -0.099∗ -0.170 -0.181
(0.060) (0.058) (0.057) (0.055) (0.134) (0.133)
proc -0.161 -0.173 0.212 0.235 -1.222 -1.287
(0.561) (0.530) (0.645) (0.536) (1.503) (1.460)
sumpossv 0.044 0.058 0.022
(0.073) (0.094) (0.156)
sumnegsv 0.016 0.016 0.033
(0.064) (0.052) (0.089)
sumposcv 0.040 0.017 0.056
(0.109) (0.090) (0.181)
sumnegcv 0.000 0.016 0.002
(0.047) (0.034) (0.085)
army 0.250 0.238
(0.458) (0.396)
navy 0.171 0.191
(0.331) (0.326)
af 0.557 0.580
(0.394) (0.387)
lavgemp 0.815 0.855
(0.699) (0.708)
lavgdrev 0.298 0.299
(0.530) (0.533)
avgcrat 0.701 0.756
(1.471) (1.537)
avglev 4.480 4.409
(5.510) (5.586)
Constant 0.433 0.389 0.783 0.782 -15.017 -15.657
(0.961) (0.926) (1.060) (0.990) (14.058) (14.152)
N 50 50 50 50 50 50
R-Squared 0.052 0.016 0.345 0.339 . .
Wald 19.33** 18.46** 26.90** 26.53** 13.61 10.94
DWH P-Value 0.728 0.897 0.819 0.799 0.218 0.195
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.33: Coeff. of Variation of Difference in CTR Estimate & Current Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
diffcoefvc diffcoefvc diffcoefvc diffcoefvc diffcoefvc diffcoefvc
drnk 0.242 0.253 0.416 0.442 0.434∗ 0.475∗
(0.270) (0.286) (0.351) (0.338) (0.238) (0.283)
cumdq -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
prevcont 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.008 -0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
duals 0.628∗∗ 0.530 0.413 0.329 0.578∗∗ 0.395
(0.285) (0.343) (0.436) (0.436) (0.235) (0.273)
winage -0.018 -0.019 -0.014 -0.016 0.022 0.024
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.031) (0.034)
length 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
iteration -0.033 -0.023 -0.032 -0.024 -0.034 -0.024
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
proc -0.411 -0.482 -0.696 -0.783 -0.724∗∗ -0.849∗∗
(0.368) (0.404) (0.518) (0.497) (0.333) (0.424)
sumpossv -0.150∗∗ -0.105 -0.167∗∗
(0.060) (0.074) (0.075)
sumnegsv 0.005 -0.012 0.028
(0.030) (0.038) (0.026)
sumposcv -0.042 -0.002 -0.076
(0.067) (0.070) (0.080)
sumnegcv -0.034 -0.046 -0.019
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
army 0.215 0.205
(0.405) (0.384)
navy -0.273 -0.375
(0.343) (0.351)
af -0.214 -0.314
(0.337) (0.348)
lavgemp 0.137 0.239
(0.290) (0.304)
lavgdrev 0.191 0.115
(0.233) (0.245)
avgcrat 0.461 0.452
(0.971) (1.072)
avglev 3.165 3.810∗
(2.243) (2.309)
Constant 0.905 0.917 0.759 0.814 -3.927 -4.554
(0.559) (0.572) (0.614) (0.572) (3.359) (3.536)
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
R-Squared 0.093 0.046 . . 0.042 .
Wald 23.80*** 19.55** 27.41*** 22.28** 41.52*** 30.23***
DWH P-Value 0.348 0.343 0.240 0.222 0.129 0.128
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.34: Coeff. of Variation of Difference in PM Estimate & Current Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
diffcoefvp diffcoefvp diffcoefvp diffcoefvp diffcoefvp diffcoefvp
drnk 0.252 0.267 0.194 0.208 0.302 0.354
(0.226) (0.249) (0.214) (0.198) (0.221) (0.266)
cumdq 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
prevcont 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
duals 0.510 0.412 0.605 0.548 0.601∗∗ 0.434
(0.326) (0.360) (0.407) (0.401) (0.288) (0.302)
winage 0.006 0.005 0.015 0.015 0.036 0.044
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.027) (0.031)
length -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
iteration -0.032 -0.022 -0.023 -0.016 -0.021 -0.009
(0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
proc -0.496∗ -0.561∗ -0.476 -0.525∗ -0.648∗∗ -0.795∗∗
(0.287) (0.324) (0.319) (0.289) (0.299) (0.384)
sumpossv -0.127∗∗ -0.078 -0.140∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.057)
sumnegsv 0.018 0.000 0.024
(0.023) (0.028) (0.020)
sumposcv -0.027 -0.002 -0.082
(0.069) (0.054) (0.080)
sumnegcv -0.017 -0.020 -0.001
(0.035) (0.027) (0.039)
army 0.582∗ 0.612∗∗
(0.307) (0.292)
navy 0.061 0.010
(0.246) (0.244)
af 0.218 0.178
(0.257) (0.270)
lavgemp 0.139 0.249
(0.261) (0.273)
lavgdrev -0.084 -0.168
(0.153) (0.179)
avgcrat 0.946 1.104
(0.607) (0.771)
avglev 3.977∗∗ 4.444∗∗
(1.781) (2.064)
Constant 0.754 0.739 0.666 0.665 -1.849 -2.656
(0.485) (0.517) (0.513) (0.520) (3.469) (3.670)
N 56 56 56 56 56 56
R-Squared 0.022 . 0.212 0.187 0.148 0.042
Wald 15.54 12.07 29.01*** 32.12*** 41.90*** 34.98***
DWH P-Value 0.173 0.209 0.295 0.290 0.130 0.154
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.35: IV Estimation: Contractor’s Mean Squared Forecasting Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lcmsfe lcmsfe lcmsfe lcmsfe lcmsfe lcmsfe
drnk 0.824 0.593 1.746 1.454 0.258 -0.229
(1.394) (1.638) (1.654) (1.812) (1.667) (1.984)
cumdq -0.051 -0.051 -0.060∗ -0.058 -0.007 -0.003
(0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.038) (0.045) (0.046)
prevcont 0.038 0.050 0.034 0.045 0.121 0.154∗
(0.061) (0.059) (0.066) (0.065) (0.089) (0.091)
duals -1.178 -0.655 -1.810 -1.342 -0.663 -0.080
(1.414) (1.560) (1.526) (1.557) (1.558) (1.763)
winage 0.095 0.111 0.043 0.064 -0.252 -0.302
(0.075) (0.078) (0.082) (0.088) (0.192) (0.203)
length 0.049∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
iteration -0.126 -0.171 -0.103 -0.154 -0.084 -0.113
(0.193) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.199) (0.198)
proc 0.535 0.995 -0.582 -0.073 1.364 2.172
(1.847) (2.117) (2.180) (2.333) (2.000) (2.307)
sumpossv 1.146∗∗ 1.101∗∗ 0.953∗∗
(0.502) (0.530) (0.458)
sumnegsv 0.382∗ 0.423∗ 0.445∗∗
(0.230) (0.248) (0.193)
sumposcv 0.779∗ 0.707 0.902∗∗
(0.436) (0.432) (0.420)
sumnegcv 0.416∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.377
(0.219) (0.214) (0.244)
army -1.664 -1.741
(1.919) (1.903)
navy -0.634 -0.594
(1.771) (1.844)
af -2.474 -2.115
(1.813) (1.801)
lavgemp -4.324∗∗ -4.887∗∗∗
(1.703) (1.627)
lavgdrev 1.572 1.796∗
(1.018) (0.965)
avgcrat -4.202 -5.579
(4.335) (4.570)
avglev -6.351 -11.522
(10.098) (9.825)
Constant -0.447 -0.471 -1.068 -0.959 42.824∗ 50.077∗∗
(3.235) (3.686) (3.628) (4.068) (22.997) (23.650)
N 66 66 66 66 66 66
R-Squared 0.326 0.343 0.319 0.345 0.393 0.422
Wald 55.61*** 82.03*** 75.34*** 93.91*** 75.61*** 101.61***
DWH P-Value 0.904 0.980 0.387 0.561 0.949 0.805
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.36: IV Estimation: PM’s Mean Squared Forecasting Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lpmsfe lpmsfe lpmsfe lpmsfe lpmsfe lpmsfe
drnk 1.231 1.042 1.919 1.602 0.848 0.519
(1.263) (1.465) (1.610) (1.781) (1.513) (1.731)
cumdq -0.043 -0.040 -0.045 -0.038 0.012 0.017
(0.058) (0.056) (0.048) (0.047) (0.053) (0.052)
prevcont 0.027 0.035 0.031 0.038 0.108 0.134
(0.064) (0.062) (0.068) (0.066) (0.097) (0.096)
duals -0.468 0.067 -1.378 -0.983 0.267 0.881
(1.981) (2.126) (2.036) (2.084) (1.636) (1.814)
winage 0.057 0.076 -0.005 0.016 -0.340∗ -0.381∗
(0.078) (0.084) (0.085) (0.090) (0.206) (0.214)
length 0.034∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
iteration -0.074 -0.128 -0.068 -0.120 -0.061 -0.096
(0.188) (0.187) (0.192) (0.191) (0.193) (0.189)
proc -0.231 0.242 -0.997 -0.402 0.204 0.839
(1.809) (2.053) (2.202) (2.409) (2.067) (2.193)
sumpossv 1.463∗∗ 1.235∗∗ 1.123∗∗
(0.572) (0.529) (0.462)
sumnegsv 0.236 0.329 0.407∗
(0.270) (0.258) (0.209)
sumposcv 0.651 0.489 0.823∗
(0.461) (0.433) (0.441)
sumnegcv 0.485∗∗ 0.504∗∗ 0.477∗∗
(0.226) (0.211) (0.243)
army -3.408∗ -3.689∗
(2.017) (2.060)
navy -0.803 -0.521
(1.819) (1.846)
af -2.422 -1.909
(1.794) (1.728)
lavgemp -5.744∗∗∗ -6.388∗∗∗
(1.974) (1.929)
lavgdrev 2.943∗∗∗ 3.289∗∗∗
(1.090) (1.049)
avgcrat -5.676 -6.858
(4.136) (4.228)
avglev -11.167 -16.332
(11.070) (11.307)
Constant -0.340 -0.411 -0.127 -0.047 48.937∗ 55.507∗∗
(2.885) (3.188) (3.276) (3.571) (26.299) (26.398)
N 69 69 69 69 69 69
R-Squared 0.238 0.239 0.262 0.285 0.374 0.412
Wald 30.30*** 48.24*** 43.77*** 55.62*** 59.39*** 78.47***
DWH P-Value 0.873 0.987 0.396 0.563 0.872 0.999
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.9 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this paper was to provide empirical evidence in
support of the debate surrounding the relevance of physical describability in
contracting outcomes. Given the presence of the “menu” of contracts made
available to US government acquisition officials by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, it seems unnecessary to justify whether or not the describability
or complexity of an underlying project is a relevant consideration in the defense
contracting environment. However, the internal theoretical debate in economics
pertains to whether or not this describability warrants its own contracting
approach. The empirical results of this paper seem to suggest that the
physical describability of the underlying project can have a tangible effect on
the performance outcome for the associated contract in the defense contracting
environment. While far from definitive, it seems that military aircraft projects
that are capable of being assigned a more “complete” style of contract may
perform better, on average, particularly in terms of adherence to contractual
timelines. The effect on cost performance is much less clear. Therefore, it
seems that the relevance of physical describability is two-fold in the case of DoD
contracting. First, it is a major criterion in determining the risk-sharing structure
and administrative environment under which a project will operate. Second, even
given attempts to accommodate technological complexity with an appropriate
contract type, the underlying indescribable nature of the project may produce
unforeseeable production difficulties and delays.
Possible extensions of this paper would likely focus on quasi-experimental
conditions in which projects of similar complexity were administered under
contract types with differing incentive structures. The set of projects under
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consideration in this paper does not lend itself to this type of scenario as
the projects are separated by great degrees of technological heterogeneity. In
this sense, I cannot currently comment on the “optimality” of the incomplete
contracting approach, only on its relevance in certain environments. Additionally,
it would be interesting to further research the underlying costs of EVM
application as a matter of policy analysis. Although the FAR clearly views the
application of EVM as a costly endeavor, I am not able to directly observe these
costs in my data set. It would be interesting to conduct an ex post cost-benefit
analysis in terms of EVM costs versus contract performance. A study of this type
would certainly be useful for policymakers looking to apply EVM in a non-DoD
environment.
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Chapter 4
A Model of Contract Design: Procurement under
Exogenous Uncertainty
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Abstract
In certain procurement environments, exogenous events and concerns induce
uncertainty surrounding the common cost component of manufacturing or
construction projects. The acquisition of major weapons systems by the US
Department of Defense and highway procurement during post-disaster recovery
are two examples of procurement environments characterized by this type of
uncertainty. This paper models the contract design problem for procurement
officials in these environments as an ex ante screening problem. In this model,
the deciding official must weigh the potential for inaccurate cost estimates
in standard procurement (fixed-price) procedures against the possibility for
contractor surplus extraction under a cost-plus framework. Additionally, the
paper provides examples of modular incentive structures aimed at reducing the
overall cost of procurement under uncertain conditions.
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4.1 Introduction
The ability to properly design and execute procurement contracts in an
efficient manner depends directly on the procuring agency’s understanding of
and ability to describe the extent and nature of the work to be performed.
In certain situations, this ability will be affected by elements beyond the
control of the procurer, and the resulting contract design must take these
factors into account. Especially in the case of major acquisitions, such as
large pieces of infrastructure or DoD weapons programs, the possibility of
contractual hold-up is particularly strong, as contractors will be forced to
make large, relationship-specific investments in projects for which there is
likely no other buyer or seller. Unforeseen contingencies in these situations
can cause costly delays, particularly if the contract in place does not provide
flexibility in addressing necessary changes. The primary goal of this paper
is to provide a theoretical model of procurement contract design (award
mechanism + incentive structure), which explicitly accounts for the ability of
the involved parties to accurately describe the costs of the underlying project.
In order to provide context for this model, I will primarily rely on examples
from the procurement environments surrounding DoD weapons acquisition and
post-disaster infrastructure repairs.
In defense contracting, the underlying project is often advancing the current
frontier of defense technology in response to a new external threat, leading to
complex design and production processes. Additionally, the DoD’s budget for
large acquisition projects is closely scrutinized and ultimately determined in the
political arena. As a result, support for any one project may be subject to
shifts in political power or agenda. These concerns principally define the defense
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acquisition process but are also largely beyond the DoD’s control. However,
defense acquisition officials are able to employ a spectrum of contract types and
incentive structures in the procurement process, greatly enhancing their ability
to accommodate contingencies.
According to transportation officials, the infrastructure damage caused
by natural disasters shrouds the procurement process in a similar type of
uncertainty. While bridge repair, culvert replacement, and highway re-surfacing
are typical projects that transportation officials might oversee on a daily basis,
the post-disaster environment often changes the scope of the work required for
these projects and presents unique challenges that may not be apparent during the
cost estimation process. Due to this exogenous change in procurement conditions,
transportation officials are often allowed to procure construction projects using
a more streamlined and flexible approach.
The contracting procedures employed by the Vermont Agency of
Transportation (VTrans) after Tropical Storm Irene are evidence of the value
placed on increased flexibility in an uncertain procurement environment. While
major projects, such as new bridges and overpasses, continued to be governed
by fixed-price contracts with varying incentive structures, many projects, which
would have been covered by standard procurement procedures prior to the
emergency, were instead administered using a cost-reimbursement contract. From
correspondence with VTrans officials, it is apparent that these cost-plus contracts
were preferred due to their flexibility in accommodating unforeseen construction
challenges and tasks. Therefore, one of the determining factors in awarding
these maintenance rental agreements, instead of fixed-price variants, was certainly
transportation officials’ ability to fully define the work involved in each project.
As in contracting for major weapons systems, we might expect several
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possible consequences of using standard procurement procedures in the presence
of increased uncertainty surrounding the scope or physical describability of a
road construction project. First, bidders may incorporate a large risk premium
into their fixed-price bid. The intent of this premium would be to shield the
contractor from suffering losses in the event of unforeseen cost growth. A
fixed-price contract provides the contractor with the greatest cost minimization
incentives and maximum control over resulting profit. However, any adverse cost
performance will be the sole responsibility of the contractor under the fixed-price
contract, perhaps leading the contractor to build an expensive “cushion” into
his bid. Second, the use of a fixed-price contract for a project with high levels
of technological uncertainty may lead otherwise attractive contractors to refrain
from participation due to the risk of contractual hold-up. Finally, one must
consider the effect of transaction costs. Whereas a fixed-price contract may
increase efficiency, it may be very difficult to amend in the case of substantial
changes to the scope of work. Meanwhile, cost-plus contracts are more flexible
in accommodating changes to the original plan. See Bajari and Tadelis, 2001 for
more on transaction cost theory.
The contract design model in this paper attempts to capture all of these
concerns regarding the choice of optimal incentive power by procurement officials.
Given the structure and supporting assumptions of the model, I provide a
decision rule for a theoretical official who is attempting to choose the appropriate
contract type based on ex ante expectations of procurement costs under the
different incentive structures. This procurement official ultimately must weigh
the potential effects of inaccurate cost estimation in the fixed-price contract
against the weak cost-minimization incentives of the cost-plus contract and make
a decision based on the specific characteristics of the underlying projects.
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides further background
information and a comparison of the contracting approaches in DoD weapons
procurement and post-disaster highway projects from Vermont in the aftermath
of Tropical Storm Irene. Section 4.3 provides a brief summary of the
relevant literature involving highway procurement auctions and contract design.
Section 4.4 models the contract design problem facing procurement officials when
confronted with extreme amounts of uncertainty regarding the common cost of
a procurement project. Section 4.5 examines the possibility of incorporating
incentive/disincentive payments in order to limit both social costs and the final
payment to the contractor. Section 4.6 discusses the different administrative costs
for each contract type and extends the model to a procurement environment with
risk averse bidders. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Contracting Similarities: Defense Acquisition and
Post-Disaster Road Repair
Defense Acquistion
The procurement environment for the US Department of Defense is largely
characterized by elements of internal and external uncertainty, as first described
by Peck and Scherer (1962). Internal uncertainty originates from the complexity
of major weapons systems: difficulty in describing the physical characteristics of
the project, incorporating frontier-expanding technologies into a single product,
and coordination issues between multiple contractors. Alternatively, external
uncertainty exists due to the unique nature of the defense industry. Demand
and innovation are driven by existing and imminent threats to security, and the
entire acquisition process is subject to changes in the domestic and international
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political climates.
Within the catalogue of major defense contracts, there exists a broad spectrum
of technological requirements and project complexity. These requirements differ
from program to program. For example, the technology required to produce
a next-generation fighter jet is far more demanding and ex ante difficult to
describe than in the case of a helicopter modernization program, which will be
largely dependent on existing technologies. Additionally, when one considers
the contracts that collectively produce a major weapons system, uncertainty
surrounding the budget, timeline, and product of an initial research and
development contract is likely to dwarf identical concerns in a full-rate production
contract. As a result of these considerations and the resulting need for flexibility
in contract administration, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides
government officials with a menu of contract types to accommodate the specific
requirements of the project and task at hand. This menu of contracts serves to
encourage participation and innovation in an industry that might otherwise be
prone to severe underinvestment due to contractual hold-up.1
The FAR contract type menu provides acquisition officials with the choice
between fixed-price and cost-plus contracts along with variations of these types,
including different types of incentive structures and price-adjustment formulas.
For major weapons systems, the contract type and price are negotiated jointly
with the contractor, and the flexibility of the resulting contract should mirror
underlying concerns regarding the parties’ ability to fully specify the project in
question. As specified in the FAR, cost-reimbursement contracts are only to be
used in the event that the project cannot be described with a sufficient amount
1See Rogerson (1994) for a thorough description of unique issues in the DoD procurement
environment and government policies that address these problems.
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of accuracy to implement a fixed-price contract (FAR, 16.301). As a result,
the contract administration requirements that accompany a cost-plus contract,
thus, provide the government and the contractor with the ability to modify
contractual obligations as necessary. On the other hand, the language of the
FAR clearly indicates that the government prefers the fixed-price contract when
feasible due to its high-powered, cost-minimization incentives for the contractor.
In summary, DoD procurement of major weapons systems is plagued by issues
of exogenous uncertainty, and the FAR provides acquisition officials with a tool
to address these concerns in a systematic manner.
Post-Disaster Infrastructure Procurement
While a multitude of government procedures and policies for awarding
infrastructure contracts using a standard procurement process (i.e., a
competitively-awarded, fixed-price contract) are extensively covered in the
economic literature, the procurement of these same types of projects in a
post-disaster environment has received relatively little attention. Based on
conversations with officials form the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans),
it is clear that procurement procedures for highway infrastructure projects were
drastically altered due to emergency conditions in the aftermath of Tropical
Storm Irene. The storm’s impact on Vermont’s road network increased the
urgency with which repairs were required, stretched the state’s limited resources
for procurement due to the simultaneous emergence of numerous projects, and
complicated standard cost estimation procedures due to uncharacteristic damage
to structures and terrain2
2All factual information in this section of the paper is taken from electronic correspondence with
VTrans officials, who actually participated in post-disaster procurement following Tropical
Storm Irene.
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In order to accommodate the unique conditions imposed by Irene, Vermont’s
existing disaster response protocols provided VTrans officials with a more flexible
set of procurement guidelines. For example, formal permit, cost estimation, and
plan development requirements were suspended by the state government for a
period of 180 days following declaration of the natural disaster. Furthermore,
VTrans officials were able to utilize a special cost-plus contracting formant, the
Category III Maintenance Rental Agreement (MRA), in the event of the declared
emergency.
A MRA consists of a list of prices for labor, equipment, and key component
materials provided to VTrans by the contractor. These prices include any
markups for profit, overhead, and general/administrative support.In the case
of other MRA categories, the acquisition official is required to solicit and
consider at least three bids and award the contract based on price, quality,
and availability. However, in the case of Category-III MRAs, the competitive
requirement is suspended, and the contract is typically awarded via direct
solicitation. According to VTrans officials, government representatives typically
anticipate the need for higher spending limits and contractors anticipate higher
price requirements due to uncertain work conditions and a greater potential
for equipment damage in post-disaster conditions. This often leads to the use
of Category-III MRAs even when VTrans has an existing alternative MRA in
place with the contractor. The following quote from an official with VTrans,
summarizes the perceived benefit of using the cost-plus format:3
In a disaster there is always the element of uncertainty as you don’t
always know what you are dealing with. Sometimes the ground or
river is unstable and you lose some of the gains you made. Sometimes
the hole becomes bigger once you open it up. That’s why both the
3This quote is from email correspondence dated 16 January 2013.
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state and the contractors like the MRAs. By the hour contracting
allows for nasty surprises to be handled a bit easier.
Based on this comment, VTrans officials’ ability to choose a more flexible but
incomplete contract approach was instrumental in reacting to the uncertain
procurement conditions following Tropical Storm Irene.
The parallels between defense acquisition and post-disaster infrastructure
procurement are primarily rooted in uncommon levels of exogenously-driven
uncertainty regarding the actual cost of the project. This uncertainty will
inevitably affect participants’ ability to accurately estimate construction costs,
and the application of high-powered incentive contracts in this type of scenario
can lead to classic manifestations of contractual hold-up. The application
of the FAR contract menu in DoD acquisition and VTrans’ choice between
standard procurement procedures and the MRA format are examples of the use
of incomplete contracting to address this uncertainty and prevent hold-up issues.
My intent for the remainder of this paper is to model the contract design decisions
of acquisition officials in these two unique procurement environments, eventually
providing theoretical support for selecting a specific course of action based on the
level of uncertainty surrounding the actual costs of procurement.
4.3 Literature Review
This paper is intended to extend the considerable body of economic analysis
regarding the effects of uncertainty in both the general auction and public
procurement environments. With this goal in mind, I now survey previous
contributions to both the theoretical and empirical literature, supporting the
relevance and applicability of the model presented in this paper.
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4.3.1 Relevant Mechanism Design Literature
Goeree and Offerman (2003) present a model of strategic bidding behavior in
which the participants receive separate signals for both the private and common
value of the object for sale. Their model combines the two independent signals
into a “surplus” signal, which is then used to derive the equilibrium bidding
strategy and revenue results for comparison between standard auction formats.
The authors experiment with the weighting of the common value in the surplus
statistic, demonstrating that a policy causing the bidders to place less weight
on their common value for the object results in higher expected revenues for the
seller (p. 607). Although Goeree and Offerman conclude that their model firmly
predicts the inevitability of inefficiencies in the auction process for an object
with both private and common values, they temper this result by stating that
the auction only approaches random allocation in the case that the common value
signal completely “overrides” the private value signal (p. 611).
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) present a model of procurement contract selection
in which the primary consideration is the ex post expected cost of renegotiation
between the buyer and seller. Their model is based on the experiences of
construction industry officials and characterizes the “procurement problem” as
one of “ex post adaptations rather than ex ante screening” (p. 388). This is
an important distinction, as the authors’ solution to the procurement problem
hinges upon the relative costs of renegotiation under the different contract types.
The authors show that projects accompanied by complete descriptions of the
work required and consisting of tasks relatively simple in nature will be procured
using fixed-price contracts, whereas cost-plus contracts will typically be used
in more complex projects (p. 404). Their model endogenizes the efficiency of
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renegotiation, as the contract type selected directly determines the efficiency of
any subsequent negotiation. In the public procurement environment, possibilities
for renegotiation during construction may be limited by existing regulation, as
regulators attempt to prevent issues like cronyism and kickbacks within the
procurement bureaucracy. If this aversion to renegotiation is systematic, the
model proposed by Bajari and Tadelis may not fully conform to the procurement
environment. Therefore, a model that addresses the contract type decision as an
ex ante screening problem may be appropriate in some cases.
In a closely related paper, Tadelis (2012) summarizes the major theoretical
factors at play in contract design, comparing existing practices in private and
public procurement. Through the use of a simple theoretical framework, Tadelis
demonstrates that project complexity, completeness of design, and contractor
experience should be decisive considerations in the procuring agency’s selection
of both contract type and award mechanism. Specifically, more complex projects
with incomplete designs are more suitable for cost-plus procurement, which
should optimally be arranged through direct negotiation (p. 300). Alternatively,
simple and moderately complex project should be assigned fixed-price contracts,
and special attention should be paid to attracting well-qualified firms to compete
in an open auction for the contract (p. 300). As in Bajari and Tadelis (2001),
Tadelis’s main conclusions are tied to the cost-plus contract’s ex post flexibility
in adapting to construction contingencies (p. 299).
Lewis and Bajari (2011) present a model of procurement in which the
buyer attempts to force the contracting firm to internalize the costs associated
with a negative externality caused by the project. Specifically, the authors
model a mechanism in which the buyer uses a scoring auction to evaluate each
participant’s bid, consisting of both an estimate for the cost of the project and
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a required amount of time for construction (p. 1179). The buyer then uses
an incentive/disincentive structure to incentivize completion of the project in
an amount of time that optimizes the social welfare function (p. 1181). This
mechanism accounts for the fact that the new project will have social value, yet
its construction will be costly in terms of both payment to the contractor and
negative externalities imposed on users. Lewis and Bajari demonstrate that this
“A+B” contract design is particularly effective at reducing total costs of highway
procurement projects in California in which the government accounts for costs of
traffic delays to commuters.
4.3.2 Empirical Analysis of Uncertainty in Common
Value Auctions
Athey and Levin (2001) examine the role of private information in the
bidding outcomes for U.S. timber auctions conducted by U.S. Forestry Service.
Participating firms bid a unit price for the timber, and officials tabulate each
firm’s resulting total bid by multiplying the unit prices by Forestry Service
estimates of the available timber. However, payments by the winning firm to
the Forestry Service are based on actual quantities of timber harvested. The
authors portray timber estimation as an inexact science, as gaps between actual
amounts and predicted amounts are quite typical. Athey and Levin find that
bidders incorporate private estimates of timber amounts into their initial unit
price bidding strategy. Specifically, firms are able to bid such that their expected
payments to the Forestry Service are less than their bids by skewing bids towards
timber species which the government has overestimated (p. 377). The authors
conclude that rents to this private information are largely diminished via the
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competitive bidding mechanism, and, furthermore, the unit-price bidding format
provides the winning bidder with “insurance” against uncertainty surrounding
the actual total volume of harvestable timber on a given tract (p. 408).
Goeree and Offerman (2002) provide experimental results regarding the
efficiency of auctions with both private and common value components. The
authors find that increased uncertainty regarding the common value of the item
results in a reduction in the efficiency of the auction, an increase in the winning
bidder’s profit, and decreased revenue to the seller (p. 641). Additionally, the
results of the authors’ experiment suggests that increased competition leads
to more efficient results for two reasons. First, more bidders naturally lead
to a higher statistical probability that the winning bidder possesses “better
information,” and, second, the increased competition causes individual bidders
to place less weight on their privately-observed common value signal (p. 461).
De Silva, et al., (2008) use highway procurement data from Oklahoma and
Texas to test theoretical results regarding the impact of information release on
the outcome of auctions with both private and common cost components. Using a
difference-in-difference approach, the authors find that the release of engineering
cost estimates by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation leads to lower
average bids and a differential effect of the policy in projects with a relatively
larger common cost component (p. 175). Their results show that, on average,
the policy results in a decline in bids for bridge projects and a much smaller
effect in paving projects. Of these two types, the authors argue, with support
from construction experts, that the actual costs of completing the bridge projects
are more uncertain and depend on specific design and construction decisions (pp.
162-163). Therefore, uncertainty surrounding the common cost of construction
exists prior to the auction, and the main effects of the release of the government’s
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cost estimate occur via reduction of this uncertainty.
Raviv (2009) studies the effects of uncertainty in a common value setting,
using auction sales data for used vehicles. The author’s model estimates
the variance in the underlying distribution of bidders’ common value signals
via demonstrated correlation between the variance of the distribution and the
difference between the first bid and the winning bid (pp. 334-335). Raviv assumes
that the variance of this distribution is correlated with uncertainty regarding
the actual common value of the item for sale. His empirical results show that
increased uncertainty leads to a higher number of overall bids, a reduced ratio
of winning bid to pre-sale estimate, and, thus, a substantial effect on auction
“progress and outcome” (p. 342).
Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2010) attempt to estimate the procurement
costs associated with incomplete contracting. The authors use data from
unit-price auctions conducted by the California Department of Transportation for
highway construction projects. Their model assumes that contractors are able to
foresee changes and adaptations to the original plan and pass the transaction costs
associated with these changes back to the procuring agency through strategic
bidding (p. 3). Using structural estimation techniques, the authors find an
average ratio of adaptation costs to winning bid of almost seven percent for the
projects in their data sample (p. 40). This research demonstrates the importance
of contract design in achieving cost-efficiency goals.
Kosmopoulou and Zhou (forthcoming) empirically examine the effect of price
adjustment clauses for major input materials on bidder behavior in highway
procurement auctions. The stated purpose of these clauses is to mitigate risk
for construction firms that is directly tied to fluctuations in the price of essential
construction materials (p. 1). The authors find that the resulting reduction in
uncertainty regarding the common cost of construction has the expected effect
on bidding behavior for Oklahoma highway construction projects. Firms in their
data sample bid more aggressively and the dispersion of bids is reduced (p. 15).
The results of this paper provide an empirical example of the effect of exogenous
uncertainty on expectations of cost and the importance of mechanism design in
generating more efficient procurement outcomes.
This paper contributes to the mechanism design and auction literature in
the following ways. First, I consider the alternative situation from Bajari and
Tadelis (2001): the “procurement problem” modeled in this paper is precisely one
of ex ante screening, and decisions regarding the contract type are based on the
magnitude of the expected costs, which are heavily influenced by the completeness
of the project description. Therefore, the cost difference in fixed-price versus
cost-plus contracts arises from the contractor’s required compensation for a
one-time estimate of the cost in comparison to a more fluid compensatory
agreement. Second, I derive an optimal bidding strategy in the presence of
exogenous concerns, which directly affect the variance of the distribution of
bidders’ common cost signals. Using this result, I analyze the question of overall
contract design (mechanism and incentive structure) and consider other factors
which may affect the contract type decision (competition, additional incentive
structures, administrative costs, and contractor risk aversion). Third, the model
seeks to capitalize on recent empirical accomplishments, which use itemized
bids to study bidder behavior in procurement auctions. By modeling estimates
and costs of contingencies as functions of the required inputs, this model lends
itself to the empirical identification of underlying bidding strategy through the
examination of idiosyncratic pricing in itemized bids. A recent report by the
Transportation Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences synthesizes
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information regarding the current state of emergency procurement procedures
from departments of transportation across the US (Gransberg and Loulakis,
2012). One of the primary findings of this report is that the actual economic
impact of current emergency contracting practices remains unknown and untested
(pp. 71-72). Therefore, the final contribution of the theoretical foundations
presented in this paper is to facilitate empirical analysis of existing emergency
procurement practices in hopes of suggesting a generalized, optimal approach to
post-disaster procurement.
4.4 Theory
4.4.1 A Model of Procurement in Uncertain Conditions
Following Goeree and Offerman (2003), each contractor’s bid for the price
of a construction project consists of two, privately-observed components: 1) the
contractor’s independent private cost of performing the task (ci), and 2) the
common cost of construction for the project (vi). The private costs of construction
may depend on the firm’s current capital structure, profit requirement, backlog,
labor idiosyncrasies (i.e., unionized labor), and other internal considerations only
pertinent to the individual firm. The common cost of the project might consist
of labor, material costs, equipment rental, and costs of tasks standardized across
firms (e.g., pouring a cement footing in accordance with a specified design). In
this paper, I will augment the standard private and common value model with
the possibility that exogenous uncertainty affects expectations of the common
cost of the procurement project. As an initial step, I will provide baseline
examples by modeling the composite cost signal for a cost-plus contract with
a uniform common cost, the cost-plus signal for the realized common cost, and
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the fixed-price signal with estimated common cost.
In order to support empirical identification through the use of itemized bids,
I assume that all common construction costs (vi) for the project in question can
be uniformly described as a linear function of daily rates for Labor/Equipment
(L) and Materials (M), which I restrict to be the same for all contractors in
performing a specific project. Furthermore, I assume that the private costs
(ci) of construction are only dependent on the number of days worked and are
independent of the actual amounts of labor and materials used. This indicates
that the contractor’s markup required for profitability will vary only due to
changes in the required number of construction days for a given project in the
cost-plus environment. An equivalent statement is that the contractor would
charge the same price per unit of labor and material, independent of the amounts
required, plus a daily charge to cover overhead, administration, and profit.
Incorporating these assumptions, I can express the daily rate for reimbursement
(Di) in the case of a cost-plus contract without uncertainty as:
Di =
ci
d
+ (L+M),
where d represents the total number of construction days. Therefore, the
privately-observed composite signal for the cost-plus contract without uncertainty
(sCPnu ) will be:
sCPnu = ci + d(L+M).
Now, assume each project consists of g ∈ [1, ..., K] possible tasks or dimensions
along which the project can vary, where each incremental task requires an
additional gk units of labor and material. Given this assumption and the structure
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of the common cost component, the sum of these tasks will translate into the
number of days required for construction of the project. Furthermore, I assume
that the possible dimensions,
∑Kpossible
k=1 gk, associated with any given project are
common knowledge for both government officials and potential contractors. Each
contractor receives an independent draw from Kpossible independent distributions,
G1(·), ..., GKpossible(·), regarding the probability that each contingency, gk, occurs
during construction. Taken together, these assumption indicate that all involved
parties would agree on the different dimensions of the project along which
construction could possibly encounter difficulties, but each contractor will possess
privately-observed expectations regarding the probability, pki, that event gk
occurs.
Cost-Plus Scenario
I will now combine the baseline cost-plus contract with this parameterization
of project dimensions. The composite cost-plus signal of contractor i for any
procurement project can be expressed as:
sCPi,u = v
CP
i + ci, (4.1)
where vCPi is the common cost signal for the project in the cost-plus scenario.
Using the defined parameters and inputs of the model, this common cost can be
expressed as:
vCPi =
{
Krealized∑
k=1
gk(L+M)
}
. (4.2)
In this scenario, the pay-as-you-go system of cost-plus contracting and the
assumption of uniformity of daily input rates, L + M , implies that the sum
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of the actual number of realized construction events will translate into the
actual number of days, dA, required to complete the project under a cost-plus
contract. Furthermore, I assume that this realization of the actual common
cost corresponds to a particular set of draws,
∑Kpossible
k=1 pkA, from distributions
G1(·), ..., GKpossible(·) :
Krealized∑
k=1
gk = dA =
Kpossible∑
k=1
pkAgk. (4.3)
I have specifically chosen to model the realization of construction
contingencies as an additive process,
∑
gk, due to the fact that the contractor
may face multiple contingencies with various degrees of difficulty. For example,
excavation difficulties may induce g = 3 additional days of labor and materials,
while weather conditions may require g = 4 additional days. In this scenario,
the contractor would need to account for g = 7 additional days of labor and
materials rather than gmax = 4 days. Combining equations (4.1) through (4.3),
I can express the composite ex ante cost signal for the cost-plus contract, which
accounts for realized contingencies, as:
sCPi,u =


Kpossible∑
k=1
pkAgk(L+M)

 + ci = dA(L+M) + ci. (4.4)
Fixed-Price Scenario
Now I consider the composite cost signal for the same contractor, i, for the
identical construction project in the fixed-price environment. Note that, in the
fixed-price scenario, receipt of the cost signal and bid formulation will occur prior
to construction. Therefore, I am required to consider the contractor’s expectation
of the common cost, derived using his K independent draws from distributions
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G1(·), ...., GK(·), rather than the realization of actual construction contingencies.
We can express the composite signal in the fixed-price environment as:
sFPi,u = E(vi)
FP + ci, (4.5)
where E(·) is the expectation operator, and E(vi)
FP is the contractor’s ex ante
expectation of the common construction cost for the project in question. In the
fixed-price scenario, the contractor must consider all of the potential construction
difficulties that could arise and build those costs into the contract price in order to
protect against cost growth beyond his fixed-price estimate. Given this discussion,
I now express the common cost signal for the fixed-price contract as:
E(vi)
FP =
Kpossible∑
k=1
pkigk(L+M), (4.6)
where the expectation of potential construction contingencies translates to the
contractor’s estimated number of days to completion, dT,C:
Kpossible∑
k=1
pkigk = dT,Ci (4.7)
Combining equations (4.5) through (4.7), I arrive at contractor i’s ex ante
fixed-price composite signal:
sFPi,u =
Kpossible∑
k=1
pkigk(L+M) + ci = dT,Ci(L+M) + ci. (4.8)
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Fixed-Price Premium
For purposes of comparison with previous literature, it may be informative
to demonstrate a theoretical fixed-price premium in the context of this model.
Suppose now, quite plausibly, that the procuring agency possesses a cost estimate
for an identical project in which there is no exogenous uncertainty affecting the
common cost of construction. In reality, for example, this estimate could be
the prior cost of constructing a bridge, which is then destroyed during a natural
disaster. For purposes of comparison, assume that this estimate takes the form
of a known number of construction days, dnu, and the common daily rates for
inputs:
ECEnu = dnu(L+M).
If we consider the difference between this known cost and the contractor’s
estimated common cost, we have:
Pi = (dT,C − dnu)(L+M),
where Pi accounts for the potential cost of contingencies, which contractor i will
demand as insurance against cost growth due to construction uncertainties for the
project in question. Therefore, I can express the total fixed-price cost signal for
a construction project as a combination of three components: the government’s
baseline estimate in absence of uncertainty, an “insurance” premium associated
with the fixed-price signal, and the contractor’s requisite markup:
sFPi,u = dnu(L+M) + Pi + ci. (4.9)
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Comparison of Cost Signals
Without considering the competitive effects of auction mechanisms typically
used in conjunction with fixed-price contracts, I can now compare the composite
cost signals from the cost-plus and fixed-price scenarios. This type of comparison
would be useful in the case that procurement for a project occurred through
direct solicitation. Comparing equations (4.4) and (4.8), one can easily
determine that the sole difference between the two competing cost signals is
the mathematical difference between the actual number of days required for
construction and the contractor’s ex ante estimate of the number of required
days.4 Therefore, in the case where the government uses direct solicitation
rather than a competitive award mechanism, the model suggests that the relevant
consideration is the government’s expectation of the magnitude of the difference
between the contractor’s anticipated common cost of construction and the actual
cost of construction: (dT,C−dA). Larger expected values of this statistic indicate
greater possible cost-savings through the use of the cost-plus format, while smaller
or negative values may justify the use of standard fixed-price procedures.
Although this result certainly hinges upon the underlying assumptions of the
model, it captures a key consideration that influences real world procurement
officials. The value of the cost-plus contract is primarily due to its flexibility in
accommodating contingencies. Whereas a fixed-price contract requires ex ante
compensation for potential adverse outcomes, which may or may not occur, the
cost-plus contracting environment allows the government to pay for contingencies
as they appear. On the other hand, the low-powered incentive structure of the
4Note that, in the case of direct solicitation, the private cost required in the two scenarios
would also likely differ if the government intended to make the contractor indifferent between
the two types of contracts. However, if the objective is to induce cost savings by choosing the
most efficient contract type, causing the contractor to be indifferent between the two types is
likely not the government’s goal.
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cost-plus contract provides little motivation for cost saving behavior on the part
of the contractor. In practice, this comparison is also likely complicated by
information asymmetry on the part of the construction firm. The firm possesses
greater knowledge of the construction process, particularly after the project has
commenced. The cost-plus contract may, consequently, allow the contractor to
submit false or misleading claims for additional compensation as part of routine
administrative procedures. As a result of these concerns, it may be prudent to also
consider the relative magnitude of the cost-reducing effects of competitive award
mechanisms typically used with fixed-price contracts in standard procurement
procedures.
4.4.2 Effects of a Competitive Award Mechanism
The total gain to society for the procurement of an infrastructure project is
represented by ΠG:
ΠG = V − cf (ci, vi, gk)− Cs, (4.10)
where V represents the social value of the project, cf represents the payment to
the firm, and Cs is the social cost of the project. The primary consideration
in this paper is the difference in the magnitude of cf (·) produced under
standard procurement procedures versus cost-plus contracting in the presence of
uncertainty regarding the common cost of the project. To examine the possibility
that competition in standard procurement produces cost-saving effects that may
tip the balance in favor of the fixed-price approach, I now introduce a competitive
award mechanism into the model.
Assume a first price, sealed-bid auction for a project successfully attracts
n ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders. Furthermore, assume that these firms receive
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independent draws for the private cost component (ci) of the project from
distribution H(·). In the standard procurement scenario, this private cost
component does not include the contractor’s mark-up, which is determined
via a competitive award mechanism. The private cost distribution is assumed
to be independent of the distributions, Gk(·)∀k = [1, .., K], from which each
bidding firm receives K independent draws regarding the probability of K
possible construction contingencies. Additionally, I assume that all associated
density functions for these distributions are twice continuously differentiable and
log-concave on the supported range.5 The log-concavity assumption is essential
in addressing issues of multidimensionality. See Goeree and Offerman (2003), De
Silva, et al., (2009), and Caplin and Nabluff (1991) for additional applications of
this assumption.6 Given these signals and pertinent parameters, the firm is able
to construct a composite cost signal for the project, si:
si = s
FP
i,u =
Kpossible∑
k=1
pkigk(L+M) + ci. (4.11)
The independence of the distributions for the private and common cost signals
allow this additive construction, creating an independent joint distribution for
the total cost signals, F (·).
Define B(·) as a bidding function, which is strictly increasing in the
5The log-concavity assumption holds for many commonly used empirical distributions. For
example, the Uniform, Normal, Exponential, Logistic, Extreme Value, Weibull, Gamma, and
Chi-squared distributions all possess log-concave density functions. See Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005) for a thorough summary of this property and its applications.
6This assumption ensures the existence of equilibrium in the presence of the multidimensional
signal. Additionally, it ensures that the expected values of both the private cost and common
cost signals are non-decreasing in the value of the composite signal. This ensures that the award
mechanism will not select an inefficient bidder who has grossly understated his expectation of
the common cost. In other words, the lowest bid should be indicative, on average, of a firm
that has both a low estimate for the common cost and a relatively efficient private cost signal.
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construction firm’s total cost signal. For example, a firm with total cost signal si
would have a corresponding bid of B(si) = bi.
7 Given that I have assumed the
government will award the project to the contractor with the lowest of n total
bids, we can express the expected profit for a contractor with total cost signal si
as:
E(Π(bi)) = [bi − si][1 − F (B
−1(bi))]
n−1. (4.12)
Setting bi = B(x) and differentiating equation (4.12) with respect to bi, we have
the following first order condition:
∂E[Π(bi)]
∂bi
= [1− F (x)]n−1 −
n− 1
B′(x)
f(x)
[1− F (x)]−n+2
[B(x)− si] = 0.
Simplifying this equation and solving for B(x), we have the optimal choice of bid
for contractor i on project j:
B(x)∗ = b∗i = si +
B′(x)
n− 1
1− F (x)
f(x)
⇒ b∗FPi =
Kpossible∑
k=1
pkigk(L+M) + ci +
B′(si)
n− 1
1− F (si)
f(si)
, (4.13)
indicating that the contractor’s bid will shade his estimate of the total cost to
account for the winner’s curse in the presence of competition. It is important to
note the unique nature of this bidding strategy in a common value auction. As in
the standard auction result, the bidder will shade his bid less as more competitors
enter the auction. However, there is no offsetting effect of increased competition
on uncertainty regarding the common cost component. Each contractor has a
privately observed estimate of the common cost, based on his own independent
7Note that this implies B−1(bi) = si.
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draws from the Gk(·) distributions concerning each event, gk. This structure and
the sealed-bid format of the auction do not allow for revision of the contractor’s
common cost based on observed competition. Therefore, this bidding strategy
suggests that increased competition will only result in decreasing bid amounts.
Using this optimal bidding strategy in conjunction with equation (4.12), I can
solve for the contractor’s expected profit from using his optimal bidding strategy
in competition for the project:
E(Π(b∗i )) = [b
∗
i − si][1− F (si)]
n−1 =
[
B′(si)
n− 1
1− F (si)
f(si)
]
[1− F (si)]
n−1.
At this point, I again introduce the cost-plus signal from the previous section.
However, I will now model contractor i’s daily profit rate, πi, separately from the
contractor’s private cost signal, ci. This indicates the separate specification or
negotiation of the contractor’s markup (the “plus” portion of cost-plus), which
is standard practice in many uses of the cost-plus format. Accounting for this
adjustment, I can express the total cost of hiring contractor i to conduct the
project under a cost-plus contracting format as:
bCPi =


Kpossible∑
k=1
pkAgk(L+M)

 + ci + πi. (4.14)
Comparing equations (4.13) and (4.14), one can ascertain the key differences
between the two contracting approaches. As mentioned in the previous section,
the cost-plus contract is attractive due to its flexibility in accommodating only
realized construction contingencies, whereas the fixed-price contract requires the
government to reimburse the contractor based on ex ante expectations of potential
contingencies, which could be inaccurate. Relying on the alternative signals in
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equations (4.4) and (4.8), the contractor in the fixed price scenario stands to gain
(lose) [dT,C − dA] (L+M) in the event that his bid overestimates (underestimates)
the common cost of construction. However, the fixed-price approach ensures that
the contractor’s markup is subject to competitive pressures, which are not present
to affect profit in the cost-plus scenario.
There are at least two compelling reasons why awarding a cost-plus contract
using an auction may be suboptimal. First, the selection of a cost-plus contract
is an admission by the procurer that the costs are unknown or incomplete at the
award date, complicating bid evaluation. Second, according to Tadelis (2012),
more cost effective and competent contractors will likely charge a higher profit
rate. Since this is the critical dimension along which firms differ in the cost-plus
environment, the competitive selection of a bidder with the lowest cost-plus signal
leads to adverse selection, as the lowest bidder will likely be less desirable (p.
299). While competition may not be beneficial in cost-plus contracting, the
introduction of the auction mechanism in the case of the fixed-price approach
provides another key dimension along which the government may evaluate the
alternative contract types: contractor markup.
Consider the contractor’s economic profit under each contract type:
bCPi − s
CP
i = π
CP
i ,
b∗FPi − s
FP
i =
B′(si)
n− 1
1− F (si)
f(si)
= πFPi . (4.15)
Notice that the profit term in the cost-plus contract is set at a daily rate or
percentage of the daily cost.8 However, the total profit for the same contractor in
8While this assumption may seem questionable, given the likely aversion to providing
guaranteed economic profit for contractors, this inclusion of a profit “rate” is a common
feature of cost reimbursement contracts in defense contracting and is considered essential
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the fixed-price scenario now depends directly on the number of active competitors
in the auction. Specifically, as n→∞, the middle expression in equation (4.15)
approaches zero. While this effect should never drive the profits for the contractor
into negative territory within the model, the discerning government must consider
whether the profit-reducing effects of competition in the fixed-price scenario
outweigh the potential benefits of the cost-plus contract’s flexible payment
structure.
4.4.3 Exogenous Uncertainty and A Decision Rule
In this section, I will introduce the key difference between this model and
previous models of contract design in the literature: exogenous uncertainty
regarding the common value of the procurement project. Suppose the government
forms its expectations for the actual value of the contract based on the following
relationship:
E(dA) = d˜A =
1
n
N∑
i=1
E(dT,Ci). (4.16)
Consider the entire distribution of common cost signals, V (·), with variance
σ2. The exogenous uncertainty surrounding the project manifests itself in
terms of the expected variance of this distribution. Specifically, I assume that
the government’s expectation of the variance is an increasing function of the
exogenously-determined number of dimensions, Kpossible, along which the project
can possibly vary:
E[σ2] = Φ(Kpossible),
to continued innovation in the face of uncertainty. See Rogerson (1994) for more on the
importance of profitability in the defense industrial base.
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where
∂Φ
∂Kpossible
> 0.
Therefore, as the number of dimensions, Kpossible, increases, the variance of
the distribution V (·) increases, and each expected individual estimate bears a
greater amount of risk.9 In other words, the probability that any one draw
from the common value distribution will be the actual common value is a
decreasing function of this variance. Combining these assumptions with the
profit comparison in section 4.4.2, the procurement official chooses the cost-plus
contract instead of the fixed-price contract in the case that:
E[d˜A − dA] > E[π
CP
i − π
FP
i ] (4.17)
The inequality in equation (4.17) is more likely to hold in the event that
the expected variance of V (·) is high, which corresponds to higher values of
Kpossible. However, in the case that Kpossible is small and, therefore, Prob(d˜A =
dA) is high, the government is perhaps better off to implement the standard
procurement procedure. To see this, consider the fact that the winning bidder
from the auction process is assured by the assumptions of the model to have at
most the lowest common cost signal of the participating contractors. However,
the government forms its expectations of the actual cost using the expected mean
of this distribution. By definition, with at least two bidders, the auction will
select a bidder with a common cost component that is less than or equal to the
9Based on the Transportation Research Board’s 2012 report (Gransberg and Loulakis, 2012),
one of the major factors in emergency procurement success stories was rapid response time
by agency officials. Therefore, one could also consider the possibility that the natural disaster
does not directly add increased dimensions to the project relative to a non-emergency scenario
but, instead, restricts the time available for officials to “trim” the possible dimensions to
achieved a more reasonable assessment.
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average of all participating common cost signals. Therefore, the expectation for
the common cost of the lowest bidder will be less than the expected average
common cost of all bidders. This result and the competitive pressures on the
contractor’s markup from the bidding process suggest that the expected results
from the fixed-price contract design should be most efficient in the case of limited
or zero uncertainty.
At this point, it is critical to mention the importance of commitment power
to the results of this model. In the case of the standard procurement procedure,
the above comparison of the two contract types only holds true if the government
is able to commit to the result of the fixed-price procedure. If this is not the case,
one can easily make a case for an adverse selection problem via the competitive
mechanism. Due to the fact that the government awards the contract to the
lowest bidder, the contractor with the lowest expected value of the common
cost of construction will win the auction. If the procuring agency allows for
the possibility of renegotiation of the contract at a later date, each contractor
can understate his estimate of the common cost of construction and earns
profit when contingencies are added as they occur. Alternatively, the ability
to accurately estimate construction costs is likely related to the firm’s experience
in the industry. Therefore, one might expect inexperienced firms dealing with a
large amount of uncertainty to inadvertently understate associated construction
costs, actually increasing their chances of winning and receiving profits due to the
realization of unspecified contingencies. Neither of these results is ideal for the
procuring agency. If commitment power holds, the agency can expect offsetting
effects of this strategic behavior on the part of contractors. Overstating the costs
of construction contingencies may increase profit, but it also decreases the chances
of winning the project, while understating the expectation of common cost risks
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decreased profit in exchange for increased chances of winning.
4.5 Modular Incentive Structures
Following Lewis and Bajari (2011), I now consider additional incentive
structures, which provide the government with the ability to motivate contractors
to internalize or reduce a portion of the total cost of the project. While these
mechanisms are often used by transportation officials to account for the effect of
a project on traffic patterns and delays for commuters, the US Department of
Defense applies these mechanisms for a somewhat different purpose. According
to the US Federal Acquisition Regulation, additional incentive mechanisms can
serve to slow unwarranted cost growth in flexible procurement environments by
“(i) motivat[ing] contractor efforts that might not otherwise be emphasized; and
(ii) discourag[ing] contractor inefficiency and waste (FAR, 16.401).” Therefore,
in addition to the internalization of social costs, I also consider the possibility
that these incentive structures can be tailored to offset some of the effects of
uncertainty modeled in this paper.
4.5.1 Use of Contract Incentives to Offset Social Costs
If one recalls equation (4.10), the primary purpose of the
incentive/disincentive design introduced by Lewis and Bajari (2011) is to
motivate the contractor to internalize a portion of the social cost of the project,
Cs. In calculating bonus and penalty rates which are functions of the cost
of delays to consumers, the government is essentially able to motivate the
contractor to complete the project in a socially optimal amount of time.
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Cost-Plus Contract with Social Incentives
Suppose that the government’s estimate of the project with uncertainty
surrounding the common cost takes the following form:
ECEu = dE(L+M).
The government can then set its estimated number of construction days as the
socially optimal timeline for construction. This in turn implies that the optimal
value of the social cost of the project, Cs, is dEcs, where cs is the daily social cost
of construction (e.g., the daily cost of traffic delays to commuting wage earners).
In order to deter the contractor from exceeding this target, the procuring agency
can then establish incentive and disincentive rates, which cause the contractor to
internalize the cost of commuters in the case of delays. Due to the fact that the
contractor in the cost-plus environment does not provide an estimate of the time
required for construction and instead receives only a daily rate, the price of the
cost-plus contract with social incentives takes the following form:
CPu = dA(L+M)+ci+π
CP
i (dA)+1{dA < dE}(dE−dA)cI−1{dA > dE}(dA−dE)cD,
(4.18)
where cI and cD are incentive and disincentive rates, respectively. Bajari and
Lewis (2011) demonstrate that the sufficient condition to achieve ex post efficiency
in this scenario is to set the payment structure such that cI ≤ cs ≤ cD(p. 1183).
By defining this incentive structure, the government is able to ensure that, in
the event the contractor exceeds the engineer’s estimate for the socially optimal
number of construction days, he does so only by subtracting the additional social
costs of construction directly from his overall payment.
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Fixed-Price Contract with Social Incentives
In the fixed-price scenario, the contractor submits his bid for the project
in question via a competitive award process. In this paper, the common cost
component of this bid takes the form of an estimated number of construction
days, multiplied by uniform daily rates for required labor and materials. As a
result, the model does not explicitly provide a standard A+B bidding result but
an A = B(L + M) result. However, the assumptions of the model (primarily
log-concavity) imply that the winner of the standard fixed-price contract should
have an estimate of the required construction time that is at most equal to the
lowest of all other bidders. Realizing that this is the case, the government sets the
optimal value of social cost equal to the winning contractor’s estimated number of
construction days multiplied by the daily social cost: Cs = dT,Ccs. Incorporating
this modification, the final cost of the fixed-price contract with social incentives
is:
FPSPu = dT,C(L+M)+ci+pi
FP
i +1{dT,C < dA}(dA−dT,C)cI−1{dT,C > dA}(dT,C−dA)cD,
(4.19)
Note that the incentive payments in the fixed-price incentive contract are
based on the contractor’s estimated time for completion relative to the actual
number of days until completion. The government is able to force the contractor
to internalize the social cost of any delays beyond his estimated timeline by again
setting cI ≤ cs ≤ cD.
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4.5.2 Use of Incentives to Moderate Contract Cost
Growth
In this section, I examine the ability of the government to implement
a bonus/penalty structure to limit expenses in an uncertain procurement
environment. In contrast to the previous section, the goal is now to limit or
reduce cf (·) in equation (4.10) instead of Cs. As previously mentioned, these
types of incentive structures are routinely incorporated into contracts for major
weapons systems in an attempt to slow or moderate potentially explosive cost
growth.10 In these contracts, it is common for the DoD to directly tie contract
incentives to a target or ceiling price. For example, an incentive payment in
a Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract is determined using a formula that
relates actual cost to a target cost (FAR, 16.405-1). The use of these types of
contracts follows directly from the presence of uncertainty regarding the cost of
the project and the government’s assessment that accurate estimation of project
costs may be incredibly difficult.
In order to support implementation of cost-limiting incentives, the government
can establish an upper bound for the contract price. This allows the government
to identify situations in which additional contractual incentives may actually
motivate the contractor to reduce the overall cost of the contract. Consider the
following scenario. The government wishes to procure a more advanced version
of an existing aircraft, complete with new avionics and targeting mechanisms.
While some production aspects of this aircraft will be clearly defined based on the
procurement of the existing version, the development process and incorporation
10The incentives I include here embody the idea behind the FAR incentive contracts but do
not explicity follow a formula from the FAR. An explicit formula is actually not listed in the
FAR, and the details of these formulae are negotiated between the DoD and contractors.
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of the new components may be quite complex and difficult to describe. In this
scenario, the government can acknowledge the possibility of error in its estimate
and limit its cost exposure by setting a price ceiling as a percentage increase
over its estimate for the new aircraft. One can imagine a similar scenario in
highway or road procurement. Suppose a bridge is destroyed by flooding in a
natural disaster, and the actual extent of the damage to the surrounding terrain
and bridge footings is unknown. In this scenario, the government could again
establish a price ceiling, using a percentage increase over its own estimate. In
order to provide concrete guidance for acquisition officials, it is important that the
guidelines for establishing price limits for decision-making purposes are codified
in regulation or policy.
The goal for the remainder of this section is to demonstrate how the inclusion
of contract incentives may assist in limiting the government’s total cost in the
procurement of complex or uncertain projects. In order to focus my analysis,
I will momentarily assume that the government is only interested in using the
incentives to reduce procurement costs due to uncertainty and ignores social costs:
Cs = 0 in equation (4.10).
11
For purposes of clarity, I will now consider only the relevant range of contract
cost outcomes over which the government would be willing to incentivize faster
completion by the contractor. The government would likely not want to provide
additional compensation to the contractor in the case that the actual number
of construction days fell below the government’s estimate. However, in the case
that the actual timeline exceeds the government’s estimate, it may be possible
11In defense contracting, this is not an outlandish assumption. Consider, for example, the
acquisition program for the F-35, whose procurement timeline already exceeds fifteen years.
The obvious conclusion from this sort of lengthy timeline is that, in certain projects, the need
of the user may not be immediate and production may be relatively non-intrusive for society.
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for additional contract incentives to “put the brakes” on additional cost growth.
In light of this discussion, I now amend the definition of the actual number of
construction days to reflect the following relationship:
dA = dE + du, (4.20)
where dE represents the government’s estimate of the number of days of
construction, and du is the number of additional construction days due to
unforeseen contingencies.12 The purpose of this additional definition is to
incorporate the intuition that the government is procuring an item or task
whose exact common cost is ex ante uncertain and may exceed the government’s
estimate.13
Cost-Plus Contract with Moderation Incentives
First, I consider the price of a cost-plus contract, augmented with an incentive
payment function. I can express the total price of the cost-plus contract as:
CPu = dA(L+M) + ci + π
CP
i (dA) + 1{dA ≤ dC}(dC − dA)cI , (4.21)
where cI > 0 and is a daily incentive rate for completing the project by a target
date, dC .
14 This target date is associated with the government’s price ceiling for
12This definition is primarily intended to define the value of du and does not conflict with the
assumptions regarding dA from previous sections.
13This framework implies that the uncertainty surrounding the project may leave the
government and contractors with large amounts of error in their estimates in comparison with
the eventual cost of the project. One can think of the upper bound as a theoretical confidence
interval above the government’s estimate. Given the method by which uncertainty is built
into the theoretical model, this consideration of potentially positive estimation error seems
to be a natural extension of the underlying theoretical issues with contract formalization.
14Note that this expression implicitly assumes that wasted time and resources naturally occur
in the construction process, and the incentive structure works through the elimination of this
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the project. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that the government
determines its ceiling price using a uniform percentage increase above its own
engineering cost estimate, dE. Specifically, I assume that the government chooses
a percentage α, leading to:
dC = dE + αdE.
This continuum of possible cost outcomes is depicted in Figure 4.1, along with
a hypothetical realization of the actual number of construction days, dA. Due
to the government’s imposition of a price ceiling, I assume that the government
will offer no compensation beyond the ceiling date. In the cost-plus scenario, the
contracting firm only receives an incentive payment if it completes the project
in less time than the procurer’s ceiling date, as in Figure 4.1. Therefore, the
incentive structure in equation (4.21) implies that the government may be able
to use contract savings relative to the ceiling price in order to limit the overall
payment to the contractor.
dE 
 
Construction  
Days 
dC=dE+αdE dA 
dU 
Figure 4.1: Cost Plus Incentive Scenario
Based on the details of this scenario, the government’s optimal “rule” for
setting the incentive rate, cI , should satisfy:
(dC − dA)(L+M) ≥ du(L+M) + (dC − dA)cI . (4.22)
waste. If this were not the case, the goverment might incur additional costs as the contractor
increased amounts of labor and material to speed completion of the project.
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Equation (4.22) indicates that the government should set its incentive rate so
that the savings on labor and material costs due to the reduction in the overall
number of construction days meets or exceeds the combined cost of the unforeseen
construction contingencies and the incentive payment. In order for this condition
to be possible, the daily rates for labor and materials, (L+M), must be greater
than or equal to the daily incentive rate, cI , which should be a relatively palatable
condition for the government to satisfy.15 If one considers the incentive contract
from the firm’s perspective, the contractor will choose to accept the incentive
payment in the case that:
(dC − dA − du)(L+M) ≥ (dC − dA)(π
CP
i /d). (4.23)
In order for this expression to hold, the daily rates for labor and materials must
meet or exceed the contractor’s daily markup. Again, this is certainly a feasible
scenario, as this condition would only be violated if the contractor’s markups on
labor and materials were greater than one hundred percent.
In the case that equation (4.22) holds with equality, we can solve for the
break-even incentive rate:
cI =
(dC − dA − du)
(dC − dA)
(L+M). (4.24)
Substituting this expression back into equation (4.21) and simplifying, I can
15To demonstrate this condition, note that equation (4.22) can be simplified to the following
expression:
(dC − dA − du)(L+M) ≥ (dC − dA)cI .
Given that all of the measures of construction days are positive, the only way that
equation (4.22) can hold is if (L +M) > CI .
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express the final break-even cost for the cost-plus contract as:
CPu = (dC − du)(L+M) + ci + π
CP
i (dA). (4.25)
Given this result, the government can make a decision regarding the usefulness
of the incentive structure in the contract through comparison with the initial
cost-plus result. Notice that implementation of this incentive structure means
that the government strictly pays less than the actual value for the cost-plus
contract when:
(dE + du) = dA > (dC − du) > dE.
This corresponds to the situation when:
dA > dE +
α
2
dE > dE.
Conversely, the government strictly pays more under the incentive contract when
dE < dA < dE +
α
2
dE,
and the two contracts are equivalent at
dA = dE +
α
2
dE .
Note that in the event the contractor reaches the ceiling date the cost-plus
payment becomes:
CPCeiling = (dC − αdE)(L+M) + ci + π
FP
i ,
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which reverts the contract back to the government’s estimate. The effect of
this payment structure is pictured in Figure 4.2. Taken together, this analysis
demonstrates that the contractor, once incentive payments are enacted, should
do everything in his power to complete the project prior to the halfway point
between the government’s estimate and the target date associated with the price
ceiling.
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Figure 4.2: Effect of Cost-Plus Incentive Structure
From these results, I can list at least two conclusions regarding the cost-plus
incentive contract: 1) the government must retain its own estimate as private
information to prevent manipulation if the estimate is to be used as the trigger for
incentive payments, and 2) it is in the contractor’s best interests to complete the
project as soon as possible after the incentive payments begin. Additionally, one
can see that the policies governing calculation of the price limits and the actual
momentum of cost growth in the cost-plus environment will largely determine
the efficiency of the incentive payment program. The flexible compensation
structure of the cost-plus contract supports this as a possible course of action,
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and I have modeled the incentive decision in terms of actual values rather than
expectations to reflect the unique ability to collect information in the cost-plus
environment. It is also important to realize that this incentive structure prevents
the government’s cost liability for the common cost of the project from exceeding
the estimated price ceiling (the common cost never exceeds (dC − 1)(L +M))
but does not eliminate costs beyond the government’s estimate.
Fixed-Price Contract with Moderation Incentives
In the fixed price scenario, the procuring agency acquires additional
information regarding the common cost of construction via the competitive
bidding process. As in previous sections of the paper, the government’s
expectation of the actual number of construction days, E(dA), is the sample
average of the submitted bids for common cost, defined in equation (4.16). As
a result of the competitive award process, the government expects that the
estimate of the winning contractor is less than or equal to E(dA). Therefore, the
government’s ex ante expectations do not indicate that the situation described for
the cost-plus contract should occur under the fixed-price contract. In other words,
the contractor should exceed its own fixed-price bid and, thus, the government’s
estimate at its own risk. However, it may be possible, after receiving bids
and awarding the contract to the lowest bidder, that the government observes
a sizable difference between the average bid and the winning bid, as depicted
in Figure 4.3. In this scenario, the government may suspect the potential for
unforeseen cost growth beyond the contractor’s initial estimate. In this case, the
government could implement the following type of incentive contract, which pays
the contractor for days worked beyond its estimate but penalizes the contractor
for exceeding the government’s expectation of the actual number of days of
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construction:
FPu = dA(L+M) + ci + π
FP
i − 1 {dA > E(dA)} (dA − E(dA))cD (4.26)
As this essentially sets a price ceiling for the contract, the disincentive rate equals
the contractor’s daily cost of continuing the project: cD = (L+M)+
ci
dA−E(dA)
. By
implementing this type of incentive, the government retains use of the competitive
pressure on the contractor’s markup but also allows for flexibility in allowing a
defined amount of cost growth. Additionally, this incentive structure still caps
the cost of the contract from the government’s standpoint, although at a point
higher than the contractor’s initial estimate.
dT,C E(dA)=dE 
Possible Est. Error 
Construction  
Days 
Figure 4.3: Fixed-Price Incentive Scenario
The results of this section are intended to address a different issue and,
therefore, do not conflict with the findings of Lewis and Bajari (2011). Due
to the demonstrated success of these types of incentive contracts in reducing
overall government expenditure in highway contracts(see Lewis and Bajari, 2011)
and their presence in the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s menu of contracts, it
seems that strong consideration should also be given to implementing incentive
payments aimed at limiting the cost of particularly complex or uncertain highway
projects. A decision tree which summarizes the paper’s preceding results up to
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this point is presented in Figure 4.4.16
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Figure 4.4: Summary Decision Chart
4.6 Additional Considerations
4.6.1 Costs of Contract Administration
The model of contract design presented in the preceding sections of this paper
suggests that the selection of one contract type over another should be based only
on the relative size of the payment to the contractor. However, as previously
mentioned, the contractor enjoys many more opportunities to revise his cost
16Note that in the case of either contract type, the additional incentive to hurry construction
ahead of the target completion date may adversely effect the quality of the finished project.
Based on discussions with VTrans officials, this seems to be a legitimate concern regarding
post-Irene construction projects. Specifically, required time limits for “compaction” of paved
surfaces may have been ignored in order to complete the projects as soon as possible, perhaps
leading to decreased durability.
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estimates in the cost-plus environment and perhaps has a greater opportunity
to extract contractual surplus from the government. Due to the fact that the
cost-plus contract is essentially paid on a daily basis until completion of the
project, the contractor has limited incentives to control cost growth. In practice,
the potential for this behavior from the contractor often leads the procuring
entity to employ cost monitoring systems and personnel in addition to layers of
incentives (e.g., the incentive/disincentive structure), which are intended to limit
cost growth.
One can find examples of these cost oversight measures in DoD procurement
and offshore petroleum drilling contracts. The US Department of Defense often
utilizes some of the more flexible cost reimbursement contracts from the FAR in
the procurement of major weapons systems.17 One of the primary considerations
for DoD acquisition officials in choosing a cost reimbursement contract is the
ability of the government to fund implementation of its project management
technique, known as Earned Value Management, for the project in question.
The FAR states that, as part of required documentation, each contract must
include a discussion of any additional “burden of managing the contractor’s
costs” in the selected contract type, including an assessment of “the adequacy of
Government resources” required to mitigate expected cost risk (FAR, 16.103). In
DoD procurement of major weapons systems, this additional “burden” includes
ensuring the contractor’s adherence to standard ANSI/EIA-748, Earned Value
Management Systems.18 In the DoD’s largest projects, this often involves the
assignment of a project manager or management team, consisting of a group
of military officials whose sole responsibility is to administer the associated
17See Crocker and Reynolds (1993) for more on the DoD’s use of the FAR menu of contracts.
18ANSI/EIA=American National Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance, DoD
Earned Value Management Guide
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contracts.
In Corts and Singh (2004), the authors empirically analyze the choice of
fixed-price versus cost-plus contracts in offshore petroleum drilling. In this
industrial setting, petroleum exploration and production companies utilize a
cost-plus structure in the form of “day-rate” contracts, where the drilling
contractor provides a fully-staffed drilling rig in exchange for a daily payment
(p. 234). To monitor the operation’s progress and protect company interests in
a day-rate contract, a representative from the petroleum company is located on
the drilling rig and has direct input in decisions regarding the technical aspects of
the operation (p. 234). The presence of this representative allows the petroleum
company to directly observe “the timeliness of well completion, the occurrence of
worker and environmental accidents, [and] the ease of working with the particular
driller.”(p. 235) Therefore, one can observe at least two examples of additional
administrative requirements for cost-plus contracts in relevant and important
industries.
The magnitude of the additional administrative burden in cost-plus
contracting will certainly vary by the regulatory environment in which
procurement occurs and by the magnitude of the potential surplus extraction.
Whereas the multi-billion dollar contracts that collectively form a DoD weapons
project may require an entire team of administrators and a mandated set of
project guidelines, petroleum companies seem content to protect their interests
by placing a single, although influential, representative at day-rate drilling sites.
While the intent behind these two practices is quite similar, the difference in the
magnitude of the associated costs is likely substantial across the two industries.
In terms of the model used in this paper, the additional administrative costs
used in cost-plus contracting would appear as an additional procurement cost to
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the government. If I assume that the government is solely responsible for this
expense, I can amend equation (4.10) to depict this additional consideration:
ΠG,j = V − cf(ci, vi, gk)− cA(type, size)− cu, (4.27)
where cA(type, size) is the cost of administering the contract in question and is
a function of both the contract type and overall cost of the contract. Notice
that I have not assumed the costs of fixed-price administration to be zero.
In some cases, particularly in urgent circumstances, the solicitation of bids
and coordination required to conduct standard procurement procedures may
outweigh the costs of administering the contract in a cost-plus environment.
Additionally, as prominently featured in Crocker and Reynolds (1993) and Bajari
and Tadelis (2001), the costs of formulating a high-powered, complete contract
can be prohibitive if the project is difficult to define. Clearly, this is a situation in
which the regulatory details surrounding the contract and characteristics of the
project itself will be of paramount importance in the acquisition official’s choice
of contract type. Any empirical application of this theoretical contract choice
model will require the investigator to identify these regulatory parameters and
ensure that the empirical model accurately reflects their impact on the contracting
outcome.
4.6.2 Extension: Contractor Risk Aversion
Due to heterogeneity between firms in terms of capacity, existing backlog,
proximity to the construction site, and experience, among other considerations,
it is possible that contractors will have differing risk attitudes regarding their
involvement in a competitive award process for construction projects. For some
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contractors, losing the bid on a contract may result in severe consequences such as
layoffs, repossession of equipment, or even complete exclusion from a geographical
portion of the market. One might infer that these idiosyncratic risk preferences
would then directly affect the contractor’s bidding strategy. To incorporate this
possibility into the current model of contract design, I will now introduce an
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, where the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion is a function of the contractor’s current status in the procurement
marketplace. For example, firms with relatively higher capacity and larger market
shares should be relatively less risk averse, on average, than smaller firms with
fewer existing contracts.
A utility function, U(x), exhibiting Constant Absolute Risk Aversion(CARA)
preferences satisfies the following condition:
CARA⇒
U ′′(x)
U ′(x)
= λ,
where λ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.19 To satisfy this
condition, I will assume that all participating construction firms receive utility
from expected profit in accordance with the following functional form:
U [Π(bi)] =
−1
λi
e−λiΠ(bi) + r,
where
Π(bi) = [bi − si], (4.28)
and r is a constant value that ensures the bidder receives zero utility in the event
his bid does not win.
19See Babcock, et al. (1993) for a survey of research aimed at empirically estimating the CARA
coefficient. The authors report an estimated range of 0.005 to 0.49.
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The contractor’s expected utility from participating in the auction is then:
E(U [Π(bi)]) = U [Π(bi)][1− F (B
−1(bi))]
n−1,
where B(si) = bi is again defined as a bidding function, which converts the
contractor’s composite cost signal (si) into an actual bid (bi). Taking the
derivative of this expression with respect to bi and simplifying, I have the following
first order condition:
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
e−λi(bi−si) +
1
λi
e−λi(bi−si) − r = 0.
I can then solve this equation for the optimal bidding strategy in the case of the
bidder with CARA utility preferences:20
b∗RAi = si −
1
λi
log(r) +
1
λi
log
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
(4.29)
Through this expression, it is apparent that increasing levels of risk aversion
(increases in λ) will result in a smaller shade for the bidder. Given the previous
discussion regarding factors that could possibly influence a contractor’s risk
attitude, this result seem quite intuitive. As bidders become more risk averse,
they are increasingly sensitive to losing the contract to another bidder, and
the contractor lowers his shade on the bid to reflect his risk preference. As a
result of this prediction, the government can expect greater overall savings in an
auction with risk averse bidders. See Krishna (2010) and Miller (2008) for similar
examples of this effect of risk aversion on bid levels.
In order to fully discuss the impact of risk aversion on contracting outcomes,
20A full derivation of this bidding strategy can be found in Appendix C.
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I will now substitute the fixed-price composite cost signal into equation (4.29):
b∗RAi = dT,C(L+M) + ci −
1
λi
log(r) +
1
λi
log
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
(4.30)
As in section 4.4.2, I can now compare the results of the fixed-price award
mechanism with risk averse bidders to the result from direct solicitation of the
cost-plus contract. The cost-plus profit markup is identical to that defined in
section 4.4.2, whereas the resulting profit from the fixed-price contract design is
now:
b∗RAi − si = −
1
λi
log(r) +
1
λi
log
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
= πRAi
Given this markup from the award process and the potential for the contractor to
realize a loss or gain based on the accuracy of his cost estimate, the government
must again make a decision between the two contracts based on the expected
magnitude of the contractor’s surplus extraction. Specifically, if the government
anticipates:
πCPi ≥

Kpossible∑
k=1
pkigk −
Krealized∑
k=1
gk

 (L+M) + πRAi , (4.31)
the fixed-price procedure may prove to be the most cost efficient form of contract
design. Note that this inequality is more likely to hold when the bidder is highly
risk averse, thus including a smaller competitive markup in his bid. This result
may support use of contractor training programs and promotion of policies that
foster participation by small or financially disadvantaged contractors in contracts
for complex or uncertain projects, as the gains from more aggressive bidding may
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outweigh perceived difficulties in cost estimation.
4.6.3 Feasibility Assessment: VTrans Post-Irene
Procurement
In formulating the contract design model that I have presented in this chapter,
I attempted to ensure that the decision structure relied on information that
is routinely collected as part of either standard or post-disaster procurement
procedures. However, some of the features of the model are more closely tied
to practices in DoD contracting. Therefore, in order to better establish the
applicability of this theoretical model in an empirical setting, it may be useful
to discuss its potential application to a real-world scenario. Following my choice
for background context, I will now discuss the feasibility of implementation of
my contract design model in studying post-Irene emergency procurement by the
Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans). As previous studies of Vermont
highway procurement have established the availability of data from the fixed-price
contracts, I will focus primarily on the unique information collected during
administration of maintenance rental agreements (MRAs).
The procedural guidelines for employment of the emergency MRAs and
email correspondence with VTrans officials state that the contractual terms of
the MRAs were not available for renegotiation. This feature supports the ex
ante screening approach of the contract design model presented in this paper,
suggesting that the primary concern of acquisition officials in this situation is
not the potential magnitude of subsequent transaction costs associated with a
particular contract type.
From correspondence with VTrans officials, it is verifiable that payments for
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the MRA contracts were delivered via a specially-designed software program,
known as the Maintenance Activity Tracking System (MATS). For each contract,
the MATS entries include 1) the dimensions of the project, 2) a start and
completion date, 3) the physical location of the project, and 4) a description of the
contractors employed and labor, materials, and equipment used (L and M). In
addition to the MATS data, each maintenance rental agreement document signed
prior to commencement of work specifies a contract term (beginning and end date)
and a maximum limiting amount (a ceiling for potential cost reimbursement).
Using the listed “dimensions” of projects in the MATS database, it may be
possible to construct an index of project complexity based on similarities between
contracts. Furthermore, this same index could then be applied to standard
projects or similar projects administered via non-emergency procedures. To
construct this index, one could rely on standardized definitions of tasks and
materials utilized by VTrans and FEMA in bid analysis and cost accounting. For
example, FEMA provides cost codes and descriptions for over 750 different tasks,
materials, and equipment requirements in its cost reimbursement instructions for
local officials.21 This process could potentially allow for the construction of the
Kpossible dimension and gK task variables for each individual project.
The alternative sets of dates provided for each project in its corresponding
MRA document and MATS entry may provide us with competing measures of the
project timeline. If the MRA lists an estimate of the start and completion dates,
which is likely due to the fact that the document is signed prior to construction,
this would provide the researcher with the expected number of construction days,
dT,C or dE . Conversely, the MATS entry used to remit payment to the contractor
21An example of these instructions, provided via VTrans to local officials, can be found at
http://vtransgrants.vermont.gov.
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would contain the actual start and completion dates and, thus, the actual number
of construction days, dA.
Given this discussion, I have two primary concerns regarding the feasibility
of applying my model to the VTrans procurement process. First, contractors
were not required to separately state their private and common costs in the
MRA contract. For example, the equipment and labor rates included overhead,
meals, lodging, etc. Furthermore, the contractors did not separately state their
markup. However, the standardized cost accounting procedures used by FEMA
and VTrans may allow the researcher to estimate these “hidden” costs. Second,
some of the MRAs may have involved the solicitation of several bids from different
contractors. It is unclear at this point whether these contractors knew they were
in competition, and the effect of this process is unclear. Fortunately, the required
documentation for these contracts should include justification for selecting the
winning contractor, perhaps allowing the researcher to model the process as a
scoring auction.
In addition to the standardized contract data, it may also be possible to
use contractor invoices from cost-plus contracts to demonstrate the ability to
implement project management techniques traditionally used by the DoD. For
example, procedural guidelines for the MRA require contractors to submit
invoices every two weeks. Using this information, it may be possible to construct
measures of Earned Value, Planned Value, and Actual Value, which can then be
used to calculate cost and schedule variance for each contract.22 If this process is
successful, the researcher could then use the Earned Value Management output
to conduct policy evaluation.
22An example invoice, found at http://vtransgrants.vermont.gov, shows that the contractor
may calculate a “percentage complete” for each invoice, relating the current cost to the total
expected cost.
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The unique procurement environment during the post-Irene recovery provides
several interesting possibilities for policy evaluation. First, if we compare
emergency MRAs from before and after Irene, it may be possible to detect the
magnitude of the competition effect on cost-plus contracting outcomes. Due
to the sudden requirement for the simultaneous execution of multiple projects,
transportation officials were often not able to solicit multiple bids for the MRAs
during the response to Irene. Second, by comparing emergency MRAs with
fixed-price contracts of similar scope, one may gain a better understanding of
the impact of the contract type decision on cost outcomes. Finally, it may be
possible to compare the outcomes of projects administered and funded by different
levels of government to investigate the impact of coordination issues during the
response to a major natural disaster.
4.7 Conclusion
The intent of this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation for the contract
design process in the presence of exogenously-driven uncertainty regarding
common costs of procurement. I have argued that this uncertainty is a
similar characteristic in both the US DoD acquisition environment and highway
procurement conducted by government officials during post-disaster recovery
operations. As a result, the contracting tools used by officials in both scenarios are
motivated by similar concerns regarding the potential magnitude of unforeseen
project contingencies. In the event of pervasive uncertainty, officials in both
scenarios typically elect to administer a more flexible cost-reimbursement contract
rather than rely on standard procurement procedures.
This paper models the contract design decision as an ex ante screening
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problem: the government official must determine which contract type is
appropriate based on his confidence level in the potential accuracy of contractor
cost estimates. If the deciding official foresees massive estimation errors in cost
estimation procedures typically conducted as part of the fixed-price process,
the option to instead complete the project through direct solicitation and a
cost-plus contract becomes more attractive. The theoretical model in this paper
provides several decision rules regarding the contract design process. First, it
suggests that the costs associated with possible estimation errors in the fixed-price
contract must be weighed against the possibility of larger surplus extraction by
the contractor in the cost-plus environment. Second, given the choice of contract
type, the model provides suggestions for additional incentive structures that may
help to offset the overall cost of procurement to society. Finally, the model
incorporates the differential costs of administering each contract, which depend
not only on the contract type but also the size of the project and the regulatory
environment.
Possible extensions of this paper include relaxation of the independence
assumption. If contractor experience with similar projects increases the accuracy
of cost estimation, the independence assumption regarding each contractor’s
draws from the cost distribution for each dimension may no longer be valid. For
example, an experienced contractor may realize that a high probability of one
event implies a high probability for another event. This would perhaps provide
experienced contractor’s with more accurate estimates under the fixed-price
framework. As a result, relaxation of this assumption would also lead to
asymmetric information among bidders. Another possible extension might
consider the relationship between incentive power and previous contracting
history with the procuring agency. For example, if the contractor’s current
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status and future livelihood is largely dependent on government contracts, the
government may be less susceptible to surplus extraction by this contractor in the
cost-plus environment. The ability to punish the contractor in future contracts
may naturally align the contractor’s incentives with the government’s. Therefore,
in this scenario, typical reservations regarding the cost-plus contract may not be
as severe.
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Appendix A
Categorical Examples of Cost and Schedule Variance
Explanations
Change in Manufacutring Inputs
1. Change in material costs. (CV/SV)
2. Change in required amount of materials. (CV/SV)
3. Decision to hire locally led to lower wage costs. (CV)
4. Decreased travel requirements led to lower labor costs. (CV)
5. Contractor forced to fabricate parts it originally intended to purchase. (CV)
6. Increased labor wage rates. (CV)
Supply Chain Management
1. Early delivery of components or receipt of materials from subcontractor.
(CV/SV)
2. Sale of over-requisitioned materials. (CV)
3. Delay in delivery of parts or components to the production line. (CV/SV)
4. Parts shortage. (CV/SV)
5. Receipt of parts in excess of baseline requirements. (CV)
6. Over requisition of material. (CV)
7. Cost growth in subcontracted parts or components. (CV)
8. Early completion of all outside vendor tasks. (SV)
9. Delayed off-loading of work packages to subcontractors. (SV)
10. Delayed pull of materials from inventory. (SV)
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11. Chain reaction/ domino effect production delay. (SV)
12. Shortage of general procurement items. (SV)
Corrective Actions in Production
1. Correction of deficiencies identified by product testing. (CV/SV)
2. Alteration of fabrication methods to improve performance. (CV/SV)
3. Implementation of “recovery” or “challenge” schedule to improve delivery
performance. (CV/SV)
4. Additional testing required due to initially poor performance. (CV/SV)
5. Contractor risk mitigation efforts. (SV)
6. Realignment of prime and sub- contractor work schedules to improve
delivery performance. (SV)
Fundamental Change to Contract Details
1. Change in funding scope due to incorporation of additional capabilities.
(CV/SV)
2. Re-design of aircraft or major component. (CV/SV)
3. Incorporation of funds spent prior to contract definitization. (CV)
4. Cessation of cost reporting on an under-performing portion of the contract.
(CV)
5. Re-baselining of contract or major subcontract established new contract
price and schedule milestones. (CV/SV)
6. Re-prioritization of contract due to other operational commitments
(Iraq/Afghanistan) of prime contractor. (CV/SV)
7. Extension of contractor’s oversight period for program. (CV)
Administrative Factors
1. Change in overhead, general and administrative (G&A), or burden rates by
prime contractor. (CV)
2. Change in foreign exchange rates. (CV)
3. Transfer of inventory or materials to other contracts. (CV)
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4. Perceived savings or additional costs due to pre-existing delays from
previous iterations of the contract. (CV/SV)
5. Errors in the Earned Value Management (EVM) reporting process.
(CV/SV)
6. Correction of accounting or invoicing mistakes. (CV/SV)
7. Cost reporting prior to contract definitization is recorded as negative cost
growth due to lack of budget. (CV/SV)
8. Implementation of new FAA regulations changes testing requirements.
(CV)
9. Staffing vacancies in vital areas of production. (CV/SV)
10. Production delays due to labor negotiations/ strikes. (SV)
11. Change in EVM reporting procedures. (SV)
12. Administrative hold on procurement funds. (SV)
Changes to Required Effort
1. Change in level of effort or work required for design and/or production of
contracted item(s). (CV/SV)
2. Change in expertise or worker aptitude level required to complete a specific
work package. (CV/SV)
3. Change in staffing levels to address problem areas. (CV)
4. Change in required administrative support for subcontracted efforts. (CV)
5. Change in overtime hour requirements. (CV)
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Appendix B
Regression Results: Estimation of EDRNK
Table B.1 lists the regression results for the OLS estimation of the contract
choice model. Using the resulting coefficient estimates, I then construct the
expected contract type for each contract in the estimation sample as a function
of its associated project and firm characteristics.
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Table B.1: Regression Results for IV Estimation (Expected Contract Type)
(1)
drnk
ladjip 0.022
(0.078)
army 1.422∗∗
(0.706)
navy 1.315∗∗∗
(0.447)
af 1.563∗∗∗
(0.469)
rd -2.286∗∗
(1.001)
proc 0.289
(0.994)
length -0.001
(0.004)
lvar 0.017
(0.027)
duals 0.791∗∗
(0.375)
winage -0.019
(0.027)
lemp -0.096
(0.326)
ldrev 0.079
(0.225)
prevcont 0.043∗∗∗
(0.012)
nsd 8.659
(6.547)
cratio -1.923∗∗
(0.783)
rdper -0.006
(0.513)
Constant 4.438
(3.712)
Interaction Terms with NSD Yes
N 149
R-Squared 0.614
F-Statistic 26.268
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Appendix C
Derivation of Optimal Bidding Strategy: CARA Utility
Preferences
An individual possesses Constant Absolute Risk Aversion(CARA) preferences
when his utility function, U(x), satisfies the following condition:
CARA⇒
U ′′(x)
U ′(x)
= λi,
where λ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. In this paper,
I assume that all firms exhibit CARA risk preferences for profit gained during
the award process. Specifically, I constrain the contractors to have an identical
utility function:
U [Π(bi)] =
−1
λi
e−λiΠ(bi) + r,
where
Π(bi) = [bi − si],
and r is a constant value that ensures the bidder receives zero utility in the event
his bid does not win and λ varies by contractor.
The contractor’s expected utility from participating in the auction is then his
profit times the probability that he possesses the lowest composite cost signal:
E(U [Π(bi)]) = U [Π(bi)][1− F (B
−1(bi))]
n−1 = U(bi − si)[1− F (si)]
n−1,
where B(si) = bi is again defined as a bidding function. I can then solve for
the optimal bidding strategy by finding the bid that maximizes the contractor’s
expected utility from his auction profits:
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⇒
∂E(U [·])
∂bi
= U ′(bi − si)[1− F (B
−1(bi))] + U(bi − si)
n− 1
B′(si)
f(si)
[1− F (si)]−n+2
= 0
⇒ e−λi(bi−si)[1− F (si)]
n−1 − (−
1
λi
e−λi(bi−si) + r)
n− 1
B′(si)
f(si)
[1− F (si)]−n+2
= 0
⇒
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
e−λ(bi−si) +
1
λ
e−λ(bi−si) − r = 0
⇒ e−λ(bi−si)
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
= r
⇒ e−λ(bi−si) = r
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
−1
⇒ −λ(bi − si) = log(r)− log
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
Therefore, the optimal bidding strategy in the case of the bidder with CARA
utility preferences:
b∗RAi = si −
1
λi
log(r) +
1
λi
log
[
B′(si)
n− 1
[1− F (si)]
f(si)
+
1
λi
]
.
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